A decade later - Fundação Luso-Americana

a document disclosure policy that gives
you access to a huge number of primary
sources. Basically, the book starts with
Portugal’s April 25 th , 1974 Revolution and
ends – as far as material about Angola is
concerned – in February/March of 1976,
when the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (Portuguese acronym
MPLA) won the first stage of the Angolan
conflict.
[MR] Why did the Cold War spread to the periphery
of the international system – specifically
Angola – during the period of Détente?
[TMS] The Cold War had already spread
to the periphery way before. Here we
have it spreading to Southern Africa. In
the case of Africa, in the first stages, the
Cold War spread to the Congo during
the Congolese civil war from 1960 to
65, where the US came out victorious.
Then, at the end of 1974, it spread to
Southern Africa- Angola, which begs the
question: why at a time of bi-polar
Détente? The reason was twofold. In the
case of the United States, it has to do
with what I call in the book the “inverted
Vietnam” effect, meaning that the US
intervened in Angola not because Angola
per se held such great geopolitical interest
for the US, but because the Ford
administration – particularly Henry
Kissinger, secretary of state at the time
– came to the conclusion that after losing
in Vietnam they had to beat the
Soviets in what they considered to be
the periphery of the international system
to show the world that though they
lost in Vietnam, they still had the
strength and the will to beat the Soviets
in the so-called Third World.
[MR] The US decided not to intervene in Angola
for a long time. At your book launching,
poLicy
‘ Zaire was the us’s main informant with regard
to Angola. in other words, the vision the us
had of the Angolan conflict was, to a great degree,
the vision mobutu transmitted.
’
Ambassador António Monteiro stated that, to
some extent, Mobutu had “conducted American
policy.”
[TMS] For a long time the US in fact did
not intervene in Angola. What we have
is four phases in American policy. The
first is a phase of virtual indifference,
until January of 1975. It’s almost as if
Angola didn’t even exist for Secretary of
State Kissinger. Then in August of 1975
the US started receiving intelligence that
the Soviets were supporting the MPLA
with weapons and money; and then there
was the pressure from Zaire – Mobutu
– regarding the issue. In the third phase
the US finally adopted an offensive strategy.
This phase started in July of 1975
with the approval for a covert program
for Angola called Operation IA Feature,
in which the US gave massive support to
the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (Portuguese acronym FNLA) and
the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA). Finally
there was the last phase, which in real
terms started in November of 1975,
which was the American defeat. The role
of Zaire was extremely important. Zaire
had a tremendous influence on America’s
Angola policy, not because Mobutu spearheaded
America’s policy in Angola, but
because Zaire was the US’s main informant
with regard to Angola. In other
words, the vision the US had of the
Angolan conflict was, to a great degree,
the vision Mobutu transmitted. Secondly,
since the US publicly wanted to avoid the
appearance of being involved in Angola
– and that’s why it was a covert program
– what they did was channel the program
through Zaire. The money went through
Zaire, the weapons that were earmarked
went via Zaire, all with the concern of
making it look as if the arms were Zairese
and not American.
[MR] Operation IA Feature marked a turnabout
in America’s Angola policy. What exactly did it
involve?
[TMS] Essentially it involved three types
of measures: first, financial support of 32
million dollars for the FNLA and UNITA.
Some say the amount was even greater.
Second, weapons concessions to the FNLA
and UNITA via Zaire – a large amount of
heavy weaponry. The third measure
involved the recruitment of mercenaries
from Portugal, the UK, France, and a few
African countries. Plus, despite the instructions
that the US government gave the CIA,
which had the responsibility of running
the covert program, – that there weren’t
Parallel no. 6 | FALL | WINTER 2011 41