Comprehensive Report

Inadequacies in Iraq’s pre-1991 CW program were
probably caused by limited equipment and inferior
precursor chemicals. Iraq could procure the materials
to address these problems if sanctions were
lifted, intrusive inspections removed, and threat of
force abated.
• In the case of VX, which Iraq claimed it abandoned
because of lack of success at large-scale production
according to Iraq’s FCCD, the scientists eventually
became well aware of the factors resulting in
unstable, poor quality (low purity) VX. (see discussion
on VX in production section).
• These factors included low purity and instability of
precursors, reaction temperature control, inadequate
vacuum systems, and inadequate size of separation
vessels.
Infrastructure—Research and
Development
Reflecting the importance the Regime attached
to industrial and scientific progress and aiming to
recover from the war with Iran, Baghdad undertook in
the mid 1990s a centralized, national effort to coordinate
Iraqi industrial activities. By the late 1990s,
fueled by resources available through the Oil-for-
Food program, that effort underlay a specific initiative
aimed at boosting the capabilities of Iraqi pesticide
and pharmaceutical industries, including the capability
to manufacture dual-use chemicals. Although ISG
found no direct evidence linking dual-use chemical
production to an active or latent CW program,
research and development on types of specific chemicals
linked to Iraq’s CW program raises concerns
about the legitimacy of Iraq’s chemical plans.
Prior to 1991, Iraq’s national research and development
(R&D) capability was limited in scope, and
efforts were largely concentrated in state establishments
such as the Al Muthanna State Establishment
(MSE) and at the university level.
• Iraq’s industrial sector had limited capabilities for
research, primarily because it had typically purchased
turnkey facilities for industrial production
from abroad.
After the Gulf war, Iraq’s ability to conduct R&D
stagnated, and the majority of MSE scientists were
deployed to operate factories or manage critical infrastructure
problems caused by the war. The universities
had no formal national R&D role and continued to
operate their departments in a self-directed, isolated
style.
• The effects of sanctions and the prevailing international
situation devastated the research community,
preventing the intellectual capital of Iraq from
participating in normal academic interaction.
In the 1994 timeframe, Saddam issued an edict that
all Iraqi universities address problems experienced
in the military and industrial sectors, according to
an Iraqi academic scientist. Prior to this, universities
were not obligated to conduct applied research for
either sector.
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