PUTIN’S RESET

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RUSSIAN MISSILE AND AIR DEFENSES Part of Russia’s Soviet legacy was a massive air defense system and the world’s only operational missile defenses. In modern Western terminology, these are “antiaccess/area denial” weapons. According to General Frank Gorenc, the U.S. air advantage in Europe “is shrinking” and “the more alarming thing is their [Russia’s] ability to create anti-access/area denied [zones] that are very well defended” by ground-based anti-aircraft missiles. 146 (Emphasis in the original). In 2016, General Robin Rand, Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, told the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that the Minuteman III will have a difficult time surviving in the active anti-access/area denial environment of the future and if it “is used to be a deterrent for this nation, then it needs to have a high probability that it will get to the target that it’s intended for.” 147 In the 1960s, Minuteman was reportedly provided chaff counter measures against the emerging Russian missile defenses, 148 obviously not the systems they now have or that they are about to deploy. For decades, there has been no indication of modern penetration devices on U.S. Minuteman and Trident missiles in Department of Defense presentations to the Congress. Today, Russia is building what it calls an “aerospace defense” system designed to defend against all types of U.S. and NATO airborne and missile weapons. It has the potential to degrade both the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the ability of NATO to defend conventionally the weaker treaty members bordering Russia. In 2012, then- Lieutenant General Oleg Ostapenko, then- Aerospace Defense Troops commander, lists one of main functions of the Aerospace Defense forces as: “Destroying ICBM and SLBM warheads and destroying or functionally suppressing enemy military spacecraft.” 149 In 2011, then-Russian Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov announced that Russia’s missile defenses would be “impenetrable.” 150 They won’t be, but they can erode our nuclear deterrent and our ability to use airpower to defend against a Russian conventional attack. Russia will soon have two systems that can intercept ICBMs and SLBMs – the Moscow ABM system and the S-500. The Moscow ABM is being upgraded into the improved A-235 configuration. 151 Today, there are more ABM interceptors deployed at Moscow than the entire planned U.S. missile defense force. The main Russian defense against ICBMs and SLBMs will be the multirole S-500. Russian generals state that it is capable of intercepting ICBMs as well as medium-range 44
missiles, airborne threats including aircraft, cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles and that the system is capable of intercepting missiles in near space. 152 Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said the S-500 “can destroy aerodynamic and ballistic targets of all types…” 153 Lieutenant General Ostapenko said that the S-500 can intercept “low-orbital satellites and space weapons” and “intercontinental ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of the trajectory and, within definite limits, in the midcourse sector.” 154 The S-500 will obviously be more capable than the new Russian S-400 against stealth aircraft and other types of air breathing targets. The announced S-500 range is 600-km, presumably against non-stealth aircraft. 155 Because of the limited range of many U.S. conventional air-launched cruise missiles, the S-500 has the potential to intercept many of the aircraft that carry them before the missiles can be launched. This could give Russia a significant advantage because U.S. land-based missile defenses, other than the Patriot, have no self-defense capability against aerodynamic threats. This is a direct result of designing systems against rogue state threats rather than against Russia. In April 2015, Aerospace Forces Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Viktor Gumenny said that delivery of the S-500 system to the troops will begin “soon.” 156 The announced Russian S-500 program involves the deployment of 10 battalions by 2020. 157 They will not likely make that date but their deployment is not likely to end at 10 battalions. The new Russian S-400, with an announced intercept range of up to 400-km, is operational. 158 The Russians say the S-400 is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a velocity of 4.8-km per second (a range of about 3,000-km), bombers, and cruise missiles. The announced S-400 program involves the deployment of 56 battalions. 159 The Russians are also deploying a new mobile SAM system called the S- 300V4. They have just announced that it has a new 400-km range interceptor. 160 Former Almaz-Antey’s Chief Designer Pavel Sozinov told TASS this “means that Airborne early warning and control aircraft, including AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), will now be unable to enter the 400-kilometer zone without repercussions.” 161 Russia is also developing the medium-range mobile S-350E Vitaz. 162 45
