Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

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viii Executive Summary Insecurity for those under threat of genocide and impunity for international crimes is a combination that allows gov ernments to get away with murder. When a conflict is recognised as genocidal in nature, addressing this duo must become central to the management of the crisis. Both have been insufficiently prioritised in managing the crisis in Darfur; this has impeded efforts to prevent genocide. The British Government has been careful not to blame the GoS. But if there is broad consensus that the GoS bears responsibility for mass murder, why is there not an unequivocal message that the perpetrators w ill be brought to account? Granted it is not helpful or practical to indict the Government. But the senior figures involved directly in the atrocities in Darfur should be brought to account. Asking the GoS to ‘rein in’ those responsible must have given the Janjaweed perpetrators great comfort. Because the world does not hav e the moral strength to end impunity or protect the v ulnerable, we have to rely on probable sponsors of genocide to provide security . Now that the mandate of 3000 African Union (AU) soldiers in Darfur has been slightly ex tended, wealthy nations should support an increase in the number of AU troops to around ten times the current number, in line with the recommendations of Gen. Romeo Dallaire. A no-fly zone is now really too late, nonetheless should be imposed and monitored. The UN and member states hid behind the humanitarian aid effort. The need to protect citizens in Darfur was understood more in the African Union than it was among the wealthy member states, including the UK. However the AU mission languished in an under-resourced state, atrocities continued and even the recently expanded force is still a sub-optimal arrangement to avert the threat of ‘genocide by attrition’. Political settlementwill always be harder to achieve if security for those under threat is not prov ided concurrently. In a climate of fear it has been predictably hard to keep the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement around the negotiating table. Justice is often perceived as a post-conflict issue. Impunity, though, in a genocidal situation is a brother to insecurity; both tell the perpetrator that there is insufficient resolve or political w ill to stop genocide. Allowing impunity for past atrocities in the South of Sudan and in the NubaMountains has contributed to the crisis in Darfur. Documentation is the first step in bringing about accountability . But a library of reports will not end impunity if there is no resolve for it to lead somewhere. International inquiries have in the past led to the formation of ad hoc tribunals. The US refusal to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) is not helpful in ending impunity in Darfur and the Security Council should have referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC once the systematic nature of the atrocities w as known. Once the International Commission of Inquiry has finished, member states should be encouraged not to veto or abstain regarding an ICC referral. While we are focussed on the crisis, we need to be mindful that long term, the problems of Sudan lie in the neglect, underdevelopment and inequality in the regions that allow the racism and hostility to be fostered. Sudan will never be at rest until these are addressed together and aggressively. Aegis Trust v iews a federal Sudan as a helpful, stable way forward but that is for the Sudanese to determine. Whatever route they take, justice and equality will be a good foundation for the future. Upholding international law at an early stage in this genocidal process by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC could have deterred the perpetrators. So far, the perpetrators are not trembling in fear of justice. Despite the 1948 Convention (Appendix A) and the signing of the Stockholm Declaration inJanuary 2004 (Appendix C), and despite many great efforts by governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in respect of the humanitariancrisis in Darfur, the genocidal crisis remains ex tremely difficult tocontain or mitigate without a massive shift in politicalw ill. Leo Kuper’s contention continues to bear truth: that gov ernments still hav e the ‘sovereign right to commit genocide’.
The Aegis Trust recommends that: Executive Summary • Security for civilians subject to genocidal acts in Darfur be prioritised through: o a ten-fold ex pansion of the AU force and a strengthening of its mandate to include disarmament of the Janjaw eed militia, or at least superv ision of disarmament by the Gov ernment of Sudan. o A no-fly zone to imposed immediately by the UN, to be enforced by the AU with finance and resources from w ealthy UN member states. • Serious efforts shall be made to address impunity: o Preferably the UN Security Council should refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC. o If referral to the ICC prov es impossible due to political opposition, av iable alternativ e should be put forw ard to end the impunity of perpetrators of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. • Long term underly ing causes of the crisis must be addressed: o Long term, a comprehensive plan should be agreed to reverse the underly ing causes of the crisis, namely the inequality and marginalisation within Darfur. A significant dev elopment package is required that benefits all groups equally. o Political empow erment through a federal system in Sudan may prevent a mov ement tow ards autonomy in the West whichw ould lead to greater conflict and the fragmentation of Sudan in the future. ix
Page 1 and 2: Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide Nove
Page 3 and 4: Authors: Dr James M. Smith is Chief
Page 5 and 6: Table of Contents 4.3 Chronology of
Page 7: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary
Page 11 and 12: (k) Other inhumane acts of a simila
Page 13 and 14: While the point about not devaluing
Page 15 and 16: SECTION 2 Darfur and the Ideology o
Page 17 and 18: Humanitarian aid was denied. Govern
Page 19 and 20: Africa, and to the mov ement of Ara
Page 21 and 22: ev idently faced exclusionary ideol
Page 23 and 24: tension between the tw o communitie
Page 25 and 26: Section 3: Systematic Actions Amoun
Page 27 and 28: The United Nations Inter-Agency Fac
Page 29 and 30: UK Waiting for the International Co
Page 31 and 32: 4.1.4 Civil war and rebels The rebe
Page 33 and 34: Security of African civ ilians in D
Page 35 and 36: 4.4 British policy Main pointsof Br
Page 37 and 38: SECTION 5 Ending Impunity 80 Justic
Page 39 and 40: cooperation of the GoS.” 88 In ot
Page 41 and 42: CONCLUSION Insecurity for those und
Page 43 and 44: Appendix A Article IX: Disputes bet
Page 45 and 46: Appendix B Appendix B: Definitions
Page 47 and 48: Appendix D Appendix D: October 1987
Page 49 and 50: B - Jebel Mara District Number Name
Page 51 and 52: Zaling District Number Name of Vill
Page 53 and 54: Appendix F Appendix F: Chronologica
Page 55 and 56: Appendix F 65 10/4/2001 Kabkabiya S
Page 57 and 58: Appendix F 147 4/3/2002 Jaddara Kab
Page 59 and 60:
Appendix G New Information: UN Inte
Page 61 and 62:
US: Seeks to put Sudan on the UN SC
Page 63 and 64:
Appendix G billion and ev en has it
Page 65 and 66:
Security & Political Dialogue: Augu
Page 67 and 68:
Appendix G International Response (
Page 69 and 70:
Appendix G United States: Focus on
Page 71 and 72:
Appendix I: List of Janjaweed Camps
Page 73 and 74:
RAZALLAH JAWAZAT Location: east of
Page 75 and 76:
Appendix K: Orders Issued by the Ar
Page 77 and 78:
Appendix L movement that started in
Page 79 and 80:
Appendix L Would the secular, secta
Page 81 and 82:
Appendix M 7. Stress importance of
Page 83 and 84:
Appendix O: Recommendations followi
Page 85:
Appendix O After oath taking brothe
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Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

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