PUTIN’S RESET

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will be used, including preventively and with the use of nuclear weapons.” 114 In 2008, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, then-Commander of the Strategic Missile Troops, said “some of our ICBMs could be targeted at missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, and subsequently at other such facilities.” 115 In 2009, Sergei Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, said that Russian nuclear policy “does not rule out a nuclear strike targeting a potential aggressor, including a preemptive strike, in situations critical to national security.” 116 In March 2015, Russia’s Ambassador to Denmark Mikhail Vanin made, perhaps, the most explicit of the nuclear targeting threats: “I don’t think that Danes fully understand the consequence if Denmark joins the American-led missile defense shield. If they do, then Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles.” 117 In May 2016, Putin said that Poland will be in Russia’s “cross hairs” and the Russian Defense Ministry declared Romania could be turned into “smoking ruins.” 118 Since the beginning of Russian aggression in Ukraine, a main focus of Russian nuclear threats has been on deterring a NATO counter attack. 119 In February 2016, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, U.S. Army commander in Europe noted that “they [Russia] do talk a lot about using tactical nuclear weapons.” 120 In July 2016, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Curtis M. Scaparrotti noted, “Russian doctrine states that tactical nuclear weapons may be used in a conventional response scenario.” 121 General Bradshaw has also stated that the NATO rapid deployment force must be armed with the same weapons Russia has, that is, tactical nuclear weapons. 122 Unfortunately, this won’t happen. These weapons have almost entirely been eliminated by NATO nations. With regard to the remaining gravity bombs, a 2009 NATO information publication proclaimed, “…NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces.…Taking further advantage of the improved security environment, NATO has taken a number of steps to decrease the number and readiness levels of its dual-capable aircraft.” 123 Unlike the U.S., Russia is now introducing new nuclear capabilities, both strategic and tactical. A declassified August 2000 CIA report stated that there were “powerful advocates” for the development of very low-yield nuclear weapons in the Russian military and the Atomic Energy Ministry and the range of applications for sub-kiloton nuclear weapons “could include artillery, air-to-air missiles, ABM weapons, anti-satellite weapons, or multiple rocket launchers against tanks or massed troops.” 124 In 2009, the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Commission report said Russia was 40
developing “low-yield tactical nuclear weapons including an earth penetrator.” 125 In May 2014, in a major nuclear exercise presided over by Putin, Russia announced the launch of several tactical nuclear-capable missiles and bombardment rockets. 126 According to one NATO diplomat, “What worries us most in this strategy is the modernization of the Russian nuclear forces, the increase in the level of training of those forces and the possible combination between conventional actions and the use of nuclear forces, including possibly in the framework of a hybrid war.” 127 RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION There is a fundamental difference between U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear modernization programs. U.S. modernization will begin in the late 2020s, is partial and involves four systems through 2040, of which only two are now under contract. Every year since 1997, Russia has introduced modernized strategic nuclear strike capability, improving its deterrent and war fighting capability in a serious way. Deployed Russian forces are likely to increase even if we assume compliance with New START, reaching about 3,000 actual deployed warheads by about 2030. 128 A few of the new Russian systems are dual-capable (i.e., conventional and nuclear). Their announced programs include over 20 new or modernized strategic delivery systems, most of which are clearly new (i.e., post-Cold War designs). They are: 129 • A new road-mobile and silo-based Topol-M Variant 2 (SS-27 Mod 1) ICBM. • A new RS-24/Yars/SS-27 Mod 2 derivative with a Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) payload. • Improved versions of the Soviet legacy SS-N-23 SLBM called the Sineva and the Liner with many more warheads. • A new six warhead Bulava-30 SLBM being deployed on two types of the new Borey class submarine. • A program to give the legacy SS-19 ICBM a hypersonic glider vehicle. • Modernization of Blackjack (Tu-160) and Bear (Tu-95) heavy bombers which are armed with: 1) a new stealthy long-range strategic nuclear cruise missile designated the KH-102; and 2) the new stealthy longrange KH-101 cruise missile which, in December 2015, President Putin revealed “can be equipped either with conventional or special nuclear warheads.” • A program to produce at least 50 more of an improved version of the Tu-160 heavy bomber. 41
