Comprehensive Report

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key figures, such as the suspected head of the BW program, the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture, the National Monitoring Directorate representative to the Ministry of Industrialization and Minerals, the director of the MIC, the former Minister of Industrialization and Minerals, the Minister of Transportation and Communication that had involvement in the BW program, and other important individuals that had suspected involvement with Iraq’s BW program. In the area of mobile production equipment and facilities, there were a number of key individuals interviewed. Some of these individuals included the Director of IIS Directorate of Criminology M16 that reportedly discussed mobile platforms in 2000, the director of a possible dispersal site for rail mobile units, managers of a reported mobile BW agent production site, and a former military officer who allegedly knew that Iraq had “portable biological factories or laboratories” making BW agents in 1998. 78
Annex D Trailers Suspected of Being Mobile BW Agent Production Units ISG assesses the capability of two mobile trailers with tanks or suspected fermentors on board that were recovered near Irbil and Mosul in 2003 as impractical for biological agent production and almost certainly designed and built for the generation of hydrogen. Background Iraq’s Consideration of Mobile BW Agent Production Systems. Several events underpin the continuing suspicion that Iraq possessed mobile facilities and laboratories. • In the 1980s, the Technical Research Center (TRC) at Al Salman purchased a mobile laboratory for forensic purposes in support of a proposed meeting of the Arab League or Arab Games in Baghdad. The meeting did not take place in Iraq, but Al Salman retained the laboratory. • Later, in 1987 Dr. Rihab, head of the BW bacteriological group, and Dr. ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi, MIC First Deputy and right hand man of Husayn Kamil, discussed the possibility of developing a transportable system for the production of BW agents. The idea was largely Al Sa’adi’s; Rihab rejected the proposal in favor of the more pedestrian route that, in time, led to the construction of Al Hakam, Iraq’s major BW research, development, testing, production, and storage facility (see Figure 1). Discovery and Initial Exploitation of Suspect Trailer-Borne Equipment It was against this background that Coalition Forces discovered two trailers in Northern Iraq in April and May 2003. In April 2003, a trailer (trailer 1) was recovered after its discovery in Irbil. This trailer appeared to be complete with all equipment fitted. A second, similar trailer (trailer 2) was later identified and recovered in May 2003 from a site adjacent to the Al Kindi research facility at Mosul. Some items of equipment were missing from this trailer bed. Initial Assessments and Sample Analysis. A team of military experts conducted a preliminary technical field investigation of trailer 1 soon after its capture. They assessed the trailer to be part of a possible Iraqi mobile BW weapon production system, with its equipment being capable of supporting a limited biological batch production process. A second examination was undertaken by a team of scientific experts, after Al Kindi personnel suggested the trailers were for hydrogen production. Their report concluded, “The trailers have equipment and components possibly compatible with biological agent production and/or chemical processes that might include hydrogen production.” ISG Assessment of the Trailers In response to questions raised by these earlier reports, a team, comprised of specialists in fermentation technology and bio-manufacturing, conducted a comparative assessment of the trailers with respect to the two major uses postulated: • A clandestine mobile BW agent production platform. • Field units for hydrogen production. This assessment focuses on Trailer 1 because it appeared to have a complete set of equipment. The ‘reactor vessel’ was considered to be the key component of the system for evaluation because its purpose as either a bio-fermentor or a chemical reaction vessel for hydrogen generation, would resolve the debate over the function of the whole assembly of equipment mounted on Trailer 1. The Trailers as a Clandestine BW Agent Production Platform The crucial item of equipment for the production of BW agents is the fermentor. This provides and maintains an aseptic and controlled, optimal environment for growth of the selected microorganism. A fermentor, regardless of the particular microorganism being produced, be it BW agent or not, must possess certain Biological 79
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Comprehensive Report of the Special
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Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program B
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Contents Key Findings..............
