Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

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Nazis made the word ‘Jew’ more prominent and negative; Hutu radicals did the same to the concept of ‘Tutsi’. Perpetrators can even invent an identity. Whatever was an ‘Aryan’? We do not understand this totally my thical race today, but for a time it was a very real identity for millions of Europeans, and still is for a few. Now ‘Arab’ supremacists, out of a different historical context again, are defining the Sudanese Africans, increasingly using the term ‘Zurga’ (‘nigger’) and ‘Abid’ (‘slave’). The discrimination and stereoty ping has been around for centuries, but is now used to identify , exclude and destroy an ‘enemy ’. 9 ‘To perpetrators of genocide, identity is important.’ How citizens and governments view national identity is critical to the wellbeing of a nation. It may be argued, then, that the key lesson from this is that w e should not simplify the situation ourselves. It is true that we must guard against stereotypes and generalisation; we must striv e for individual responsibility rather than collective blame. We must promote inclusion, not exclusion. Exclusion is the first step to genocide. Let us not delude ourselves though. These are good principles for nation-building and community cohesion. But if people are being killed or driven out of their lands into a wilderness, we need to understand something of the mentality of the perpetrators and how they define the victim. What matters most in understanding this crisis, is that some people perceive themselves as Arab and superior, and they victimise another group because they identify them as non-Arab or African. In Darfur we have to use the perpetrators’ definition of Africans to identify w ho is under threat. It is true that there is a complex background to this situation. Tribal tensions and civil war play a part. Land ow nership and poverty are factors. But it is not good enough to blame it on ancient tribal wars, not when a Gov ernment is involved. It is not good enough to blame it on a pow er struggle or a civil w ar. That is where the simplification lies. The Aegis Trust was told over and ov er again by refugees in Chad that they w ere v ictims because the Janjaweed said they were African, or slav es (See section 4.2.2). The conflict is driven by racism at both regional and central Section 2: Darfur and the Ideology of Sudan Gov ernment level. Attempts to shroud that will undermine the resolution of thecrisis. 2.4 The significance of exclusionary ideology Ideologues do not necessarily set out to find a w ay to destroy a group of people. They set out on a utopian mission. If a group is in the w ay of that mission, ways may be found to marginalise, exclude and dehumanise it. Such ideas can justify , in the mind of a dominant group, ex treme measures that can be taken against the perceiv ed inferior group. In ex treme situations a racist or exclusionary ideology sets the scene for future genocide. The National Islamic Front sought to create an Islamic state in Sudan – its Civilization Programme has sought to return to 7th-century Islam and create an Islamic paradise. An exclusionary ideology is a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute or eliminate certain categories of people. Episodes of genocide and politicide become more likely when the leaders of regimes articulate an exclusionary ideology. 14 By looking at underlying ideology we can help differentiate a possible cause of organised violence. It is an important factor in a genocidal risk assessment. ‘Exclusionary ideology is the first step to genocide.’ The presence of an exclusionary ideology in a time of crisis can help to differentiate the threat of genocide from other forms of conflict. 2.5 Exclusionary ideology in Darfur 2.5.1 Arab Congressbackground Whilst the notion of African inferiority has been a feature in Sudanese society for centuries, the emergence of an Arab supremacist ideology in Darfur coincides with the efforts of Liby a’s Colonel Gaddafi to create an Arab belt across 14 Harff, B. (2003). “ No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955” , American Political Science Review, Vol 97, No. 1, pp. 57-73.
Africa, and to the mov ement of Arab militias, originally sent from Libya to fight inChad, who fled into Darfur. At this time an Arab supremacist ideology in Darfur emerged, espoused by the Arab Congress, which marginalises and dehumanises Africans. 15 Ev idence suggests that the Arab Congress was covertly active as early as 1980/1. At this time cassette recordings calling the Arabs in Darfur to prepare themselves to take ov er the then regional Gov ernment were w idely distributed. Having classified the citizens of Darfur as either Arabs or ‘Zurga’ Blacks, the speakers told listeners that the Zurga had had enough time ruling Darfur and that it w as time for the Arabs to take power in the region. They also demanded that the name of the region should be changed from Darfur, meaning land of the Fur, to something more suitable. Soon after the distribution of these tapes in 1982, the first massacre of Fur took place in Aw alvillage in Darfur. 