Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

SECTION 5
Ending Impunity 80
Justice is often perceiv ed as a post-conflict issue.
Impunity, though, in a genocidal situation is a brother to
insecurity; both tell the perpetrator that there is insufficient
resolve or politicalwill to stop genocide.
Indeed, Darfur is just one more instance in Sudan’s circle
of v iolence and impunity. Perpetrators of previous
atrocities in the Nuba mountains in 1992 and in the
Western Upper Nile oil fields in the late 1990s have not
been brought to justice and some of the leading figures
who directed these events are now directing policy on
Darfur. 81
5.1 Who is in control?
Hav ing returning from Darfur at the beginning of June
2004, the UK Secretary of State for International
Dev elopment, Hilary Benn said, "There is no doubt that the
GoS bears the primary responsibility.” 82 He also said in
answer to questions in Parliament that, “those who have
committed these atrocities should be called to account for
what they have done.” 83
Mr Benn’s gut reaction and passion
for action against the GoS clearly
was not shared by everyone in Her
Majesty ’s Government. Since June
of 2004, the FCO has been careful to
place blame for the atrocities on the
Janjaweed militia, not the GoS.
Neither has any UN resolution stated the responsibility of
the GoS for the atrocities.
Some, arguing in favour of Khartoum, conclude that the
ev ents in Darfur are out of the control of the GoS – ev en
though the crimes areso highly organized and systematic.
80 This chapter is an adaptation of an article published in the Aegis
Review on Genocide (Summer/Autumn 2004).
81 Justice Africa,“Briefing June-July 2004” ,
http://www.justiceafrica.org/July04.htm [Accessed 23 October 2004].
82 Briefing at the House of Commons, 18 June 2004, at which Aegis
was present.
83 Answer to a question in Parliament from Rev. Martin Smyth MP
(UUP), Hansard, 9 June 2004, Column 283.
‘Impunity…in a
genocidal situation
is brother to
insecurity.’
In a failed state, it is possible that order is lost at a v ery
high level – at such a high level that individuals have
enough power to control certain events or territories.
How ever, this is not a reason to allow impunity. On the
contrary, control is lost, in part, because people do not fear
accountability . In such a case, impunity contributes to the
anarchy of a failed state, which allows crimes against
humanity and genocidal acts to occur.
How ever, in most countries, the use of the air force to
support crimes against humanity would indicate
Gov ernment culpability. The intervention of the Vice
President, Ali Osman Taha, in the release of Janjaweed
leader Musa Hilal to lead the Janjaweed points to
Gov ernment culpability at the highest level. Musa Hilal had
prev iously been imprisoned for mass killings. 84
So, whether it is genocide organized by central
Gov ernment or powerful individuals w ithin the governing
structure in Khartoum, a referral to the ICC would help to
bring future stability. The prosecutor’s office of the ICC
would not be interested in accusing or indicting the GoS. It
is interested in the individuals responsible for these crimes
– whether they represent the Government or not.
5.2 Countering the genocidal threat
with judicial process
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said on 7 September “We
want an end to that climate of impunity and we therefore
support proper international investigation of all the
ev idence about w hat international
crimes have been committed…and
by whom.” 85
Already, report after report from
within the UN, the US State
department and numerous human
rights groups found the GoS culpable
for these crimes. These led US
Secretary of State Colin Powell to re-state on 9 September
2004, “We concluded that genocide has beencommitted in
Darfur and that the GoS and the Jingaw eit bear
responsibility – and genocide may still be occurring." 86
Documentation is the first step in bringing about
accountability . The efforts of the US State Department,
84 Wax , E. (2004). “ Janjaweed Leaders Describe Campaign against
Africans as Self-Defence” , Washington Post, 18 July 2004.
85 Hansard, 7 September 2004, Column 619.
86 United States State Department (2004), “ The Crisis in Darfur” ,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/36042.htm [Accessed 16
November].
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