PUTIN’S RESET

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Europe, retired U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove, described the Russian A2/AD problem this way: We have the tools, but we do not have nearly enough of them – and the speed that we would need to eliminate these A2/AD bubbles – to be able to deploy our forces is going to be controlled by the depth of the bench of how we can attack those A2/AD forces. . . Right now, we’re almost completely dependent on air forces and aviation assets in order to attack the A2/AD problem . . . We need more long-range, survivable, precision strike capability from the ground . . .We need dense capability – like the dense A2/AD networks that we face. 219 Over the past three years, the Russian armed forces have conducted no fewer than18 large-scale exercises, some of which have involved more than 100,000 troops and several of which simulated nuclear attacks against NATO allies. 220 The Zapad 2013 exercise, which took place in the Baltic region involved the deployment of an estimated 70,000 troops including land, sea, air, air defense, airborne, Special Forces, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Interior, medical units and army psychological personnel, logistical and engineering forces. Among the missions demonstrated were: search and rescue; amphibious landing and anti-landing; air and ground strikes on enemy targets; submarine and anti-submarine warfare; missile strikes with long-range precision strike assets; and airborne and air assault operations. 221 The current Russian military buildup is driven by a strategic vision of full spectrum dominance involving capabilities to conduct rapid decisive operations in space, cyber space, air, land and naval domains. In the view of Stephen Blank, To judge from its procurements, the current large-scale comprehensive buildup of weaponry through 2025 aims to acquire a multi-domain, strategic-level reconnaissance-strike complex as well as a tactical-level reconnaissance-fire complex that would together give Russia high-tech precision forces that could conduct operations in space, under the ocean, in the air, on the sea and the ground, and in cyberspace. This force would have parity with the U.S. and NATO in conventional and nuclear dimensions of high-tech warfare, and therefore the capability to deter and intimidate NATO. It would also have strategic stability, which Russia defines to include non-nuclear strike capabilities, and therefore sustain non-nuclear and pre-nuclear (i.e., before conflict starts) conventional deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict, including against internal threats, which now feature prominently in Russia’s defense doctrine. 222 60
EVOLVING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND CONCEPTS The final area where Russian defense investments have paid off is in nuclear weapons. Russia is a major power because it, along with the United States, is the largest nuclear weapons state in the world. With respect to theater nuclear weapons, the Russian inventory is estimated to be ten times that of the United States. Russia is modernizing every part of its nuclear force posture. In May 2016, Russia announced the deployment of a massive new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a replacement for the aging SS-18. This missile, the RS-28 Sarmat – dubbed by the Western media ‘Son of Satan” or the ‘Satan II’ – will be the world’s largest nuclear missile and due to be operational in 2016. The RS-28 reportedly can reportedly carry a payload between 4 to 10 tons. At 10 tons, it will be able to carry 10 heavy or 15 medium independently-targeted thermonuclear warheads. 223 Russia is modernizing the rest of its ICBM force, deploying an advanced submarine that will carry a new ballistic missile and adding dual capable cruise and ballistic missiles to its theater land and sea forces. It is clear that Russia has violated the 1987 INF Treaty by developing cruise and ballistic missiles that exceed permissible ranges. The 2014, 2015 and 2015 State Department reports Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments have all stated that Moscow is in violation of its INF Treaty obligations. The 2016 report declared that: the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty. 224 Nuclear weapons are at the heart of Putin’s geo-political strategy for reasserting Russian influence not only in the near-abroad but also in Europe as a whole. The Kremlin believes that if Europe remains vulnerable to Russian nuclear threats it can be influenced, even coerced on subjects such as Ukraine. In effect, Moscow hopes that this threat will encourage NATO and the EU to stand by as the Russian empire is recreated. According to the former head of the Russian General Staff, Yuri Baluyevsky: the purpose of expanding the inventory of short-range, nuclear armed ballistic missiles was “to erect a system of national security assurance” with missiles that could target cities in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic and, as a result, “cool the heads of these states leaders.” 225 Nuclear weapons also play a crucial role in 61
Page 1 and 2:
PUTIN’S RESET The Bear is Back an
Page 3 and 4:
Table of Contents FOREWORD 5 BY FRA
Page 5 and 6:
