Comprehensive Report

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Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF ISG judges that a break-out production capability existed at one site, the State Company for Drug Industries and Medical Appliances, SDI, at Samarra. Since Iraq could relocate production assets such as fermentors, other sites with basic utilities could also be converted for break-out. A full program to include R&D and production or even just large scale production would require months rather than weeks to re-initiate in a break-out context. A break-out of large-scale proportion would require all three key production elements; fermentor capacity, media capacity, and technical expertise. A break-out capability must also take into consideration the scale and scope of the program being considered. Modest or small-scale break-outs would be easier and require less time after a decision to do so was made. For a larger scale and scope such as Iraq possessed in 1990 would require more equipment, larger supply source, more personnel and a longer time period for effective start-up. Iraq, having had achieved a maturing program, had a core group of experienced personnel; a better start than existed in 1985. Personnel are movable assets as is growth media. While sanctions and inspections may be a hindrance to an ample supply of media, it would not have been a show stopper. Iraq developed a milk and corn byproduct media that is judged to be adequate for the production of anthrax spores, albeit of a reduced production efficiency. Thus, the equipment for the scale and scope of a program becomes the critical factor to evaluate a breakout capability. ISG assesses the SDI to have the fixed equipment that could be altered for producing certian BW agents within four to five weeks after the decision to do so, including utilities and equipment, not all of which had been declared to the UN. However, such conversion would not be trivial (see Figure 10). ISG judges the movable assets at the Al Dawrah FMDV Plant could provide the core of an alternative break-out capability at any other suitable site in Iraq, perhaps within 2 to 3 weeks after the decision to do so. The 1 cubic meter tanks or fermentors presently unaccounted for are other important assets that, if indeed still exist, could, when combined with the Al Dawrah FMDV assets, exceed the capacity Iraq possessed in 1990. In this case media and personnel are also movable assets. • Iraq had shown the ability to move fermentor assets pre-1990 era. Iraq had also shown its ability to utilize small cadres of skilled personnel to lead clusters of less skilled personnel in the production process. • Iraq gained additional production and development know-how during the post-1991 era. • Iraq has developed the capacity to produce indigenously, substitute media for the production of some agents, such as corn and milk byproduct media for anthrax spores. ISG judges that Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) would likely be the agent of choice for breakout production. • It represented the single strategic BW agent that Iraq had in its historical arsenal. • Iraq has a previous track record in large-scale growth, processing, testing and weaponization of anthrax spores. • Corn byproduct medium, indigenously manufactured for Bt production, would also be suitable for the growth of B. anthracis. Mobile Assets Prior to OIF, a key source reported that Iraq had developed a mobile BW capability designed to evade UN inspectors and to provide Baghdad the ability to produce BW agents for offensive purposes (see Figure 11). According to the US Intelligence Community, this reporting was augmented by reports from at least three additional sources who indicated a mobile BW or fermentation capability existed in Iraq. The reported development of a mobile BW agent production capability was a central element in the pre-war assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs and, as a result, has been one of the key issues addressed by ISG. 42
Two 1,000-liter, stirred, jacketed vessels suitable for use as fermentors for the growth of bacterial BW agents. Autoclave with control panel. Production hall with tiered vessels of Soviet origin not declared to the UN. Plate fi lter press. Biological High grade water production plant. Figure 10. Examples of equipment found at SDI that could be diverted to BW purposes. 43
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Comprehensive Report of the Special
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Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program B
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Contents Key Findings..............
