Comprehensive Report
GPO-DUELFERREPORT-3
GPO-DUELFERREPORT-3
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Weaponization<br />
Between the late 1980s and the start of Desert Storm<br />
in 1991, Iraq attempted to develop a range of systems<br />
for the dispersion of BW agent. In the dash to<br />
field viable BW weapons the workers in the program<br />
adapted robust bombs capable of mounting on many<br />
types of aircraft and warheads, including the Al<br />
Husayn missile. They also worked furiously to ready<br />
an aircraft spray system.<br />
• The scientists and engineers conducted weapons<br />
trials over some three years with both simulants and<br />
BW agents, on occasion using living animals as<br />
targets. Delivery systems tested included a<br />
helicopter-borne spray system, aerial bombs,<br />
artillery shells, multi-barrel rocket launchers, longrange<br />
missile warheads and an aircraft mounting of<br />
an adapted auxiliary fuel tank.<br />
• In the haste to prepare for the 1991 conflict,<br />
systems tried and tested with CW agents were<br />
preferred; the R-400 aerial bomb and the Al Husayn<br />
warhead, charged with anthrax, botulinum toxin<br />
and aflatoxin. Additionally, engineers at<br />
Al Muthanna rushed the auxiliary fuel tank,<br />
modified into a spray system, of the Mirage F1<br />
aircraft into service (see Figure 12).<br />
• Shortly after the passage of Security Council<br />
Resolution 687 in early April 1991, Iraqi leaders<br />
also decided to erase all traces of the offensive BW<br />
program.<br />
• By the autumn of 1991, Iraq probably accomplished<br />
both the destruction of the weapons stockpile and<br />
surviving evidence of the BW program.<br />
• Interviews conducted by ISG have produced a<br />
reasonably coherent picture of this unilateral<br />
destruction, with few conflicting details, although<br />
important questions about the disposition of bulk<br />
BW agent and bacterial reference strains remain.<br />
• ISG judges that the former Regime destroyed most<br />
of its hidden stockpile of BW weapons. A few<br />
pre-1991 weapons probably either escaped destruction<br />
in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. It is<br />
thus possible that a few more will be found in the<br />
months and years ahead.<br />
ISG bases its reservations on the following factors:<br />
• The security situation in Iraq has limited the<br />
physical verification of Iraq’s unilateral destruction<br />
claims—by excavating and counting weapon fragments,<br />
for example.<br />
• Prior to Desert Storm, Iraq had dedicated<br />
complimentary programs to develop spray technology<br />
that could effectively disseminate either<br />
CW or BW agents. These spray dispersal systems<br />
were intended for use in conjunction with various<br />
developmental unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)<br />
programs. Initial testing was quickly beginning to<br />
show progress by the time of Desert Storm. Since<br />
that time however, while their desire for these<br />
systems remained, their developmental work shifted<br />
focus. Due to the attention of the UNSCOM<br />
inspectors, the developmental effort shifted away<br />
from the more controversial spray technologies<br />
toward completing the longer range UAV goals.<br />
• Many of the officials interviewed by ISG had<br />
previously lied–or told half-truths–to UNSCOM,<br />
and they may have lied to ISG as well, though ISG<br />
assesses that most were being open and truthful.<br />
• The continuing exploitation of Iraqi documents may<br />
produce evidence that contradicts the assertions of<br />
the Iraqi officials.<br />
• The efforts of the Iraqi Interim Government and<br />
Coalition forces may yet result in the discovery<br />
of unacknowledged WMD stockpiles left by the<br />
former Regime, though ISG judges this to be very<br />
unlikely.<br />
Biological<br />
ISG judges—with important reservations—that the<br />
former Regime clandestinely destroyed almost all of<br />
Iraq’s biological WMD and long-range missiles in<br />
1991. Numerous interviews with high-ranking Iraqi<br />
political figures, WMD scientists, and military and<br />
security officers indicate that after a brief period of<br />
concealment in 1991, Iraqi leaders decided to destroy<br />
Iraq’s undeclared weapons stockpile in secret.<br />
ISG has not discovered any evidence that Iraq has<br />
conducted research or trials dedicated to the dispersion<br />
of BW agents since declaring its offensive program<br />
in 1995. Iraq pursued some delivery systems<br />
projects until OIF that could have provided some<br />
BW utility and whose origins lay in the development<br />
of BW and CW dispersion systems.<br />
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