Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

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SECTION 4 Security 4.1 Securing populations at risk as a priority 4.1.1 Humanitarian aid and political settlement are necessary, but not sufficient in a genocidal situation. The label of ‘genocidal conflict’ or ‘threat of genocide’ is an important one: it infers great threat to civilians. In the management of such a situation, security must be as much a priority as providing humanitarian aid and achieving political settlement. This is the key difference in the management of a conflict where the risk of genocide is minimal. Although the killing unfolded more slowly in Western Sudan than in Rwanda ten y ears previously, the principle remains the same: in a genocidal situation, compromising security in fav our of peace talks may cost liv es. 4.1.2 Responsibility to protect In 2001 the International Commission for Interv ention and State Sov ereignty reached its conclusions about the world’s responsibility to protect. When sovereignstates are unw illing or unable to protect their ow n citizens, the responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. 65 Yet during the crisis in Darfur there has been a distinct lack of attention to security for those at risk. Either the GoS has actively supported the Janjaweed or it has lost control of them. Whichever scenario is true, externally implemented security measures are needed. It w ould be unfair to suggest that security has not been considered at all. It is astounding, however, that so much confidencewas placed in the GoS to provide protection for the vulnerable, for tw o reasons: First, there is v ast ev idence that the Gov ernment is complicit in the organisation and funding of the killing. Had 65 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). “ The Responsibility to Protect; Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” , http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf [Accessed 1 November 2004]. 21 the exclusionary ideology driving the crisis been recognised and its implications understood, capitulation to Sudan’s wishes – that it be allowed to address the security issue internally – could not have been justified. Asking them to ‘rein in the Janjaweed’ was a lame excuse for the rest of the world not to do any thing else substantial. Second, the ‘Peace Villages’ run by the Government in Kordofan during the so-called forced resettlement in 1992 were brought into total disrepute – they were more akin to concentration camps or ghettos. 66 So when, in August, Jan Pronk agreed a plan with the GoS to provide 18 safe areas for internally displaced refugees, it w as more than surprising. While these w ere different from previous safe areas, and it would have been hoped that AU observers would at least have access to them, they were to be guarded by Sudanese police. It w as not long before journalists were reporting how Janjaweed militiamen became policemen, guarding the people they had ravaged and displaced from their homes. 4.1.3 Who is in control? Some argue that the GoS is not fully in control of policy in Darfur. In a failing state this would be understandable. A clique of around 40 people in the security establishment is thought to be dominating the agenda in Darfur. 67 Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the Vice President, is the leading figure so the clique is in a position of strength within the Gov ernment. It still does not make sense, though, to ask the GoS to ‘rein in the Janjaweed’, as the so-called clique is in all likelihood coordinating the air strikes and security on the ground anyway. While we continue to deal with the Government in Khartoum, we should not be surprised that the situation is grow ing worse. When Bosnian Muslims were being killed by Bosnian Serbs, the UK’s FCO wanted the Serb Gov ernment in Belgrade to bring the rogue Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, under control. They believed that a strong Milosev ic was the answer to Bosnia’s problems – they did not want to undermine his Gov ernment for fear of creating anarchy. But Yugoslavia was already a failing state, descending into bloodshed and fiasco, as Karadzic organised mass murder. Milosevic did not rein in Karadzic. Khartoum will not rein in the Janjaweed. 66 See section 2.2. 67 Justice Africa (2004). “ Prospects for Peace in Sudan, Briefing” June - July 2004, http://www.justiceafrica.org/June_July04.htm [Accessed 23 October 2004].
