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Comprehensive Report

GPO-DUELFERREPORT-3

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imported anhydrous chlorine gas from China, with<br />

the permission of the UN, for use within its chemical<br />

and sewage treatment industries.<br />

• Formalene and phenol, both ostensibly produced<br />

indigenously, were imported by the resin facility<br />

north of Baghdad because of a lack of consistent,<br />

quality supply from local producers.<br />

Sulfur Mustard process and key chemicals/<br />

associated Iraqi facilities.<br />

Ethylene + Chlorine (aq) = Chloroethanol<br />

Chloroethanol + Na2S = thiodiglycol<br />

Thiodiglycol + HCl = Sulfur Mustard<br />

Figure 2.<br />

ISG judges that the longstanding intent of the<br />

Regime was to restart WMD production once UN<br />

sanctions were lifted. Based on an investigation of<br />

facilities, materials, and production outputs, ISG<br />

also judges that Iraq had a break-out capability<br />

to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard CW<br />

agent, but not nerve agents.<br />

• Iraq declared to the UN an experimental sulfur<br />

mustard production route from locally available<br />

chemicals—sulfur, chlorine, and ethylene, all of<br />

which Iraq had access to at the time of OIF (see<br />

Figure 2).<br />

• Iraq retained the necessary basic chemicals to produce<br />

sulfur mustard on a large-scale, but probably<br />

did not have key precursors for nerve agent production.<br />

With the importation of key phosphorusbased<br />

precursors, Iraq could have produced limited<br />

quantities of nerve agent as well.<br />

• Mustard production could have started within days<br />

if the necessary precursor chemicals were colocated<br />

in a suitable production facility; otherwise<br />

production could have started within weeks. Nerve<br />

agent production would have taken much longer,<br />

because of the complexity of the process, according<br />

to Dr. Mahmud Faraj Bilal, a senior Iraqi scientist<br />

and CBW expert, and the lack of advanced phosphorus<br />

precursors in country. Bilal believed a covert<br />

offensive CW program was unlikely because the<br />

program would require 400-500 witting personnel.<br />

Chemical<br />

Iraq at OIF possessed a large range of corrosion-resistant<br />

production equipment, tagged and<br />

monitored by UNMOVIC, and procured for civilian<br />

purposes by non-CW associated facilities. However,<br />

ISG did not encounter any production units specifically<br />

configured to produce key precursors or CW<br />

agents.<br />

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