Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

Security of African civ ilians in Darfur has been an issue
since 2000 (See Appendices E and F). International
attention only turned to the region in September 2003
follow ing six months of armed resistance to the GoS. But it
was only in June 2004 that the security of civilians became
an issue on the international community ’s agenda. As of
November 2004, the practical measures taken to increase
security remain wholly inadequate.
In early 2004, those members of the international
community engagingwith the GoS over Darfur employed a
tactic of quiet diplomacy, fearing that any thing more would
jeopardise the impending North/South peace deal.
Although by February the first reports were being
published giving the background to the crisis and ev idence
of the ongoing and w idespread atrocities, 72 the crisis was
cast and managed as humanitarian in nature. 73 A ceasefire
was being pursued by the international community,
primarily with the aim of securing humanitarian access.
The security of civilians remained low on the priority list
shaping policy. Perhaps there was an assumption that a
ceasefire would provide security . That is not necessarily
the case in a genocidal situation.
Following the signing of the ceasefire in Ndjamena on 8
April, its maintenance and the attainment of a political
settlement became the major concern.
Deployment of observers to monitor the ceasefire between
the GoS, SLA and JEM was seen as key. Whilst the
monitoring of the ceasefire was vital, on its own this w as
not a measure that w ould provide security for the
threatened population. This was a ty pical response to a
conflict situation. But this was not just a conflict situation.
In IDP camps such as Kailek, a policy of forced starvation
was being implemented against civilians. These measures
would do nothing to help them. Quiet diplomacy and
emphasis on the humanitarian crisis continued despite
reports that in camps such as Kailek, security was so bad
that starv ing IDPs refused humanitarian aid for fear it
would single them out forJanjaweed attack. 74
Following publication of the United Nations High
Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) report at the
beginning of May, the language used by the international
community to describe the situation began to change,
indicating that the grav ity of the situation in Darfur w as
72 Amnesty International (2004) Too Many People Killed for no
Reason, Report no. AFR 54/008/2004.
73 Slim, H. (2004). “ Dithering Over Darfur” , International Affairs, Vol
80, No 5, 811-833.
74 UN Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission
(April 2004), Kailek Town; South Darfur.
Section 4: Security
beginning to register with policy makers. 75 How ever, the
lack of attention in the Security Council betrayed a lack of
urgency on the part of the international community, despite
USAID w arnings that 350,000 might die unless decisive
action were taken. 76 Despite increasing reports of
Janjaweed being incorporated into the GoS’s Popular
Defence Force to ‘provide security in Darfur’, many EU
countries were calling for Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed.
No enforcement actions were being taken, nor appeared
likely to be taken in the near future. The international
community was continuing to rely upon the good faith of
the GoS, of which therewas little evidence.
By June, Darfur had become a major international concern
and civilian security was beginning to be recognised as a
key issue. The diplomatic pressure exerted by the
international community increased, with a number of highlev
el diplomatic visits to Sudan. Serious consideration was
giv en to taking enforcement action to pursuade the GoS to
comply with its ceasefire agreements, with consideration of
sanctions and no-fly zones.
Diplomatic pressure reached a peak at the beginning of
July, with the visits of the UN Secretary General, Kofi
Annan and US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Both
pressed the GoS for the disarmament of the Janjaweed.
Annan obtained promises from the GoS that it would
deploy more troops to stop militia violence. However,
knowledge of previous complicity of Sudanese security
forces in attacks and the bad faith demonstrated by the
GoS up till now meant that this promise should not have
raised any hopes. Indeed, further troops in the region was
more acause for alarm.
The US continued to force the issue into July. Following a
month of disagreement ov er the measures that should be
taken against Sudan, a UN resolution was passed. Whilst
welcome, the 30 days’ grace given by UN Resolution 1556
before sanctions would be imposed was generous to the
GoS, considering it had spent the last three months
violating the agreements it had made in the April ceasefire
agreement, and reports from the new AU monitors
confirmed that atrocities were continuing. Although there
was w ill for stronger action among some members of the
Security Council, most notably the United States, strong
UN action was opposed, in particular by China, which has
inv estments in Sudan’s oil industry worth $15 billion. Arab
League opposition w as also significant, especially at a
time when Western actions against Sudan could easily be
75 Statements made by the UN and the US calling the situation in
Darfur genocide. Sweden warns that Darfur faces possible genocide.
76 UN Wire (2004) “ Sidelining of Factions Could Threaten Sudan
Peace Ex perts Warn” ,
http://www.unwire.org/News/328_426_24350.asp [Accessed 16
November 2004].
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