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Cyber Primer

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Integrating cyber operations<br />

Case study 3 – Alleged cyber attack against a state’s<br />

critical national infrastructure<br />

<strong>Cyber</strong> attack against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure<br />

Who<br />

Although the United States’ Department of Homeland Security, who conducted<br />

the analysis, did not name any group or nation as being responsible for causing<br />

the power cuts, independent analysts have linked the spear-phishing attack to<br />

Russia – iSight Partners, a United States security firm, said the probable culprit<br />

was the so-called ‘Sandworm Team’, a Russian hacking group it has been tracking<br />

for more than a year.<br />

What<br />

<strong>Cyber</strong> attack against three Ukrainian regional electric power distribution<br />

companies (Oblenergos) that cut power to 225,000 people in Ukraine. The<br />

attack is thought to be the first known successful cyber attack aimed at critical<br />

national infrastructure.<br />

How<br />

A report written by the cyber emergency response team in the Industrial Control<br />

Systems arm of the Department of Homeland Security said the attack had several<br />

stages and initially involved hackers installing malware on computer systems at<br />

power generation firms in Ukraine, probably facilitated by a spear-fishing email<br />

sent to an employee.<br />

The cyber attack was reportedly synchronised and coordinated across the three<br />

locations, probably following extensive reconnaissance of the target networks.<br />

According to company personnel, the cyber attacks at each company occurred<br />

within 30 minutes of each other and impacted multiple central and regional<br />

facilities. During the cyber attacks, malicious remote operation of the breakers<br />

was conducted by multiple external individuals using either existing remote<br />

administration tools at the operating system level or remote industrial control<br />

system (ICS) client software via virtual private network (VPN) connections. The<br />

companies believe that the actors acquired legitimate credentials prior to the<br />

cyber attack to facilitate remote access.<br />

While the power was cut, the attackers also bombarded customer service phone<br />

lines with fake calls to stop customers reporting the cut.<br />

80<br />

<strong>Cyber</strong> <strong>Primer</strong> (2nd Edition)

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