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Key Findings Saddam never abandoned
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• Uday—head of the Fedayeen Sad
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Evolution of the Chemical Warfare P
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Chemical Figure 1. CW facilities as
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• Iraq also declared that by 1989
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in April 1991, the UN adopted Secur
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Reports of an unexplained discovery
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• With the exception of one insta
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In subsequent years, and in part tr
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• ISG has been unable to establis
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Iraq’s Declared Work With VX Nerv
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Infrastructure—Production Capabil
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imported anhydrous chlorine gas fro
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• Less corrosion resistant equipm
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Weaponization Iraq’s capability t
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Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Tap
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VX Weaponization Iraq had not adequ
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• ISG investigation of eight ASPs
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• The amount of inspections ISG w
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An Najaf Depot Az Zubayr Depot Taji
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Depot Name Pre-OIF “Indicators”
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Annex A IIS Undeclared Research on
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• A former Iraqi intelligence off
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The absence of laboratory equipment
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• The April 2003 exploitation tea
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• The IIS M16 laboratory located
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Site exploitations have verified th
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Iraqi Regime Use of Poisons and Tox
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Figure 20. Various buried chemicals
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Figure 22. Tank of triethylamine re
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Annex B Al Muthanna Chemical Weapon
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life, and the precursor compound cy
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Table 1. Project 922, declared prod
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Figure 2. Al Muthanna R&D/Laborator
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Figure 4. Al Muthanna pilot plants
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Figure 5. Munitions storage area. C
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Removed By Iraqis During OIF Figure
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Figure 8. Al Muthanna administratio
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Figure 10. Complete excavation and
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• Drums and debris were visually
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• Cages that once housed animals
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Figure 18. Mangled and rusted munit
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Annex C The Iraqi Industrial Commit
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MIC and MIM: Key Players in Iraq’
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Annex D Tariq Company’s Activitie
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chlorine production had stopped mon
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Summary Annex E Al-Abud Network Tri
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Ties to the Former Regime Implicati
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Annex F Detailed Preliminary Assess
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16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical
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Origin of the Binary Sarin Round Us
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Figure 5. Examples of the 10 155mm
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Figure 9. Additional SAKR-18 rocket
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Biological Regime Strategic Intent
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Contents Key Findings..............
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Key Findings The Biological Warfare
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• Similarly, ISG found no informa
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Evolution of the Biological Warfare
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Figure 1. Some major sites associat
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Rihab formed a team and commenced e
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• The Iraqis were well aware of t
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who ordered the vials destroyed. Dr
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to BW than biopesticides. ISG has l
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• In the chemical field, ISG lear
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experiments and stored WMD precurso
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ISG continued to gain more insight
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mid-level scientist who worked at s
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• During the approximate period o
Page 143 and 144: Iraq’s viral BW program began its
Page 145 and 146: cally looted post-OIF (see below, u
Page 147 and 148: Iraqi Retention of Smallpox Culture
Page 149 and 150: Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Bt is a
Page 151 and 152: Figure 7. Example of dual-use biolo
Page 153 and 154: Drying Process/Carrier/Particle Siz
Page 155 and 156: tank was used only for storage and
Page 157 and 158: Figure 9. Sign at the entrance to F
Page 159 and 160: Two 1,000-liter, stirred, jacketed
Page 161 and 162: Weaponization Between the late 1980
Page 163 and 164: use with either a chemical or a BW
Page 165 and 166: Concealment And Destruction of Biol
Page 167 and 168: • Former MIC director ‘Amir Ras
Page 169 and 170: • The amount of each agent produc
Page 171 and 172: Detailed Accounting of Iraq’s R-4
Page 173 and 174: Despite an extensive interview prog
Page 175 and 176: Figure 13. 1m 3 Stainless steel mob
Page 177 and 178: Background Annex A Bulk BW Agents U
Page 179 and 180: Annex B BW Research and Development
Page 181 and 182: Al Hamath The Al Hamath facility wa
Page 183 and 184: Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vac
Page 185 and 186: • All buildings, which were found
Page 187 and 188: Figure 4. Two 1,000-liter, stirred,
Page 189 and 190: Annex C ISG Investigation of Iraq
Page 191 and 192: ate the claim of a mobile BW progra
Page 193: of accommodating rail cars. However
Page 197 and 198: Present Fermentor Design Feature Cr
Page 199 and 200: do. In summary, their conclusion is
Page 201 and 202: storage of gas cylinders other than
Page 203 and 204: • During the production cycle, ve
Page 205 and 206: Figure 8. Solids in the bottom of t
Page 207 and 208: • Process was skid mounted and wa
Page 209 and 210: • Clear operating instructions to
Page 211 and 212: Figure 9. Process fl ow diagram of
Page 213 and 214: • Undated Republican Guard Report
Page 215 and 216: Glossary and Acronyms Term or Acron
Page 217 and 218: CCHF Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Feve
Page 219 and 220: End User EOD EP ETGC EU EUC EW FAE
Page 221 and 222: HTPB HUMINT HVD IAEA IAEC IAF IAH I
Page 223 and 224: M18 M19 M20 M21 M22 M23 M40 MABOT M
Page 225 and 226: Oil for Food Program OMI OMV ONAREM
Page 227 and 228: SME SOE SOMO SOTI SPO SRBM SRC SRG
Page 229 and 230: UNSCR UNSCR UNSYG UO2 UO4 UoB URENC
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