Page 1 and 2: PUTIN’S RESET The Bear is Back an
Page 3 and 4: Table of Contents FOREWORD 5 BY FRA
Page 5 and 6: Foreword By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. A
Page 7 and 8: strategic and tactical nuclear arse
Page 9 and 10: How Putin’s Aggression Has Been B
Page 11 and 12: objectives stem not just from Putin
Page 13 and 14: Korea and Iran and a slew apologies
Page 15 and 16: Break.” 6 Pifer argued it is unfa
Page 17 and 18: The Obama administration had no cho
Page 19 and 20: close relations with Moscow - with
Page 21 and 22: Like similar warnings by Obama offi
Page 23 and 24: International Criminal Court could
Page 25 and 26: Russia’s Goals and Objectives in
Page 27 and 28: disappearing. In this context, our
Page 29 and 30: Putin’s ruling “coalition,” a
Page 31 and 32: masquerades as the last bastion of
Page 33 and 34: In the Middle East, Primakov counte
Page 35 and 36: locations providing the greatest st
Page 37 and 38: Russian Nuclear Weapons, Strategic
Page 39: large theater exercises. 103 In Jan
Page 43 and 44: RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS In
Page 45 and 46: missiles, airborne threats includin
Page 47 and 48: Forces Command stated, “Moscow’
Page 49 and 50: deployed Russian cruise missile, th
Page 51 and 52: The following chart by Michaela Dod
Page 53 and 54: Russia’s New Military in the Serv
Page 55 and 56: The strategic implications of this
Page 57 and 58: its armed forces. The state armamen
Page 59 and 60: (ISR) and targeting and the rapid d
Page 61 and 62: EVOLVING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND C
Page 63 and 64: the kind of high intensity, fast-pa
Page 65 and 66: Russian Economic Warfare By Kevin F
Page 67 and 68: What would constitute an external e
Page 69 and 70: etween Russia and China have never
Page 71 and 72: Martyn Davies, chief executive offi
Page 73 and 74: as a roadmap to expand local curren
Page 75 and 76: Russia would likewise fund efforts
Page 77 and 78: methods and motivations of Russia-d
Page 79 and 80: The Unsolved Mystery Behind the Act
Page 81 and 82: organized a “public commission”
Page 83 and 84: organized crime. After this meeting
Page 85 and 86: adherents of the radical current of
Page 87 and 88: Russia’s New Information War: Wha
Page 89 and 90: action or reaction. An extreme form
Page 91 and 92:
The most stubborn holdouts wound up
Page 93 and 94:
supported of a free press or, more
Page 95 and 96:
On a Washington evening that Novemb
Page 97 and 98:
Putin rewarded his unconventional i
Page 99 and 100:
conservatives (including the Drudge
Page 101 and 102:
frequency with which they are “li
Page 103 and 104:
ESPIONAGE-DRIVEN PROPAGANDA Effecti
Page 105 and 106:
addition to the SVR, or Moscow’s
Page 107 and 108:
The media outlets that Lesin had cr
Page 109 and 110:
This will condition people to be al
Page 111 and 112:
Black Sea Energy Deposits As a Prim
Page 113 and 114:
production climbed from 1 billion c
Page 115 and 116:
sabotage of drill rigs and other en
Page 117 and 118:
The Strange “Death” of Communis
Page 119 and 120:
displayed in a park not far from th
Page 121 and 122:
wrote about the discovery of Soviet
Page 123 and 124:
allegations of pervasive communist
Page 125 and 126:
Breedlove has also described the ex
Page 127 and 128:
the film. In fact, however, the FBI
Page 129 and 130:
About the Authors Stephen Blank is
Page 131 and 132:
Endnotes 1 Allison Quinn, “Vladim
Page 133 and 134:
22 Reid Standish, ‘Russia Is Usin
Page 135 and 136:
43 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “The Rat
Page 137 and 138:
71 Bruce Jones. “Russia searches
Page 139 and 140:
96 Mark B. Schneider, “The Nuclea
Page 141 and 142:
113 “Putin threatens to retarget
Page 143 and 144:
the-european-security-crisis-and-be
Page 145 and 146:
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airch
Page 147 and 148:
139 “New RF-US agreement to repla
Page 149 and 150:
153 “Deputy Defense Minister: Rus
Page 151 and 152:
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx
Page 153 and 154:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pres
Page 155 and 156:
219 Dave Majumdar, “Can America C
Page 157 and 158:
246 “Russia’s secret weapon: cr
Page 159 and 160:
269 Lachlan Markay, “Matt Damon
Page 161 and 162:
292 Carol Matlack, “Losing Crimea
Page 163:
314 Benjamin B. Fischer, “Doubles
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PUTIN’S RESET

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