16 In 1980 the Nimairi Gov ernment broke with tradition in Darfur by appointing a governor to Darfur w ho w as not nativ e to the region, an Arab from Kordofan. There was considerable public protest, w hich forced the Gov ernment to replace the governorwith Ahmed Diraige, a nativ eFur. 2.5.2 Arab Congressletter to the Prime Minister: 1987 The proponents of this ideology of Arab supremacy openly emerged in October 1987 in a letter sent to the Sudanese Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, attributing to the ‘Arab race’ the ‘creation of civilisation in this region … in the areas of governance, religion and language’. The letter w as distributed widely in Darfur and Khartoum. Its tone w as supremacist and drew upon the stereoty pe popular among Arabs of Africans as being of low cultural status. The salient points of the 1987 letter to the Prime Minister are as follows: 1. The Arabic tribes have been present in Darfur since the 15 th Century. They represent a coherent and well defined group in spite of the fact that they are organized into various tribes. The Arabs represent about 70% of the population of Darfur and about 40% of the educated Darfurians. They are responsible for 90% of Darfur’s gross income and 15% of Sudan’s GDP. The Arabic tribe of Darfur had 14 MPs in the Parliament of Khartoum. 15 The Arab Congress is also referred to as the A rab Gathering, Arabic Gathering, Quraish & Gureish. 16 Ferseldin, A. (2004). “ Devils in Disguise” (unpublished essay). Section 2: Darfur and the Ideology of Sudan 2. For all these reasons, the ‘Arab Gathering’ requested, in their letter to the Prime Minister, to be represented by at least 50% of all constitutional posts in the regional Government of Darfur and a similar percentage in the central Government in Khartoum. The ‘Arab Gathering’ warned against ignoring the predominant Arab tribes. To ignore them would lead to dire consequences for Darfur, the letter concluded. 17 A translation of the full letter can be found in Appendix D. The signatories to this letter w ere leaders of a number of Arab tribes in Darfur who called themselves the Arab Gathering. Their names are listed below: 1. Ahdallah Ali Masar 2. Sharif Ali Hagar 3. Ibrahim Yagoub 4. Hussein Hassan El Bash 5. Hamid Bito 6. Taj Al din Ahmed El Hilo 7. Ayoub Balola 8. Mohamed Khof El Fadi 9. El Nazir El Hadi Eisa Dabka 10. El Tayeb Abu Shama 11. Sindka Dawood 12. Haroun Ali El Sanousi 13. Suliman-Abkr 14. El Nazir Mohamed Yagoub 15. Zakria Ibrahaim 16. Mohamed Zakria Daldoum 17. Dr. Omer Abdelgabar 18. Abdullah Yahya 19. Hamid Mohamed Khir Alla 20. Abdel Rahman Ali 21. Mohamed Shiata Ahmed 22. Abu Bakr Abu Amin 23. Jabir Ahmed 2.5.3 Arab Congressdocuments In November 2003 a group called the Political Committee visited a number of councils in South Darfur. The Political Committee was apparently under the authority of the Coordination Council of the Arab Congress. The members of this committee w ere well known in Darfur. Some of them held important positions in the Government and National Congress. 18 The recommendations resulting from these meetings are listed below. 17 This analysis was taken from a research document sourced from the Darfur Centre for Human Rights and Development, a_ismel@yahoo.co.uk, November 2004. 18 Ferseldin, A. (2004). “ Devils in Disguise” (unpublished essay). 10
Page 1 and 2: Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide Nove
Page 3 and 4: Authors: Dr James M. Smith is Chief
Page 5 and 6: Table of Contents 4.3 Chronology of
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary
Page 9 and 10: The Aegis Trust recommends that: Ex
Page 11 and 12: (k) Other inhumane acts of a simila
Page 13 and 14: While the point about not devaluing
Page 15 and 16: SECTION 2 Darfur and the Ideology o
Page 17: Humanitarian aid was denied. Govern
Page 21 and 22: ev idently faced exclusionary ideol
Page 23 and 24: tension between the tw o communitie
Page 25 and 26: Section 3: Systematic Actions Amoun
Page 27 and 28: The United Nations Inter-Agency Fac
Page 29 and 30: UK Waiting for the International Co
Page 31 and 32: 4.1.4 Civil war and rebels The rebe
Page 33 and 34: Security of African civ ilians in D
Page 35 and 36: 4.4 British policy Main pointsof Br
Page 37 and 38: SECTION 5 Ending Impunity 80 Justic
Page 39 and 40: cooperation of the GoS.” 88 In ot
Page 41 and 42: CONCLUSION Insecurity for those und
Page 43 and 44: Appendix A Article IX: Disputes bet
Page 45 and 46: Appendix B Appendix B: Definitions
Page 47 and 48: Appendix D Appendix D: October 1987
Page 49 and 50: B - Jebel Mara District Number Name
Page 51 and 52: Zaling District Number Name of Vill
Page 53 and 54: Appendix F Appendix F: Chronologica
Page 55 and 56: Appendix F 65 10/4/2001 Kabkabiya S
Page 57 and 58: Appendix F 147 4/3/2002 Jaddara Kab
Page 59 and 60: Appendix G New Information: UN Inte
Page 61 and 62: US: Seeks to put Sudan on the UN SC
Page 63 and 64: Appendix G billion and ev en has it
Page 65 and 66: Security & Political Dialogue: Augu
Page 67 and 68: Appendix G International Response (
Page 69 and 70:
Appendix G United States: Focus on
Page 71 and 72:
Appendix I: List of Janjaweed Camps
Page 73 and 74:
RAZALLAH JAWAZAT Location: east of
Page 75 and 76:
Appendix K: Orders Issued by the Ar
Page 77 and 78:
Appendix L movement that started in
Page 79 and 80:
Appendix L Would the secular, secta
Page 81 and 82:
Appendix M 7. Stress importance of
Page 83 and 84:
Appendix O: Recommendations followi
Page 85:
Appendix O After oath taking brothe
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