Page 1 and 2: PUTIN’S RESET The Bear is Back an
Page 3 and 4: Table of Contents FOREWORD 5 BY FRA
Page 5 and 6: Foreword By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. A
Page 7 and 8: strategic and tactical nuclear arse
Page 9 and 10: How Putin’s Aggression Has Been B
Page 11 and 12: objectives stem not just from Putin
Page 13 and 14: Korea and Iran and a slew apologies
Page 15 and 16: Break.” 6 Pifer argued it is unfa
Page 17 and 18: The Obama administration had no cho
Page 19 and 20: close relations with Moscow - with
Page 21 and 22: Like similar warnings by Obama offi
Page 23 and 24: International Criminal Court could
Page 25 and 26: Russia’s Goals and Objectives in
Page 27 and 28: disappearing. In this context, our
Page 29 and 30: Putin’s ruling “coalition,” a
Page 31 and 32: masquerades as the last bastion of
Page 33 and 34: In the Middle East, Primakov counte
Page 35 and 36: locations providing the greatest st
Page 37 and 38: Russian Nuclear Weapons, Strategic
Page 39 and 40: large theater exercises. 103 In Jan
Page 41 and 42: developing “low-yield tactical nu
Page 43: RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS In
Page 47 and 48: Forces Command stated, “Moscow’
Page 49 and 50: deployed Russian cruise missile, th
Page 51 and 52: The following chart by Michaela Dod
Page 53 and 54: Russia’s New Military in the Serv
Page 55 and 56: The strategic implications of this
Page 57 and 58: its armed forces. The state armamen
Page 59 and 60: (ISR) and targeting and the rapid d
Page 61 and 62: EVOLVING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND C
Page 63 and 64: the kind of high intensity, fast-pa
Page 65 and 66: Russian Economic Warfare By Kevin F
Page 67 and 68: What would constitute an external e
Page 69 and 70: etween Russia and China have never
Page 71 and 72: Martyn Davies, chief executive offi
Page 73 and 74: as a roadmap to expand local curren
Page 75 and 76: Russia would likewise fund efforts
Page 77 and 78: methods and motivations of Russia-d
Page 79 and 80: The Unsolved Mystery Behind the Act
Page 81 and 82: organized a “public commission”
Page 83 and 84: organized crime. After this meeting
Page 85 and 86: adherents of the radical current of
Page 87 and 88: Russia’s New Information War: Wha
Page 89 and 90: action or reaction. An extreme form
Page 91 and 92: The most stubborn holdouts wound up
Page 93 and 94: supported of a free press or, more
Page 95 and 96:
On a Washington evening that Novemb
Page 97 and 98:
Putin rewarded his unconventional i
Page 99 and 100:
conservatives (including the Drudge
Page 101 and 102:
frequency with which they are “li
Page 103 and 104:
ESPIONAGE-DRIVEN PROPAGANDA Effecti
Page 105 and 106:
addition to the SVR, or Moscow’s
Page 107 and 108:
The media outlets that Lesin had cr
Page 109 and 110:
This will condition people to be al
Page 111 and 112:
Black Sea Energy Deposits As a Prim
Page 113 and 114:
production climbed from 1 billion c
Page 115 and 116:
sabotage of drill rigs and other en
Page 117 and 118:
The Strange “Death” of Communis
Page 119 and 120:
displayed in a park not far from th
Page 121 and 122:
wrote about the discovery of Soviet
Page 123 and 124:
allegations of pervasive communist
Page 125 and 126:
Breedlove has also described the ex
Page 127 and 128:
the film. In fact, however, the FBI
Page 129 and 130:
About the Authors Stephen Blank is
Page 131 and 132:
Endnotes 1 Allison Quinn, “Vladim
Page 133 and 134:
22 Reid Standish, ‘Russia Is Usin
Page 135 and 136:
43 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “The Rat
Page 137 and 138:
71 Bruce Jones. “Russia searches
Page 139 and 140:
96 Mark B. Schneider, “The Nuclea
Page 141 and 142:
113 “Putin threatens to retarget
Page 143 and 144:
the-european-security-crisis-and-be
Page 145 and 146:
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airch
Page 147 and 148:
139 “New RF-US agreement to repla
Page 149 and 150:
153 “Deputy Defense Minister: Rus
Page 151 and 152:
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx
Page 153 and 154:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pres
Page 155 and 156:
219 Dave Majumdar, “Can America C
Page 157 and 158:
246 “Russia’s secret weapon: cr
Page 159 and 160:
269 Lachlan Markay, “Matt Damon
Page 161 and 162:
292 Carol Matlack, “Losing Crimea
Page 163:
314 Benjamin B. Fischer, “Doubles
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PUTIN’S RESET

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