PUTIN’S RESET

eing revamped, command and control streamlined and weapons systems improved.
It also has trained certain elements of its conventional force structure to support
unconventional or so-called hybrid operations. But in many ways, what has been seen
over the past few years suggests an arc of development in the future that in many ways
reflect the Soviet-era roots of the current Russian government and military. A recent
NATO analysis explains the continuities between the current Putinist approach to its
Soviet-era political and military warfare concepts concludes this way:
In sum, it could be argued that Moscow’s non-linear warfare understanding
reflects a “new” or “renewed” Russian military thought, not a strategy or concept.
It is renewed thinking as it combines the Soviet-legacy Deep Operations Theory
and Reflexive Control Theory in order to create a “disguised blitzkrieg impact.”
In doing so, Moscow uses a core group of elite troops along with a wide array of
non-military means while concealing its true geopolitical intentions and
surreptitiously influencing its competitors’ decision-making algorithms. 207
NEW RUSSIAN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES
There is no question that the military modernization program begun in the
mid-2000s has been more successful than many observers at the time expected. The
Russian Ministry of Defense simplified the overall command structure, reduced the
number of units to a manageable set of fully staffed and equipped formations and
developed an exercise and training regime to support rapid concentration and
deployment.
A focused modernization program has now provided the military, but
especially the ground forces, with a set of new capabilities focused, in particular, on
countering well-documented U.S. and NATO advantages. What some sources have
described as Russian “New Generation” warfare includes, in addition to information
operations, new operational concepts, innovative tactics and weapons systems:
• Electronic warfare
• Unmanned aerial systems
• Massed fires with advanced warheads and sub-munitions
• Combined arms brigades with new armored vehicles
• Air assault and Special Operations brigades
• Advanced, mobile anti-aircraft systems, and
• Combined kinetic and cyber strike operations. 208
The Russian government has matched its reforms in military organization
with an impressive, albeit unfinished, program to modernize the technological base of
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