4.1.4 Civil war and rebels The rebels appear to have been the only actors in the conflict aw are of the imperative of civilian security . MPs within Darfur were calling for foreign intervention in December 2003; rebels requested higher numbers of monitors from the outset of the Ceasefire Commission and in July rebels called for foreign military intervention. It has been slow in coming and is still insufficient. Consequently, during October and early November peace talks were deadlocked ov er the security issue. Although the SLA and JEM signed Humanitarian and Security Protocols w ith the GoS on 9 November follow ing talks in Abuja, this provides minimal cause for optimism; Sudanese security forces display ed contempt for the agreement by conducting a raid on IDPs at the El-Geercamp the following day. If there are no plans to protect the vulnerable, it is not sensible to stop the victim group from defending itself in a genocidal situation. If security is not provided, ceasefires may decrease, not increase security for the vulnerable. This is the key difference from a conflict w here genocide is a low risk. In Rwanda in 1994, it w as the then rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, that stopped the genocide. Not the UN peacekeepers, not the Arusha peace deal. That lesson should also have been learned from Bosnia. An arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in 1991 left the poorly armed Bosnian Muslims unable to obtain arms to defend themselv es against the well armed Serb forces. Under Resolution 819 (1993), which created the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) troops disarmed all Muslims within the safe area. This was the condition laid down by the Serbs for ceasing attacks on the area. It w as also UN action that left the Bosnians vulnerable to the subsequent occurrence of genocide in Srebrenica inJuly 1995. We are repeating thesemistakes in Darfur. 4.2 International response to security Sending Western troops to Sudan w ould have been inappropriate under the best of circumstances. After the inv asion of Iraq howev er, it became politically inconceivable for Western nations to consider entering the sovereign territory of another Muslim state. Ironically, while the recent w ar in Iraq remains difficult to shoe-horn into legality, there is little question that international law would allow member states to interv ene to protect human ‘In a genocidal situation… ceasefires may decrease, not increase security for the vulnerable.’ Section 4: Security life under threat of genocide in Western Sudan. Political nerv ousness about where an intervention may lead, and strong opposition from Arab states and China, contributed to the issue of security being av oided as much as possible. As a result, v iable alternatives to providing protectionwere not considered carefully or early enough. Yet the need for security to be a top priority was clear and was confirmed in a report by the UN Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment Fact Finding Mission in April 2004. It reported instances where starv ing IDPs were asking not to be given humanitarian assistance, fearing that receipt of humanitarian aid would make them targets of the Janjaweed in and around the IDP camps. Yet it was not until July that the need for an international security presence was recognised in a UN resolution. Instead, the UN and member states hid behind the humanitarian aid effort, which w as also needed to save liv es. For ex ample, in the UK the Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, was the main Government spokesman on the issue. He undertook his aid role with great generosity, but deftly avoided questions about security or the political process. The Foreign Secretary and his ministers kept a low profile behind Hilary Benn and barely uttered a word until July 2004. The joint FCO-DfID Sudan Unit knew that security was needed in Darfur, as well as food, but they equally understood that leading the rest of the reluctant Security Council members to such a position was a steep, uphill task, especially as the Iraq problems diminished any moral high ground held by theUK andUS. 4.2.1 The AU force A tiny ex ternal military presence was finally established in Western Sudan, after months of killing, rape and dev astation. 154 Rwandan troops arrived on 14 August and 153 Nigerian troops on 30 August – to protect AU observers. The need to protect citizens was understood more in the African Union than it was among the wealthy member states. Reflecting on the experience in his own country, President Kagame of Rwanda said that whatever mandate was given, his soldiers would not stand and watch civilians being killed. On the 27 th July the AU Peace and Security Council passed a resolution which called for a proposal to be made for transforming the observer protection force into a fully fledged peacekeeping mission, with the requisite 22
Page 1 and 2: Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide Nove
Page 3 and 4: Authors: Dr James M. Smith is Chief
Page 5 and 6: Table of Contents 4.3 Chronology of
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary
Page 9 and 10: The Aegis Trust recommends that: Ex
Page 11 and 12: (k) Other inhumane acts of a simila
Page 13 and 14: While the point about not devaluing
Page 15 and 16: SECTION 2 Darfur and the Ideology o
Page 17 and 18: Humanitarian aid was denied. Govern
Page 19 and 20: Africa, and to the mov ement of Ara
Page 21 and 22: ev idently faced exclusionary ideol
Page 23 and 24: tension between the tw o communitie
Page 25 and 26: Section 3: Systematic Actions Amoun
Page 27 and 28: The United Nations Inter-Agency Fac
Page 29: UK Waiting for the International Co
Page 33 and 34: Security of African civ ilians in D
Page 35 and 36: 4.4 British policy Main pointsof Br
Page 37 and 38: SECTION 5 Ending Impunity 80 Justic
Page 39 and 40: cooperation of the GoS.” 88 In ot
Page 41 and 42: CONCLUSION Insecurity for those und
Page 43 and 44: Appendix A Article IX: Disputes bet
Page 45 and 46: Appendix B Appendix B: Definitions
Page 47 and 48: Appendix D Appendix D: October 1987
Page 49 and 50: B - Jebel Mara District Number Name
Page 51 and 52: Zaling District Number Name of Vill
Page 53 and 54: Appendix F Appendix F: Chronologica
Page 55 and 56: Appendix F 65 10/4/2001 Kabkabiya S
Page 57 and 58: Appendix F 147 4/3/2002 Jaddara Kab
Page 59 and 60: Appendix G New Information: UN Inte
Page 61 and 62: US: Seeks to put Sudan on the UN SC
Page 63 and 64: Appendix G billion and ev en has it
Page 65 and 66: Security & Political Dialogue: Augu
Page 67 and 68: Appendix G International Response (
Page 69 and 70: Appendix G United States: Focus on
Page 71 and 72: Appendix I: List of Janjaweed Camps
Page 73 and 74: RAZALLAH JAWAZAT Location: east of
Page 75 and 76: Appendix K: Orders Issued by the Ar
Page 77 and 78: Appendix L movement that started in
Page 79 and 80: Appendix L Would the secular, secta
Page 81 and 82:
Appendix M 7. Stress importance of
Page 83 and 84:
Appendix O: Recommendations followi
Page 85:
Appendix O After oath taking brothe
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