merged

Political bias, 9-4, 12-7
Political patronage, 15-8
Politics of trade restrictions, 16-6
Polls, 28-3
Pollution, 5-3, 14-5, 14-9, 27-7
Pollution control, 27-6-8
“Population Bomb, The”, 14-9
Population density, 15-5, 19-10
Population growth rates, 14-9-10, 15-4-6
Pork barrel legislation, 28-5
Positive rate of time preference, 26-1
Positive statements, 1-6
Potential deposit multiplier, 10-6
Poverty, 14-2, 31-8-9
Poverty line, 31-9
Poverty rate, Intro-3, 31-9
“Power of Productivity, The”, 15-9-12, 19-10
Pre-existing conditions, 30-11-12
Preferences, 3-3
Prescription medicines, 13-11
Present value, 26-4-5
Present value table, 26-9
President, 11-1, 11-10
Presley, Elvis, 22-2, 28-7
Price, 3-1-14, 5-1, 6-5, 7-3, 8-1, 10-3, 10-9-10,
16-5, 17-1-11, 18-1-4, 21-1-9, 22-3-8, 23-3-8
Price ceiling, 3-9-10, 15-7
Price controls, 2-7, 3-6, 3-9-11, 10-12, 14-5,
15-7, 25-10
Price discrimination, 22-8
Price elasticity of demand, 13-2, 13-7, 17-1-5,
17-8-12, 25-2, 30-2
Price elasticity of supply, 13-7, 17-7-8
Price-fixing agreement, 29-7
Price floor, 3-9-11, 12-9, 30-3
Price index, 4-2-4
Price level, 4-1-4, 5-5-6, 6-1, 6-6-11, 7-6-9,
8-1, 10-10, 11-4-6, 12-1-8
Price level stability, 4-1, 4-9, 10-10, 11-4, 14-5
Price Loss Coverage program, 30-5
Price supports, 30-3
Price taker, 21-2
Prime lending rate, 12-9
Principal, 11-6, 19-3
Principal-agent problem, 19-3, 19-7, 28-7
Prisoners’ dilemma, 23-7-9, 27-9
Private market equilibrium, 13-5, 17-11, 27-2
Private markets, 27-1, 28-1, 29-1
Private nonprofit firms, 19-8
Private property, 2-5-6
Private property rights, 14-4-6, 15-5-6,
27-5
Private sector, 9-5, 11-9, 13-1, 13-4, 13-9,
14-5, 25-1
Producer interests, 15-9, 15-12
Producer’s surplus, 2-1, 3-7, 3-11, 13-4,
16-3-5, 17-10-13
Product differentiation, 23-1-2, 23-4
Product markets, 3-1, 5-9
Production, 10-1, 13-5, 14-4, 18-6, 19-1, 19-8,
20-1-6, 21-3, 22-2
Production possibilities frontier, 2-2-5, 14-2
Production techniques, 14-3
Productive capacity, 9-5, 14-2
Productivity, 1-2, 6-5, 13-2, 13-5, 14-3-4,
15-9-12, 16-1, 16-8, 19-2, 26-2, 26-7, 31-7
Profit as a signal, 26-7
Profit-maximization, 1-5, 2-6, 3-4, 19-3-4,
19-7, 20-2, 21-3, 21-7-8, 22-5-7, 23-2, 23-6
Profit-maximization for a monopsony, 25-7
Profit-maximization rule, 21-3-4, 21-8, 22-4,
23-2, 24-2, 29-1
Profit-maximization rule for employing factors,
24-2
Profits, 5-10, 6-2-3, 21-5
“Progress Paradox, The”, Intro-3-4
Progressive taxes, 13-1-2, 13-7, 31-9
Property rights, 2-9, 12-10
Property taxes, 13-2
Proportional taxes, 13-1
Proprietorship, 19-4-5
Protectionist tariff, 12-8
“Proven reserve” of petroleum, Intro-3
Prozac, 22-1
Public choice theory, 28-1
Public choice theory of regulation, 29-4
Public education, 31-9
Public employee union, 25-1
Public franchise, 22-1-2, 22-10
Public goods, 14-5, 27-8
Public interest theory of regulation, 29-4
Public nonprofit firms, 19-8
Public policy, 22-7
Public sector, 13-1, 13-4, 13-9, 14-5, 25-1,
28-1
Public services, 15-7
Purchasing power, 13-4
Quantitative easing 11-3, 11-10-12
Quantity, 17-5, 21-3-6, 22-3-5, 23-6
Quantity demanded, 3-1-5, 3-8-14, 17-1-9,
21-2-4
Quantity of output, 21-6
Quantity supplied, 3-5-14, 17-9, 21-6
Quota(s), 14-5, 15-7, 16-3-5, 22-2
Rabushka, Alvin, 15-6
Radford, R.A., 10-10-11
Ragan, James F. Jr., 25-8
Railroad Mileage in the U.S., 1-3
Rate of return, 6-2-3, 8-1, 8-12, 26-2, 31-13
Rational ignorance, 28-2, 28-4
FOR REVIEW ONLY - NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
Index - 11