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• Despite repeated attempts by ISG to confirm this information with interviews with key personalities who would be knowledgeable, no further information or physical evidence has been collected up to this point. Undeclared Movement and Destruction of Bulk BW Agent ISG has conducted a series of interviews and site visits to uncover more information on the movement and destruction of at least some bulk BW agent in 1991. When Iraq disclosed its offensive BW program in 1995, those involved decided not to disclose the movements and destruction areas associated with bulk BW agents. • A scientist who worked for the former Iraqi Regime told ISG that Iraq destroyed three tons of B. anthracis at Al ‘Aziziyah. ISG assesses that this three tons of B. anthracis is only a portion of that not declared to the UN. • An assistant of Dr. Rihab told UN inspectors in early 1997 that he had taken an unspecified number of one-cubic meter tanks filled with B. anthracis into the desert north of Baghdad near An Nibai and dumped the agent there in July 1991. • The chief reason offered for not declaring agent disposal at Ar Radwaniyah was fear of informing Regime officials that Dr. Rihab’s BW staff had deposited deactivated B. anthracis and probably at least one other agent in an area surrounded by Special Republican Guard (SRG) barracks and within site of the Ar Radwaniyah Presidential Palace. • How high up the chain of command this knowledge of undeclared movement and destruction went is yet to be determined. Evidence suggests that the Head of the Technical Research Center (TRC), Ahmad Murtada, the official responsible to Husayn Kamil for BW, knew, but he denies it. It has yet to be determined if ‘Amir Al Sa’adi, Husam Amin, or the Vice President and the Higher Committee also knew. This deception, in effect, prevented any possibility of the UN accepting the Iraqi account of its BW program. Whether those involved understood the significance and disastrous consequences of their actions is unclear. These efforts demonstrate the problems that existed on both sides in establishing the truth. 62
Annex B BW Research and Development Facilities Iraq’s BW program was initiated in early 1974 in a house in Al ‘Amiriyah. After completion of basic buildings on a new site, Al Hasan’s Ibn-Sina Center, or site number 2 (or later Al Salman) the program was transferred to Ibn-Sina Center mid 1974. The first phase of construction consisted of a clinic, telephone exchange, and a bacteriology labratory building, which appeared to have a functional high containment capability. Onto the back of the bacteriology building an animal house was attached. Later a building for viral research was built that was compartmented into 6 laboratories. This site was heavily bombed in 1991 and was not functional after that time. Even before the transfer of the new BW program from Al ‘Amiriyah, plans were already established for another facility (the green cube) “Phase 2” which became available about the same time as the dissolution of the original Al Hasan Institute. The remaining biology program along with elements of the CW program was then emplaced in this building as was the newly created Research and Technical Center (later to become the TRC). In the early 1980s Phase 3 was completed in the form of the Toxicology Laboratory to which the militarily relevant program was transferred in 1987. Revitalization of Iraq’s militarily relevant BW program was located at Al Muthanna from 1983 to 1987 when it was relocated to Al Salman. However, Al Muthanna continued to provide significant R&D assistance through 1990 particularly studies on aflatoxin and ricin as well as weapons field trials. For many years, both before and following Desert Storm, the IIS conducted research and development of biological agents, such as ricin and aflatoxin, at several facilities discovered by ISG. Brief descriptions of these laboratories are presented below. The Al Safa’ah (AGRC), Al Salman and Al Muthanna sites were no longer functional after 1991 and thus further descriptions are not provided. Al Hakam, Al Manal, TABRC, Al Hamath, and the Al Tariq Company are deemed to have a significant post 1991 BW related capability and the descriptions follow. Baghdad University, College of Veterinary Medicine, al Razi Research Institute, al Kindi Veterinary Vaccines and Drug Company, Al ‘Amiriyah Serum and Vacccine Institute have the facilities and expertise to play an important role in a resurgent R&D program. Al Hakam The Al Hakam facility was destroyed by the Iraqis under UNSCOM supervision in 1996 because of the discovery of the key role it played in the Iraqi BW program. Historically, Al Hakam was Iraq’s primary BW agent production facility, producing Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium botulinum, Clostridium perfringens and simulant, Bacillus subtilis, for testing and ultimately, weaponization purposes. Following the first Gulf war, the Al Hakam plant was directed by Iraq to change its focus to civilian projects, which had been selected as a cover for its former BW program. • The civil projects chosen to replace the production of BW agents and use the same equipment at Al Hakam were the production of biopesticides (B. thuringiensis), SCP and biofertilizers. The equipment at the facility was considered dual-use and the production of materials such as B. thuringiensis (a known stimulant for the BW agent B. anthracis) and SCP (whose equipment could be used to produce C. botulinum), led to the fear that Al Hakam could potentially be producing BW agent or at the very least, be maintaining the infrastructure and production expertise necessary to quickly reactivate Iraq’s BW agent production capability. Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant The FMDV plant was declared to UNSCOM as a facility that was used to produce botulinum toxin for offensive BW purposes from September 1990 until January 1991. After Iraq acknowledged its role in its BW program, UNSCOM disabled the FMDV plant’s high containment air handling system in 1996 by pouring a mixture of concrete and foam into its ducting. No laboratory or production work is currently conducted at the FMDV plant. The plant is Biological 63
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Comprehensive Report of the Special
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Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program B
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Contents Key Findings..............
