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Hazim claims he cannot remember if animal testing occurred. The source stated that a pilot experiment should have been conducted with the isolate to assess for activity in an animal; rabbits are particularly susceptible to camel pox. However, he could not remember an actual test of the viral isolate on rabbits due to the critical time in which the test would have occurred; the 1991 Gulf war. Hazim does not believe that anyone else could have carried out this experiment in his absence or without his knowledge. Hazim investigated existing facilities in Iraq for scaling-up the production of camel pox if and when that was possible or necessary. He decided on using the chorioallontoic membrane method of viral egg production. Although denying a plan for large-scale production, he inspected the Veterinary Service Center in Irbil. It was used in the production of animal vaccines for Newcastle disease and fowlpox. The Irbil facility had a moderate scale egg production capability but according to Hazim an untrained staff. The large size of the facility required was explained due to the fact that the amount of virus obtained through this method would only average 5 mg of tissue. This facility was autonomous to the Iraqi Government and an order to commandeer the plant for Hazim’s activity was signed by the Minister of Agriculture. However, the order was never implemented. Dr. Hazim ‘Ali’s performance in leading and conducting Iraq’s fledgling viral BW research, based on comments by his colleagues, was underwhelming. Rihab described him as “not a man to work by himself.” Dr. Nasir Al Hindawi commented that Hazim ‘Ali did not produce a single virus. Smallpox ISG concludes that Iraq had a pre-1991 intent to develop smallpox as a strategic viral BW agent and had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox). However, ISG has collected no direct evidence that Iraq either retained or acquired smallpox virus isolates or proceeded with any follow up smallpox related research. ISG assesses, however, that Iraq did have the capability to conduct research into smallpox, if not in a manner up to Western BL-4 containment standards. Iraq possessed facilities such as the Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant and Al Razi Center had equipment that could potentially be used to work on high-risk agents such as smallpox. Prior to OIF, the US intelligence community assessed that Iraq probably retained samples of the smallpox virus and may have been researching it for BW purposes. It was also stated that it had no information indicating whether such work was ongoing. Despite the limited information gained by the UN and a claim by a senior player in the CBW program that the intent of the viral BW program was to weaponize smallpox, the additional information uncovered by ISG has not provided evidence of an R&D effort to weaponize smallpox. • According to Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al Sammarai, a senior official involved in the weaponization and testing of CBW agents, the aim of the viral BW program was intended for the weaponization of smallpox. He states that Dr. Hazim ‘Ali started with Camel pox since it was easier to work with for development, but ultimately the program was intended to progress to smallpox. Dr. Bilal did not know for a fact that samples of smallpox existed within Iraq but stated that ‘Ali might obtain them from the Baghdad Central Public Health Laboratory or collections at the Al ‘Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute (ASVI). Dr. ‘Ali Mukhlif, Dr. Hazim ‘Ali’s sponsor to work with the TRC, told Bilal the intention of the program and Hazim’s activities during a meeting at Al Muthanna in 1990. • During investigations conducted by ISG and earlier by UNSCOM, Dr. Hazim ‘Ali occasionally referred to “smallpox” when questioned about their research and quickly retracted the statement to say “camel pox.” The source was unable to provide an explanation as to why he repeatedly made this mistake. This type of mistake added to the confusion surrounding Iraq’s possible R&D efforts on smallpox. Hazim stated that he would not be surprised if smallpox isolates were found in Iraq and identified two culture repositories where viral cultures could be maintained over extended periods of time: Al Dawrah FMDV Plant and the Baghdad CPHL. None were found by ISG. However, the CPHL seed stock repository was reported to have been systemi- 28
cally looted post-OIF (see below, under “Feasibility of Maintaining Smallpox Cultures from 1972) and the Al Dawrah FMDV Plant was effectively shut down and electricity turned off after it was rendered unusable in 1996. Contrary to comments made by Dr. Al Hindawi that there were no virologists in Iraq, ISG identified and interviewed close to a dozen, mostly US and UK trained, highly capable PhD virologists. Several had experience with orthopox (smallpox like) viral research experience mostly with animal related pox viruses. One actually performed genetic engineering research on animal pox viruses attempting to develop a recombinant animal vaccine. A couple had experience working with the smallpox vaccine strain (vaccinia). However, none of Iraq’s “best and brightest” virologists were assessed directly involved in Iraq’s BW efforts. After extensive interviews, none could provide direct information concerning the existence of historical or recent smallpox isolates or research. (See the accompanying textbox on reported Iraqi retention of smallpox isolates.) Biological 29
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Comprehensive Report of the Special
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Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program B
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Contents Key Findings..............