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Key Findings Saddam never abandoned
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• Uday—head of the Fedayeen Sad
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Evolution of the Chemical Warfare P
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Chemical Figure 1. CW facilities as
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• Iraq also declared that by 1989
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in April 1991, the UN adopted Secur
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Reports of an unexplained discovery
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• With the exception of one insta
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In subsequent years, and in part tr
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• ISG has been unable to establis
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Iraq’s Declared Work With VX Nerv
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Infrastructure—Production Capabil
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imported anhydrous chlorine gas fro
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• Less corrosion resistant equipm
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Weaponization Iraq’s capability t
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Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Tap
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VX Weaponization Iraq had not adequ
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• ISG investigation of eight ASPs
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• The amount of inspections ISG w
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An Najaf Depot Az Zubayr Depot Taji
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Depot Name Pre-OIF “Indicators”
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Annex A IIS Undeclared Research on
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• A former Iraqi intelligence off
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The absence of laboratory equipment
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• The April 2003 exploitation tea
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• The IIS M16 laboratory located
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Site exploitations have verified th
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Iraqi Regime Use of Poisons and Tox
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Figure 20. Various buried chemicals
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Figure 22. Tank of triethylamine re
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Annex B Al Muthanna Chemical Weapon
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life, and the precursor compound cy
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Table 1. Project 922, declared prod
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Figure 2. Al Muthanna R&D/Laborator
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Figure 4. Al Muthanna pilot plants
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Figure 5. Munitions storage area. C
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Removed By Iraqis During OIF Figure
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Figure 8. Al Muthanna administratio
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Figure 10. Complete excavation and
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• Drums and debris were visually
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• Cages that once housed animals
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Figure 18. Mangled and rusted munit
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Annex C The Iraqi Industrial Commit
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MIC and MIM: Key Players in Iraq’
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Annex D Tariq Company’s Activitie
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chlorine production had stopped mon
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Summary Annex E Al-Abud Network Tri
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Ties to the Former Regime Implicati
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Annex F Detailed Preliminary Assess
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16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical
Page 107 and 108: Origin of the Binary Sarin Round Us
Page 109 and 110: Figure 5. Examples of the 10 155mm
Page 111 and 112: Figure 9. Additional SAKR-18 rocket
Page 113 and 114: Biological Regime Strategic Intent
Page 115 and 116: Contents Key Findings..............
Page 117 and 118: Key Findings The Biological Warfare
Page 119 and 120: • Similarly, ISG found no informa
Page 121 and 122: Evolution of the Biological Warfare
Page 123 and 124: Figure 1. Some major sites associat
Page 125 and 126: Rihab formed a team and commenced e
Page 127 and 128: • The Iraqis were well aware of t
Page 129 and 130: who ordered the vials destroyed. Dr
Page 131 and 132: to BW than biopesticides. ISG has l
Page 133 and 134: • In the chemical field, ISG lear
Page 135 and 136: experiments and stored WMD precurso
Page 137 and 138: ISG continued to gain more insight
Page 139 and 140: mid-level scientist who worked at s
Page 141 and 142: • During the approximate period o
Page 143 and 144: Iraq’s viral BW program began its
Page 145 and 146: cally looted post-OIF (see below, u
Page 147 and 148: Iraqi Retention of Smallpox Culture
Page 149 and 150: Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Bt is a
Page 151 and 152: Figure 7. Example of dual-use biolo
Page 153 and 154: Drying Process/Carrier/Particle Siz
Page 155 and 156: tank was used only for storage and
Page 157: Figure 9. Sign at the entrance to F
Page 161 and 162: Weaponization Between the late 1980
Page 163 and 164: use with either a chemical or a BW
Page 165 and 166: Concealment And Destruction of Biol
Page 167 and 168: • Former MIC director ‘Amir Ras
Page 169 and 170: • The amount of each agent produc
Page 171 and 172: Detailed Accounting of Iraq’s R-4
Page 173 and 174: Despite an extensive interview prog
Page 175 and 176: Figure 13. 1m 3 Stainless steel mob
Page 177 and 178: Background Annex A Bulk BW Agents U
Page 179 and 180: Annex B BW Research and Development
Page 181 and 182: Al Hamath The Al Hamath facility wa
Page 183 and 184: Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vac
Page 185 and 186: • All buildings, which were found
Page 187 and 188: Figure 4. Two 1,000-liter, stirred,
Page 189 and 190: Annex C ISG Investigation of Iraq
Page 191 and 192: ate the claim of a mobile BW progra
Page 193 and 194: of accommodating rail cars. However
Page 195 and 196: Annex D Trailers Suspected of Being
Page 197 and 198: Present Fermentor Design Feature Cr
Page 199 and 200: do. In summary, their conclusion is
Page 201 and 202: storage of gas cylinders other than
Page 203 and 204: • During the production cycle, ve
Page 205 and 206: Figure 8. Solids in the bottom of t
Page 207 and 208: • Process was skid mounted and wa
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• Clear operating instructions to
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Figure 9. Process fl ow diagram of
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• Undated Republican Guard Report
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Glossary and Acronyms Term or Acron
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CCHF Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Feve
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End User EOD EP ETGC EU EUC EW FAE
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HTPB HUMINT HVD IAEA IAEC IAF IAH I
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M18 M19 M20 M21 M22 M23 M40 MABOT M
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Oil for Food Program OMI OMV ONAREM
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SME SOE SOMO SOTI SPO SRBM SRC SRG
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UNSCR UNSCR UNSYG UO2 UO4 UoB URENC
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