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Key Findings Saddam never abandoned
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• Uday—head of the Fedayeen Sad
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Evolution of the Chemical Warfare P
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Chemical Figure 1. CW facilities as
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• Iraq also declared that by 1989
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in April 1991, the UN adopted Secur
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Reports of an unexplained discovery
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• With the exception of one insta
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In subsequent years, and in part tr
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• ISG has been unable to establis
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Iraq’s Declared Work With VX Nerv
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Infrastructure—Production Capabil
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imported anhydrous chlorine gas fro
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• Less corrosion resistant equipm
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Weaponization Iraq’s capability t
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Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Tap
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VX Weaponization Iraq had not adequ
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• ISG investigation of eight ASPs
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• The amount of inspections ISG w
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An Najaf Depot Az Zubayr Depot Taji
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Depot Name Pre-OIF “Indicators”
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Annex A IIS Undeclared Research on
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• A former Iraqi intelligence off
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The absence of laboratory equipment
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• The April 2003 exploitation tea
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• The IIS M16 laboratory located
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Site exploitations have verified th
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Iraqi Regime Use of Poisons and Tox
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Figure 20. Various buried chemicals
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Figure 22. Tank of triethylamine re
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Annex B Al Muthanna Chemical Weapon
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life, and the precursor compound cy
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Table 1. Project 922, declared prod
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Figure 2. Al Muthanna R&D/Laborator
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Figure 4. Al Muthanna pilot plants
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Figure 5. Munitions storage area. C
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Removed By Iraqis During OIF Figure
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Figure 8. Al Muthanna administratio
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Figure 10. Complete excavation and
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• Drums and debris were visually
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• Cages that once housed animals
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Figure 18. Mangled and rusted munit
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Annex C The Iraqi Industrial Commit
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MIC and MIM: Key Players in Iraq’
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Annex D Tariq Company’s Activitie
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chlorine production had stopped mon
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Summary Annex E Al-Abud Network Tri
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Ties to the Former Regime Implicati
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Annex F Detailed Preliminary Assess
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16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical
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Origin of the Binary Sarin Round Us
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Figure 5. Examples of the 10 155mm
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Figure 9. Additional SAKR-18 rocket
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Biological Regime Strategic Intent
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Contents Key Findings..............
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Key Findings The Biological Warfare
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• Similarly, ISG found no informa
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Evolution of the Biological Warfare
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Figure 1. Some major sites associat
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Rihab formed a team and commenced e
Page 127 and 128: • The Iraqis were well aware of t
Page 129 and 130: who ordered the vials destroyed. Dr
Page 131 and 132: to BW than biopesticides. ISG has l
Page 133 and 134: • In the chemical field, ISG lear
Page 135 and 136: experiments and stored WMD precurso
Page 137 and 138: ISG continued to gain more insight
Page 139 and 140: mid-level scientist who worked at s
Page 141 and 142: • During the approximate period o
Page 143 and 144: Iraq’s viral BW program began its
Page 145 and 146: cally looted post-OIF (see below, u
Page 147 and 148: Iraqi Retention of Smallpox Culture
Page 149 and 150: Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Bt is a
Page 151 and 152: Figure 7. Example of dual-use biolo
Page 153 and 154: Drying Process/Carrier/Particle Siz
Page 155 and 156: tank was used only for storage and
Page 157 and 158: Figure 9. Sign at the entrance to F
Page 159 and 160: Two 1,000-liter, stirred, jacketed
Page 161 and 162: Weaponization Between the late 1980
Page 163 and 164: use with either a chemical or a BW
Page 165 and 166: Concealment And Destruction of Biol
Page 167 and 168: • Former MIC director ‘Amir Ras
Page 169 and 170: • The amount of each agent produc
Page 171 and 172: Detailed Accounting of Iraq’s R-4
Page 173 and 174: Despite an extensive interview prog
Page 175 and 176: Figure 13. 1m 3 Stainless steel mob
Page 177: Background Annex A Bulk BW Agents U
Page 181 and 182: Al Hamath The Al Hamath facility wa
Page 183 and 184: Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vac
Page 185 and 186: • All buildings, which were found
Page 187 and 188: Figure 4. Two 1,000-liter, stirred,
Page 189 and 190: Annex C ISG Investigation of Iraq
Page 191 and 192: ate the claim of a mobile BW progra
Page 193 and 194: of accommodating rail cars. However
Page 195 and 196: Annex D Trailers Suspected of Being
Page 197 and 198: Present Fermentor Design Feature Cr
Page 199 and 200: do. In summary, their conclusion is
Page 201 and 202: storage of gas cylinders other than
Page 203 and 204: • During the production cycle, ve
Page 205 and 206: Figure 8. Solids in the bottom of t
Page 207 and 208: • Process was skid mounted and wa
Page 209 and 210: • Clear operating instructions to
Page 211 and 212: Figure 9. Process fl ow diagram of
Page 213 and 214: • Undated Republican Guard Report
Page 215 and 216: Glossary and Acronyms Term or Acron
Page 217 and 218: CCHF Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Feve
Page 219 and 220: End User EOD EP ETGC EU EUC EW FAE
Page 221 and 222: HTPB HUMINT HVD IAEA IAEC IAF IAH I
Page 223 and 224: M18 M19 M20 M21 M22 M23 M40 MABOT M
Page 225 and 226: Oil for Food Program OMI OMV ONAREM
Page 227 and 228: SME SOE SOMO SOTI SPO SRBM SRC SRG
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UNSCR UNSCR UNSYG UO2 UO4 UoB URENC
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