Damming at gunpoint(English Version)

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Recent developments along the Salween “Joint development will make border areas more open and help eliminate bad people, minority people and bad things hidden along the border and ensure greater security.” Thai Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyud (Bangkok Post, 27 November 2002) Until the beginning of 2002, Thai and Burmese troops stationed along the Salween did not have close relations. Thai boats traveling along the Salween River were often shot at by Burmese troops. However, since 2003, the Thai and Burmese army units stationed along the border seem to be enjoying a closer relationship. This may be linked to the plans to build the dam. In particular, the Burmese Army’s Southeastern Regional Command (in control of Papun) has developed closer relations with Thai Army Task Force 36 based along the Salween River. Local sources say that in mid-2003 (prior to the ceasefire talks between KNU and the regime that began later that year) KNU leaders were told by Thai authorities not to launch any military attacks against the Burmese troops along the Salween border. On the Burma side, since 2002, many SPDC garrisons along the Salween river bank, usually on strategic mountain peaks, have been fortified and fenced with barbed wire, and surrounded by landmines. Heavy artillery has also been installed there. According to KNU military sources, there are 120 mm mortars at the bases at the bases at Maw Rit Kyo (close to Wei Gyi), Ler Toe (close to Dar Gwin) and Maw Mo Kyo (close to the Salween-Moei river junction) Roads have also been improved for transportation of troops’ supplies. 61
62 DAMMING AT GUNPOINT In March 9, 2004, the Thai Army facilitated a trip for their Burmese army counterparts to the Thai town of Maesariang, in southern Mae Hong Son province. In this border area, hitherto there had been no formal border committee between the two countries, as at other border trade points. The last feasibility study of the sites was conducted in November 2003 by EGAT. Local KNU authorities tried to prevent the team from conducting the survey. A local woman activist described their efforts to stop the survey: “We put up a signboard “No Dam” as a protest on our raft hut. One Thai commander came and asked us to take it down. He said, ‘This is not good. If the Burmese come, I will not allow you people to escape to the Thai side’”. Interview with a member of Salween Eyes, March 2004 Such threats place the local KNU administration in a difficult position in relation to the dam issue. “It [the dam] is really a headache. In previous years, the IDPs in our areas used to cross the border [into Thailand] when the enemies came. Now, if we do not cooperate with them [Thai soldiers], maybe the consequences will be like what they (the Thai soldiers) said.” Interview KNDO commander in the area, March 2004 The latest KNU-SPDC ceasefire talks started in November 2003. The KNU proposed the withdrawal of Burmese troops and garrisons in the Papun District area to allow the resettlement of IDPs to their home village sites, but the Burmese army has not accepted the proposal, and justified their presence in terms of ‘national security.’ In fact, their motive in controlling the area is clearly to facilitate and profit from border trade and the building of the Salween dam. A villager staying in a village on the Salween River informed the KRW: “A Burmese commander came a few months ago and the commander asked us to pray for the construction of the dam to be materialised as soon as possible.” Interview with Klaw Hta Villager, September 2003 However, far from heeding this advice, on March 16, 2004, over 100 Karen villagers from nearby communities travelled to the Wei Gyi dam site and conducted an animist ceremony to call on the local spirits to protect the river.
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DAMMING AT GUNPOINT BURMA ARMY ATRO
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Rich men dam the water Flooding the
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements
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Acknowledgements We would like to t
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Burma facts • The Burmese regime
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Summary As Thailand proceeds with p
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Rationale Introduction This report
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INTRODUCTION 5 Dam and the Karen Hu
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INTRODUCTION 7 PHOTO:KRW (2003) KRW
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Dams and the Burmese military regim
Page 22 and 23: The Salween dam plans The Salween R
Page 24 and 25: The Wei Gyi and Dar Gwin dams in Ka
Page 26 and 27: THE SALWEEN DAM PLANS 15 Table 2. P
Page 28 and 29: Political context of the dams in Ka
Page 30 and 31: Papun pre-1992: The Salween under K
Page 32 and 33: THE SALWEEN UNDER KAREN CONTROL 21
Page 38 and 39: Burma Army tactics to seize control
Page 40 and 41: BURMA ARMY TACTICS TO SEIZE CONTROL
Page 42 and 43: INCREASED BURMA ARMY PRESENCE 31 1i
Page 44 and 45: INCREASED BURMA ARMY PRESENCE 33 PH
Page 48 and 49: INCREASED BURMA ARMY PRESENCE 37 Fo
Page 52 and 53: INCREASED BURMA ARMY PRESENCE 41 Se
Page 54 and 55: INCREASED BURMA ARMY PRESENCE 43 th
Page 56 and 57: INCREASED BURMA ARMY PRESENCE 45 PH
Page 58 and 59: Conditions around the planned dam s
Page 60 and 61: CONDITIONS AROUND THE PLANNED DAM S
Page 74 and 75: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ALONG THE SALWE
Page 76 and 77: Impacts of the dam It is certain th
Page 78 and 79: IMPACTS OF THE DAM 67 Villagers bel
Page 80 and 81: IMPACTS OF THE DAM 69 PHOTO:KRW(200
Page 82 and 83: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 71
Page 84 and 85: APPENDICES 73 have so much medicine
Page 86 and 87: Appendix 2: SPDC garrisons in Papun
Page 88 and 89: Nov1994 Jan 1995 May 1995 July 1996
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