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Doing Business in 2005 -- Removing Obstacles to Growth

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52 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005<br />

• In 2003 Unefon, the cellphone unit of the Mexican<br />

broadcaster TV Azteca, was at risk of defaulting<br />

on a $325 million loan from its biggest creditor, Nortel.<br />

Nortel sold the debt to a private company, Codisco Investments,<br />

at a steep discount, for $107 million. Four<br />

months later, Unefon paid back the full $325 million<br />

debt. Codisco netted $218 million. But TV Azteca neglected<br />

to tell investors that half of Codisco was owned<br />

by its controlling shareholder. 14<br />

• In 2003 Italian dairy-foods giant Parmalat defaulted<br />

on a $185 million loan, prompting auditors to inspect financial<br />

statements. It turned out accounts were falsified<br />

to hide $10 billion in losses and $620 million misappropriated<br />

to other family owned companies. More than $9<br />

billion of Parmlat’s reported assets could not be traced. 15<br />

FIGURE 7.3<br />

Rich countries disclose the most<br />

Disclosure index<br />

GREATER<br />

DISCLOSURE<br />

Source: Doing <strong>Business</strong> database.<br />

5.5 OECD high income<br />

3.9 East Asia & the Pacific<br />

3.6 Europe & Central Asia<br />

3.2 South Asia<br />

2.6 Middle East & North Africa<br />

2.4 Sub-Saharan Africa<br />

2.3 Latin America & the Caribbean<br />

5.3 Rich<br />

3.7 Middle income<br />

2.6 Poor<br />

The common element in these cases: a lack of disclosure.<br />

None of the controlling shareholders informed<br />

minority investors of their ownership in related companies.<br />

This is legal in many countries. In Mexico, Russia<br />

and 70 other countries neither the corporate law nor the<br />

securities law required such disclosure. An external audit<br />

finally caught the Parmalat scandal, but managers were<br />

able to simply invent assets for 15 years without close<br />

scrutiny from audit committees. In Turkey and 67 other<br />

countries, the combination of both internal audit committees<br />

and external audits to catch and disclose such<br />

behavior is not required.<br />

Canada, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom and the<br />

United States have the most disclosure requirements of<br />

any country (table 7.2). Rich countries mandate much<br />

higher disclosure than do developing countries. East<br />

Asia has the most disclosure of any developing region.<br />

Latin America has the least (figure 7.3).<br />

TABLE 7.2<br />

Rich countries disclose the most<br />

Most Disclosure Index Index<br />

Canada 7 Japan 6<br />

Israel 7 Korea, Rep. 6<br />

Spain 7 Lithuania 6<br />

United Kingdom 7 Nigeria 6<br />

United States 7 Philippines 6<br />

Australia 6 Slovakia 6<br />

Austria 6 South Africa 6<br />

Chile 6 Sweden 6<br />

Czech Republic 6 Taiwan, China 6<br />

France 6 Thailand 6<br />

Hong Kong, China 6 Tunisia 6<br />

Ireland 6 Zimbabwe 6<br />

Source: Doing <strong>Business</strong> database.<br />

These indicators come from a new survey of corporate<br />

and securities lawyers. 16 The data measure the most<br />

stringent level of required disclosure, reflecting the<br />

choices of small investors to put their money in publicly<br />

listed or privately held companies. In countries where<br />

stock exchange regulations and securities laws are in<br />

force, the disclosure index assesses these regulations. In<br />

other countries, the disclosure requirements come from<br />

the company law. So the indicators are relevant for private<br />

companies as well as publicly listed ones.<br />

Disclosure of ownership shows who has enough<br />

power to appoint managers and determine business<br />

strategy. If an investor illicitly gains control of the business,<br />

he may expropriate the investments of small shareholders<br />

and do so legally by voting for transactions that<br />

benefit him at the expense of others. Four types of ownership<br />

disclosure reduce this possibility: information on<br />

family, indirect or beneficial ownership, and on voting<br />

agreements between shareholders.<br />

Family ownership. First, investors would like to know<br />

whether a large shareholder expands his control of the<br />

business when another member of his family buys shares.<br />

Some countries—such as Canada, Japan, and Norway—<br />

mandate disclosure of ownership by immediate family<br />

members. Others go further. The Czech Republic requires<br />

disclosure for “any related person.” Still others impose<br />

no requirements whatsoever, including such rich<br />

countries as Germany and Italy, as well as middle income<br />

ones as Egypt.<br />

Indirect ownership. A second disclosure that benefits<br />

small investors is that of indirect ownership. Yoshisuke<br />

Aikawa, the founder of Nissan, describes a classic example.<br />

Consider a wealthy Japanese family that establishes<br />

a business, Choten Corp, with ¥1 billion. 17 The family

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