PUTIN’S RESET

deterring threats from NATO and the United States until such time, estimated to be
2025 in Russian strategic assessments, advances in modern weaponry will permit
Moscow to create a regime of conventional deterrence.
It is with these objectives in mind that Russia has been developing a series of
launchers and warheads to permit it to conduct precision low yield nuclear strikes.
These weapons are consistent with the Russian military doctrine’s focus on being able
to employ a limited number of relatively low yield weapons so as to counter Western
conventional superiority and de-escalate a conflict with NATO. Recent major
Russian exercises in the Western Military District have focused in part on the use of
tactical and theater nuclear weapons for the purpose of controlling escalation. 226
One of the primary reasons that Russia has been so steadfastly opposed to the
deployment of missile defenses in Europe, even though proposed defenses will be
incapable of defeating Russian strategic nuclear forces, is because it is concerned that
such capabilities will devalue their nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion with
respect to Europe. For this reason, the hint put forward recently by the Obama
Administration that it is considering accelerating the deployment of theater missile
defenses, the Phased Adaptive Approach, to Eastern Europe, is a significant threat to
the Kremlin.
The Kremlin has become extremely adept at using the threat of nuclear
conflict to intimidate NATO. For a number of years, Russian leaders have warned
that they might use theater nuclear weapons against missile defense sites in Romania
and Poland. In October, the Kremlin announced that it was moving its advanced,
dual-capable, mobile Iskander theater ballistic missile into the Kaliningrad enclave.
From there, the missies can even hold Berlin at risk. 227
CONCLUSION
The successful occupation of Crimea and the current operations to destabilize
Eastern Ukraine belie the general weakness of Russia’s conventional military forces.
Successive modernization campaigns have run afoul of budget difficulties, weaknesses
in the country’s military-industrial complex, the inability to shift from a conscriptbased
to a professional military, a limited pool of acceptable conscripts and political
infighting. Efforts to mimic Western militaries’ transformation from quantity to
quality in military forces have been only partly successful. Despite a significant
increase in defense spending in recent years, the Russian military not only lacks
sufficient modern equipment, but also lacks many of the critical enablers to support
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