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Nizar Al Attar, who attended the CBW courses at Fort<br />

McClellan in the US and was later to head Iraq’s CW<br />

program and introduce BW to Al Muthanna State<br />

Establishment (MSE). In 1964, the Iraqi Army established<br />

a Chemical Corps, thus taking the first step that<br />

led to the acquisition of CBW. Following the Ba’thist<br />

revolution of 17 July 1968 that brought Ahmad Hasan<br />

Al Bakr to power, senior army officers, encouraged<br />

by their technologically aware subordinates, decided<br />

to embark on a CW program. It was an amateur affair<br />

consisting of small groups trying to develop agent. By<br />

the early 1970s, the attempt had failed.<br />

In 1974, a charismatic officer, Ghassan Ibrahim<br />

founded a laboratory, nominally a respectable academic<br />

body run by the Ministry of Higher Education<br />

and Scientific Research carrying out legitimate scientific<br />

research, named the Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham<br />

[Al Hazen Ibn-al-Haithem] Research Institute (see<br />

Figure 2). In reality, the institute was a front for clandestine<br />

activity in CW, BW, electronics, and optics<br />

under the patronage of the IIS. Ibrahim’s assistant<br />

was an intelligence officer, Fa’iz ‘Abdallah Al Shahin,<br />

who would later oversee Iraq’s production of CW<br />

agents during the Iran-Iraq war and play a key role in<br />

the development of other nonconventional weapons,<br />

such as radiological bombs. He would also briefly<br />

supervise part of the BW program. Later still, Fa’iz<br />

would become Deputy Minister of Oil.<br />

Al Hasan was a large, coordinated effort to master<br />

the technologies associated with several aspects of<br />

modern warfare. Quickly Al Hasan established chemical<br />

laboratories at Al Rashad, NE of Baghdad, posing<br />

as ‘The Center for Medical Diagnostics’ and a temporary<br />

biological center in the Al ‘Amiriyah suburb<br />

of Baghdad. A purpose built closed-institute soon<br />

followed: the Ibn-Sina Center at Al Salman occupying<br />

a peninsula formed by the River Tigris 30km south of<br />

Baghdad. The Ibn-Sina Center masqueraded as ‘The<br />

Center for Medical Agriculture’. After occupying a<br />

temporary headquarters in Sadun Street in the center<br />

of Baghdad, Al Hasan built a new headquarters and<br />

physics laboratory at Masbah nearby and later added<br />

an electronics laboratory at Tajiyat, north of Baghdad.<br />

The generation of scientists trained and employed at<br />

Al Hasan, many of whom devoted more than 20 years<br />

of their careers to the pursuit of WMD, formed the<br />

backbone of Iraq’s later CW and BW programs. Initially,<br />

a group of nine scientists drawn from the Ministries<br />

of Higher Education, Defense and Health led<br />

the original offensive BW effort, conducting research<br />

into bacteria, toxins, and viruses, emphasizing production,<br />

pathogenicity, dissemination and storage<br />

of agents, such as Clostridium botulinum, spores of<br />

Bacillus anthracis, cholera, polio, and influenza virus.<br />

Later, in both chemical and biological disciplines, the<br />

Al Hasan Institute engaged prominent scientists to<br />

train and guide more junior staff and chemical corps<br />

officers. Dr. Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Mun’im Al Azmirli,<br />

an Egyptian, mentored the chemists and Dr. Muzhir<br />

[Mudher, Modher] Al Falluji led the biologists. The<br />

Institute sponsored its staff to study abroad for PhDs<br />

in subjects appropriate for the CW or BW effort. The<br />

Iraqi Regime rewarded success with promotion, high<br />

status, money, and material goods.<br />

The second attempt to develop BW also faltered<br />

despite considerable effort. The Minister of Defense<br />

and Dr. ‘Amir Al Sa’adi concluded in a 1978 investigation<br />

that Al Hasan had failed to deliver what<br />

it promised and that there had been academic and<br />

financial fraud. Arrests and imprisonment of several<br />

researchers followed for fraud and embezzlement<br />

surrounding the purported development of influenza<br />

as a BW agent. Al Sa’adi decided that project was<br />

a failure, not having made enough progress toward<br />

industrial scale BW production and should be shut<br />

down, which the Iraqi government did on 16 January<br />

1979, exactly 6 months before President Ahmad<br />

Hasan Al Bakr resigned in favor of his Vice President,<br />

Saddam Husayn. The facilities and staff were parceled<br />

out to various government establishments such<br />

as State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI).<br />

The best personnel went to the IIS. Between 1979 and<br />

1985, Iraq rebuilt and expanded the dual-use infrastructure<br />

for BW research, but undertook little work<br />

of significance.<br />

• In 1979, a presidential decree created the Scientific<br />

and Technical Research Directorate (STRD)<br />

which later became the Technical Research Center<br />

(TRC), as a technical support agency for the IIS<br />

and to replace the Al Hasan as a cover mechanism<br />

for continued work on the development of chemical<br />

and biological agents.<br />

6

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