Macmillan

4 BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
logicaldemands,for the maintenance of a definitemode of
life. For example, that the certain is worth more than the
imcertaințhat illusion is less valuable than "truth": such
valuations, in spite of their regulativeimportance for us,
might notwithstanding be only superficial valuations, special
kinds of niaiserie, such as may be necessary for the
maintenance of beingssuch as ourselves. Supposing,in effect,
that man is not justthe "measure of things.". .
.
The falseness of an opinionis not for us any objectionto
it: it is here,perhaps țhat our new languagesounds most
strangely Ṭhe questionis,how far an opinionis life-furthering,
life-preserving, species-preserving, perhapsspeciesrearing;and
we are fundamentallyinclined to maintain that
the falsest opinions(to which the syntheticjudgments a
prioribelong),are the most indispensable to us;
a recognition of logicalfictions,
that without
without a comparisonof
realitywith the purelyimaginedworld of the absolute and
immutable,without a constant covmterfeiting of the work
by means of numbers,man could live" not that the renun-j
ciation of false opinionswould be a renunciation of life,
negationof life. To recogniseuntruth as a condition oflifei
that is certainly to impugn the traditionalideas of value
a dangerous maimer, and a philosophywhich ventures to d"]
so, has therebyalone placeditselfbeyond good and
evil.
That which causes philosophers to be regardedhalf-dis
trustfully and
half-mockingly, is not
ery how innocent they are " ^how
the oft-repeated disco\
often and easilytheyma