Cyber Primer

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Cyber threats Case study 5 – Insider threats Disgruntled or subverted employees may seek to exploit cyberspace to cause harm to their employers, organisations or nation in a number of ways. US Army Private Bradley Manning November 2010: Wikileaks published 251,000 State Department diplomatic correspondence, obtained by Bradley Manning, a US Army private stationed at Baghdad in 2009. Manning was sentenced to 35 years imprisonment. Canadian Navy Officer Jeffrey Paul Delisle January 2012: Royal Canadian Naval Officer Jeffrey Paul Delisle, working at Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship Trinity in Halifax, disclosed large amounts of highly classified intelligence to his Russian handler. Delisle was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden May 2013: release of classified United States National Security Agency material through disclosures leaked to The Guardian and Washington Post newspapers, while employed by contractor – Booz Allen Hamilton. A series of exposés revealed details on programmes such as the interception of United States and European telephone data, and the PRISM, XKeyscore, and Tempora Internet surveillance programmes. Snowden is currently residing in Russia. 44 Cyber Primer (2nd Edition)
Cyber threats Case study 6 – The impact of encryption Who What How Against whom Why Increasing complexity of encryption on Apple mobile devices The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) versus Apple. On 16 February 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym for the Central District of California ordered Apple to disable an iPhone’s auto-erase function, a feature that deletes a smartphone’s data after ten failed passcode attempts. The FBI had brought the case in an attempt to gain access into San Bernardino shooter Syed Rizwan Farook’s phone to see who he was in contact with, and confirm any ties to ISIS. (Note: the case was suspended following the FBI’s employment of a third party to gain access to the phone’s data, and subsequent reporting indicates nothing useful to the FBI’s case was found on the iPhone.) Due to the security features built into the software of Farook’s iPhone, the FBI was unable to unlock the phone and access its data using a brute-force passwordguessing technique. This method involves entering different passcodes repeatedly until the correct one is guessed, without running the risk that the device will permanently lock them out. Essentially, the FBI wanted the courts to impose an order on Apple to create a new software tool to enable law enforcement agencies to eliminate specific security protections the company built into its phone software to protect customer data, and unlock Apple devices such as iPhones themselves. The enhanced security is due to Apple being one of the few companies that designs its own software and hardware, including chips, thus enabling the iPhone to exclusively accept software signed with Apple’s own encryption key. Apple does not have the means to disable the auto-erase function, which it introduced along with other security measures in iOS 8 (Apple‘s operating system) following Edward Snowden’s leak on the National Security Agency’s capabilities. When 16 February 2016. Impact Apple argues that once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks – from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. This case is unique to Apple, due to it being one of the few companies that designs its own software and hardware, including chips. This enabled Apple to introduce the extra-strength encryption that lies at the heart of the issue of individual security versus state security. This issue is likely to endure. More information Background to the issue can be found at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/samcorey/stupid-is-as-stupid-votes_b_9287370.html Cyber Primer (2nd Edition) 45
Page 1 and 2: Cyber Primer Second Edition Develop
Page 3 and 4: Cyber Primer The Cyber Primer (2nd
Page 5 and 6: Preface ‘The Government will ensu
Page 7 and 8: Contents Preface . . . . . . . . .
Page 9 and 10: “In the information age almost al
Page 11 and 12: Fundamentals of cyber Chapter 1 - F
Page 13 and 14: Fundamentals of cyber • are ready
Page 15 and 16: Fundamentals of cyber cyber and cyb
Page 17 and 18: Fundamentals of cyber • details o
Page 19 and 20: Mainstreaming, competencies, unders
Page 21 and 22: Fundamentals of cyber 1.27. Cyber b
Page 23 and 24: 1A.5. Armed attack. Armed attack is
Page 25 and 26: Fundamentals of cyber Notes Cyber P
Page 27 and 28: “In the “We information reserve
Page 29 and 30: Cyber threats Chapter 2 - Cyber thr
Page 31 and 32: Cyber threats 2.5. Cyber attacks ca
Page 33 and 34: Cyber threats 2.9. Terrorists. Terr
Page 35 and 36: Cyber threats b. Payload. Payload i
Page 37 and 38: Cyber threats The process of attrib
Page 39 and 40: Phishing Spear phishing Whaling Fak
Page 41 and 42: Cyber threats Malware types Viruses
Page 43 and 44: Cyber threats and/or securely. Such
Page 45 and 46: How Against whom Why Theft of perso
Page 47 and 48: Cyber threats Using Twitter to mani
Page 49 and 50: Cyber threats Cyber attacks against
Page 51: Cyber threats State use of cyber op
Page 55 and 56: Cyber threats Impact of malware on
Page 57 and 58: Cyber threats Social engineering ag
Page 59 and 60: “In the information age almost al
Page 61 and 62: Chapter 3 - Cyber functions Cyber f
Page 63 and 64: Cyber functions levels, they protec
Page 65 and 66: Cyber functions • command and con
Page 67 and 68: Cyber functions 3.16. Indicators an
Page 69 and 70: Cyber functions Maritime Land Air a
Page 71 and 72: Cyber functions 3.27. Electromagnet
Page 73 and 74: “In the information “It is impo
Page 75 and 76: Integrating cyber operations Chapte
Page 77 and 78: Integrating cyber operations Cyber
Page 79 and 80: Integrating cyber operations archit
Page 81 and 82: Integrating cyber operations physic
Page 83 and 84: Integrating cyber operations NATO a
Page 87 and 88: Integrating cyber operations Israel
Page 91 and 92: Lexicon Lexicon Part 1 - Acronyms a
Page 93 and 94: Part 2 - Additional terms and defin
Page 95 and 96: Lexicon information operations Info
Page 97 and 98: Lexicon TEMPEST TEMPEST refers to t
Page 99 and 100: Lexicon Cyber Security Information

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