Foreword By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. A
Page 7 and 8:
strategic and tactical nuclear arse
Page 9 and 10: How Putin’s Aggression Has Been B
Page 11 and 12: objectives stem not just from Putin
Page 13 and 14: Korea and Iran and a slew apologies
Page 15 and 16: Break.” 6 Pifer argued it is unfa
Page 17 and 18: The Obama administration had no cho
Page 19 and 20: close relations with Moscow - with
Page 21 and 22: Like similar warnings by Obama offi
Page 23 and 24: International Criminal Court could
Page 25 and 26: Russia’s Goals and Objectives in
Page 27 and 28: disappearing. In this context, our
Page 29 and 30: Putin’s ruling “coalition,” a
Page 31 and 32: masquerades as the last bastion of
Page 33 and 34: In the Middle East, Primakov counte
Page 35 and 36: locations providing the greatest st
Page 37 and 38: Russian Nuclear Weapons, Strategic
Page 39 and 40: large theater exercises. 103 In Jan
Page 41 and 42: developing “low-yield tactical nu
Page 43 and 44: RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS In
Page 45 and 46: missiles, airborne threats includin
Page 47 and 48: Forces Command stated, “Moscow’
Page 49 and 50: deployed Russian cruise missile, th
Page 51 and 52: The following chart by Michaela Dod
Page 53 and 54: Russia’s New Military in the Serv
Page 55 and 56: The strategic implications of this
Page 57 and 58: its armed forces. The state armamen
Page 59: (ISR) and targeting and the rapid d
Page 63 and 64: the kind of high intensity, fast-pa
Page 65 and 66: Russian Economic Warfare By Kevin F
Page 67 and 68: What would constitute an external e
Page 69 and 70: etween Russia and China have never
Page 71 and 72: Martyn Davies, chief executive offi
Page 73 and 74: as a roadmap to expand local curren
Page 75 and 76: Russia would likewise fund efforts
Page 77 and 78: methods and motivations of Russia-d
Page 79 and 80: The Unsolved Mystery Behind the Act
Page 81 and 82: organized a “public commission”
Page 83 and 84: organized crime. After this meeting
Page 85 and 86: adherents of the radical current of
Page 87 and 88: Russia’s New Information War: Wha
Page 89 and 90: action or reaction. An extreme form
Page 91 and 92: The most stubborn holdouts wound up
Page 93 and 94: supported of a free press or, more
Page 95 and 96: On a Washington evening that Novemb
Page 97 and 98: Putin rewarded his unconventional i
Page 99 and 100: conservatives (including the Drudge
Page 101 and 102: frequency with which they are “li
Page 103 and 104: ESPIONAGE-DRIVEN PROPAGANDA Effecti
Page 105 and 106: addition to the SVR, or Moscow’s
Page 107 and 108: The media outlets that Lesin had cr
Page 109 and 110: This will condition people to be al
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Black Sea Energy Deposits As a Prim
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production climbed from 1 billion c
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sabotage of drill rigs and other en
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The Strange “Death” of Communis
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displayed in a park not far from th
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wrote about the discovery of Soviet
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allegations of pervasive communist
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Breedlove has also described the ex
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the film. In fact, however, the FBI
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About the Authors Stephen Blank is
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Endnotes 1 Allison Quinn, “Vladim
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22 Reid Standish, ‘Russia Is Usin
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43 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “The Rat
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71 Bruce Jones. “Russia searches
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96 Mark B. Schneider, “The Nuclea
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113 “Putin threatens to retarget
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the-european-security-crisis-and-be
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http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airch
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139 “New RF-US agreement to repla
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153 “Deputy Defense Minister: Rus
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http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx
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https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pres
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219 Dave Majumdar, “Can America C
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246 “Russia’s secret weapon: cr
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269 Lachlan Markay, “Matt Damon
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292 Carol Matlack, “Losing Crimea
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314 Benjamin B. Fischer, “Doubles
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PUTIN’S RESET

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