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Key Findings Saddam never abandoned
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• Uday—head of the Fedayeen Sad
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Evolution of the Chemical Warfare P
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Chemical Figure 1. CW facilities as
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• Iraq also declared that by 1989
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in April 1991, the UN adopted Secur
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Reports of an unexplained discovery
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• With the exception of one insta
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In subsequent years, and in part tr
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• ISG has been unable to establis
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Iraq’s Declared Work With VX Nerv
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Infrastructure—Production Capabil
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imported anhydrous chlorine gas fro
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• Less corrosion resistant equipm
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Weaponization Iraq’s capability t
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Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Tap
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VX Weaponization Iraq had not adequ
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• ISG investigation of eight ASPs
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• The amount of inspections ISG w
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An Najaf Depot Az Zubayr Depot Taji
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Depot Name Pre-OIF “Indicators”
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Annex A IIS Undeclared Research on
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• A former Iraqi intelligence off
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The absence of laboratory equipment
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• The April 2003 exploitation tea
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• The IIS M16 laboratory located
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Site exploitations have verified th
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Iraqi Regime Use of Poisons and Tox
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Figure 20. Various buried chemicals
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Figure 22. Tank of triethylamine re
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Annex B Al Muthanna Chemical Weapon
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life, and the precursor compound cy
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Table 1. Project 922, declared prod
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Figure 2. Al Muthanna R&D/Laborator
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Figure 4. Al Muthanna pilot plants
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Figure 5. Munitions storage area. C
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Removed By Iraqis During OIF Figure
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Figure 8. Al Muthanna administratio
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Figure 10. Complete excavation and
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• Drums and debris were visually
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• Cages that once housed animals
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Figure 18. Mangled and rusted munit
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Annex C The Iraqi Industrial Commit
Page 93 and 94: MIC and MIM: Key Players in Iraq’
Page 95 and 96: Annex D Tariq Company’s Activitie
Page 97 and 98: chlorine production had stopped mon
Page 99 and 100: Summary Annex E Al-Abud Network Tri
Page 101 and 102: Ties to the Former Regime Implicati
Page 103 and 104: Annex F Detailed Preliminary Assess
Page 105 and 106: 16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical
Page 107 and 108: Origin of the Binary Sarin Round Us
Page 109 and 110: Figure 5. Examples of the 10 155mm
Page 111 and 112: Figure 9. Additional SAKR-18 rocket
Page 113 and 114: Biological Regime Strategic Intent
Page 115 and 116: Contents Key Findings..............
Page 117 and 118: Key Findings The Biological Warfare
Page 119 and 120: • Similarly, ISG found no informa
Page 121 and 122: Evolution of the Biological Warfare
Page 123 and 124: Figure 1. Some major sites associat
Page 125 and 126: Rihab formed a team and commenced e
Page 127 and 128: • The Iraqis were well aware of t
Page 129 and 130: who ordered the vials destroyed. Dr
Page 131 and 132: to BW than biopesticides. ISG has l
Page 133 and 134: • In the chemical field, ISG lear
Page 135 and 136: experiments and stored WMD precurso
Page 137 and 138: ISG continued to gain more insight
Page 139 and 140: mid-level scientist who worked at s
Page 141 and 142: • During the approximate period o
Page 143: Iraq’s viral BW program began its
Page 147 and 148: Iraqi Retention of Smallpox Culture
Page 149 and 150: Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Bt is a
Page 151 and 152: Figure 7. Example of dual-use biolo
Page 153 and 154: Drying Process/Carrier/Particle Siz
Page 155 and 156: tank was used only for storage and
Page 157 and 158: Figure 9. Sign at the entrance to F
Page 159 and 160: Two 1,000-liter, stirred, jacketed
Page 161 and 162: Weaponization Between the late 1980
Page 163 and 164: use with either a chemical or a BW
Page 165 and 166: Concealment And Destruction of Biol
Page 167 and 168: • Former MIC director ‘Amir Ras
Page 169 and 170: • The amount of each agent produc
Page 171 and 172: Detailed Accounting of Iraq’s R-4
Page 173 and 174: Despite an extensive interview prog
Page 175 and 176: Figure 13. 1m 3 Stainless steel mob
Page 177 and 178: Background Annex A Bulk BW Agents U
Page 179 and 180: Annex B BW Research and Development
Page 181 and 182: Al Hamath The Al Hamath facility wa
Page 183 and 184: Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vac
Page 185 and 186: • All buildings, which were found
Page 187 and 188: Figure 4. Two 1,000-liter, stirred,
Page 189 and 190: Annex C ISG Investigation of Iraq
Page 191 and 192: ate the claim of a mobile BW progra
Page 193 and 194: of accommodating rail cars. However
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Annex D Trailers Suspected of Being
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Present Fermentor Design Feature Cr
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do. In summary, their conclusion is
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storage of gas cylinders other than
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• During the production cycle, ve
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Figure 8. Solids in the bottom of t
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• Process was skid mounted and wa
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• Clear operating instructions to
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Figure 9. Process fl ow diagram of
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• Undated Republican Guard Report
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Glossary and Acronyms Term or Acron
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CCHF Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Feve
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End User EOD EP ETGC EU EUC EW FAE
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HTPB HUMINT HVD IAEA IAEC IAF IAH I
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M18 M19 M20 M21 M22 M23 M40 MABOT M
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Oil for Food Program OMI OMV ONAREM
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SME SOE SOMO SOTI SPO SRBM SRC SRG
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UNSCR UNSCR UNSYG UO2 UO4 UoB URENC
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