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Comprehensive Report

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Evolution of the Chemical<br />

Warfare Program<br />

Over a period of twenty years, beginning with a<br />

laboratory operated by the intelligence services,<br />

Iraq was able to begin and successfully undertake<br />

an offensive CW program which helped ensure<br />

the Regime’s internal and external security. By<br />

1984, Iraq was operating a number of CW agent<br />

production plants, producing hundreds of tons<br />

of a range of weaponized agents annually, for<br />

use against external and internal enemies of the<br />

Regime. The program was supported by a complex<br />

web of international procurement, R&D, weaponization<br />

and indigenous precursor production<br />

efforts. Iraq fired or dropped over 100,000 chemical<br />

munitions against Iranian forces and its own<br />

Kurdish population during the Iran-Iraq war and<br />

then later to help put down the Shi’a rebellion in<br />

March 1991.<br />

• Iraq became the first nation to use a nerve agent on<br />

the battlefield when it used Tabun munitions against<br />

Iran in 1984.<br />

• During the Iran-Iraq war, CW use helped the Iraqis<br />

turn back Iranian human-wave attacks when all<br />

other methods failed, buying time for Iraqi forces to<br />

regroup and replenish. Iraq again used CW successfully<br />

to help crush the popular revolt in 1991.<br />

• By 1991, Iraq had amassed a sizable CW arsenal,<br />

comprising thousands of short range rockets,<br />

artillery shells, and bombs, and hundreds of tons<br />

of bulk agent. It also had produced 50 nerve agent<br />

warheads for the 650 km-range al Husayn missile.<br />

• Despite the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution<br />

(UNSCR) 687 in April 1991, which called<br />

for Iraq to disarm, Iraq initially chose to retain CW<br />

weapons, precursors and associated equipment,<br />

making false declarations to the UN. Even when<br />

Iraq claimed to have complied with UNSCR 687<br />

and its successors, Saddam retained components<br />

vital to restarting a CW program.<br />

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline<br />

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy<br />

choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy<br />

and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separate<br />

foldout and in tabular form at the back of Volume I.<br />

Covering the period from 1980-2003, the timeline<br />

shows specifi c events bearing on the Regime’s efforts<br />

in the BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms<br />

and their chronological relationship with political<br />

and military developments that had direct bearing on<br />

the Regime’s policy choices.<br />

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion<br />

of each volume of text, we have also included foldout<br />

summary charts that relate infl ection points—critical<br />

turning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—<br />

to particular events/initiatives/decisions the Regime<br />

took with respect to specific WMD programs. Inflection<br />

points are marked in the margins of the body of<br />

the text with a gray triangle.<br />

The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start<br />

The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan<br />

Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation<br />

Iraq’s interest in CW began in the early 1960s and<br />

escalated in response to a perceived threat from Iran<br />

and Israel to become a comprehensive CW research<br />

program by the mid-1970s. The Regime initially<br />

sent a number of Iraqi officers abroad for training<br />

in nuclear, biological and chemical defense. These<br />

officers later formed the nucleus of the Iraqi Chemical<br />

Corps, established in 1964.<br />

• According to Iraq’s Currently Accurate Full and<br />

Complete Declaration (CAFCD), submitted to<br />

the UN in December 2002, in 1971, a cadre of<br />

Chemical Corps officers sought authorization to<br />

synthesize small quantities of CW agents (mustard,<br />

Tabun, and CS) for familiarization and experience.<br />

The Iraqi General Staff approved the request, and<br />

laboratories were built for the Chemical Corps at<br />

al-Rashad near Baghdad.<br />

Chemical<br />

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