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Lot's Wife Edition 1 2017

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The Tension Between Artistic And Moral Judgements<br />

edition one<br />

lot’s wife<br />

For most people, the initial answer is uncontroversial.<br />

It’s obvious that the unsavoury details of an artist’s private and<br />

working life, for instance, don’t interfere with our appraisal of their<br />

works as a matter of general principle. If someone were to ask you<br />

“did you like Crime and Punishment?”, it would be eccentric to reply “I<br />

can’t say, I haven’t read Dostoevsky’s biography yet”. So far, so good;<br />

this seems pretty clear.<br />

When we refer to acts, intentions and consequences in the<br />

real world, the term ‘good’ is often used as a moral assessment;<br />

to art, ‘good’ is an assessment of quality. Both are normative, not<br />

descriptive, uses of the term—they express a particular point of<br />

view and not a matter of bare fact, but the resemblance stops there.<br />

We respect the critical distinction between art and morality while<br />

things go smoothly, when our artists don’t behave too badly to<br />

warrant our attention when appraising their work, or when the<br />

work doesn’t transgress our moral norms too far. If an artist is a<br />

conventionally good person, for instance, we don’t consider their<br />

works intrinsically better as a consequence; authors like Dan Brown<br />

and Stephenie Meyer seem to be decent enough people, yet this<br />

doesn’t affect the literary (de-)merit of their novels.<br />

But some artists do some incredibly, extraordinarily despicable<br />

things, and this makes the idea that ‘bad people can make good art’<br />

more of a burden to maintain for consistency’s sake, rather than<br />

a harmless platitude. When we learn of an artwork’s unsavoury<br />

background history, it often becomes impossible to ‘unsee’ it<br />

in the work, and as much as we want to pretend that art can be<br />

disassociated from its questionable origins, few of us would be<br />

willing to fully accept this in practice. What are we to make of a<br />

painting of a child by the convicted sex offender Rolf Harris? How<br />

are we to aesthetically and disinterestedly assess the artistic merit<br />

of the portrayal of sexual violence in the film Rosemary’s Baby, when<br />

the director Roman Polanski was to commit statutory rape not ten<br />

years later?<br />

This becomes an even more prickly issue when we consider<br />

artworks that include real moral wrongs—how can we critique,<br />

on purely aesthetic grounds, the brutal real-life slaughter of a<br />

water buffalo in Apocalypse Now? For many, that sort of thing<br />

could impinge on the merit of the work, as it brought about real<br />

suffering. Perhaps we could try to make some qualifications here for<br />

consistency’s sake. When we say that morality is distinct from art,<br />

we may moderate this claim—perhaps when we make judgements,<br />

morality is only distinct from art as imitation. If a person or animal<br />

is harmed in a film in the making of an artwork, our judgements<br />

on the work are no longer a matter of aesthetic taste. A snuff film,<br />

however tastefully shot, is not art as it shows reality essentially as<br />

it is.<br />

Art is, at its core, representation; an artwork is a creation one step<br />

removed from reality, and not the reality itself; and if what we are<br />

observing is a real-life evil on the film screen, we can criticise it as<br />

we would a real-life action. Therefore, when Bernardo Bertolucci<br />

not only permitted, but included in his film the sexual assault<br />

of actor Maria Schneider in Last Tango in Paris, we have sufficient<br />

warrant to criticise not only Bertolucci as committing a moral<br />

wrong, but also to condemn the quality of the film itself, as the<br />

wrong has occurred beyond the realm of representation and into<br />

the concrete world that permits moral critique. If the assault was<br />

a make-believe performance, on the other hand, we would have no<br />

warrant to do so.<br />

Yet this doesn’t seem so intuitively correct when we apply this<br />

‘art as mimesis’ criterion to harmless instances of reality seeping<br />

into art. If we watch a short film of a man drinking tea, and he<br />

is in fact drinking tea, it is dogmatic to insist that we are not<br />

watching art, but just a movie of a man drinking tea. If anyone puts<br />

something forward that can be observed aesthetically, it can be<br />

regarded as art and interpreted accordingly.

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