Advanced Technology Aircraft Safety Survey Report - Australian ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Given direct trackin to a point not in FMC while in terminal area. Had to ask for vectors. Problem with CAA not suppying P Jeppesen with new way-points. Intercepting and track outbound on a VOR radial. Requires a lot of buiton pushing to fly in INAV As there is no VOR IOC mode, only other alternative is increased workload of flying and intercept in HDG mode. Intercepting a VOR radial is almost impossible on short notice. The aircraft has to be flown in heading select up a fix line or a waypoint and a track built. When given a 'direct to' clearance to a point I am not familiar with or not on my fli htplan, without ATC HDG steer I have to look for the point and enter it into the FMS. I am uncom 4 ortable with the length of time to do it. I have had to ask for initial HDG steer whilst ascertaining the position. Low altitude level-off Box B2.7f Examples of written responses relating to low altitude level-off. low altitude level-off i.e. 1,500 ft, 2,000 ft, 3,000 ft. On departure from a short runway requiring hi h power, we were given a very low initial level-off altitude. Just after rotation the aircraft captured t 1 e assigned altitude but the thrust stayed in THRUST HOID. Some quick MCP selections were required to stop an overspeed of the flaps occurring. Level-off after takeoff is an area of concern for me as this causes problems with speed control. Low altitude level-off after takeoff during turning departure. ATC runway heading maintain 2,000 ft. Must be very quick with AT, CAB commands to overspeeds/excursions. Departure Cairns (B767) ATC, maintain 2,000 h, after takeoff to level 06 and keep speed within limits that was beyond the capability of the automatics. Changes to SlDs Box B2.79 Examples of written responses relating to changes to SlDs Change of departure SID on line up, request to immediate roll, also change of level restriction. ATC changed the ATC clearance during initial take-off phase. Sudden last minute changes to departure clearances at Brisbane. Low level altitude restrictions, sudden changes to headings all at odds with initial departure clearance. Taxiing for departure Sydney with runway change. Fi ures extracted prior to engine start are now calculated under increased pressure with most cases t 5: e captain not checking the figures. Runway change below l0,OOO ft Sydney. 8 NM final with runwa change from runway 161 to 16R, this requires the support pilot head down in the box for a whd. On departure from Shanghai Airport, given last minute different SID with take-off clearance. Too many changes to FMC. Frankfurt, last minute change of departure runway to one with minimal taxi time. ATC expected us to be able to just 'line up and go' and were not aware of need to re-calculate data and then reprogram the FMC. The common theme among these comments appears to be that pilots can at times experience difficulty changing a preprogrammed component of the flight. The later the pilot receives the advice of the change, the more difficult it becomes to program the particular change, assimilate new information, accommodate changes and maintain situational awareness. The degree of difficulty may be greater when these changes are carried out in adverse weather conditions. Several situations were reported where it was impossible for the pilot to reprogram the FMC prior to landing. In these cases the pilots elected to go around or hand-fly the aircraft. 15
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY SURVEY REPORT 16 Summary and conclusions <strong>Aircraft</strong> and ATC systems have undergone significant advances in recent decades. However, the results of this survey suggest that some of these developments have occurred in an uncoor- dinated fashion and that issues of system compatibility between airborne and ground-based systems have not always been addressed. Many pilots considered that air traffic controllers do not take full advantage of the capabilities of modern aircraft and sometimes impose unrealistic requirements on pilots. It appears that the design philosophy and aerodynamic characteristics of advanced technology aircraft have not always been Considered by the designers of ATC procedures. Of particular concern are the reports that pilots are sometimes required to disconnect automated systems to comply with ATC requirements, particularly on approach. Automated systems have the potential to improve the safety and efficiency of flight and unnecessary reversions to manual operation are not desirable. Some individual air traffic controllers appear to be unfamiliar with the descent profiles of advanced technology aircraft. A program of controller familiarisation flights on the flight decks of advanced technology aircraft (or in full-flight simulators) could help to provide this knowledge. The survey identified the most frequent situations in which pilots had difficulty complying with ATC instructions. These were late changes of runway, speed changes, STARs and changes to STARs, changes to instrument approaches, difficulties with holding patterns, unanticipated navigational requirements, low altitude level-offs and changes to SIDs. As can be seen, most of these difficulties occurred on approach rather than departure. When considering potential improvements in ATS procedures, designers would do well to give particular attention to making approach procedures more compatible with the characteristics and capabilities of advanced technology aircraft. When asked to identify a location where ATC procedures were of concern, pilots nominated a large range of geographical areas, including regions with advanced ATS systems and regions with less advanced systems. These results will to some extent reflect the pilots’ familiarity with various regional ATC systems and the frequency with which they fly in these regions. Nevertheless, the responses to this question seem to indicate that advances in ATC technology do not necessarily guarantee a higher level of pilot satisfaction with the system. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the majority of pilots do not agree that controllers sometimes ask for information which is difficult to extract from the FMC/FMGS in a reasonable amount of time. This may reflect the nature of the initial inquiry and the pilot’s skill in retrieving information from the FMC. Pilots revealed that their main concerns related to any nonessential requests shortly following takeoff, and requests involving off-track waypoints or navigation aids. These involved considerably more input into the FMC than when preprogrammed data was queried. There are many aspects of flight operations which affect the analysis of question B2.6 (‘I am concerned about the ATC procedures within the following geographical area’), for example, the frequency of flights and familiarity with ATC procedures. Notwithstanding these considerations, the results are not as clear-cut as might be expected. The responses to this question would seem to confirm that advances in technology do not necessarily guarantee a better or safer operating environment.
Page 1 and 2: Department of Transport and Regiona
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A
Page 5 and 6: ATC and situational awareness Terra
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Bureau of Air S
Page 9: asic automate ations, navigation, s
Page 12 and 13: ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY
Page 16 and 17: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AIR TRAFFIC CON
Page 18 and 19: 70% - 60% - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FIG
Page 20 and 21: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FIGURE B2.4 The
Page 22 and 23: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL the responses t
Page 26 and 27: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL By nominating s
Page 30 and 31: 9 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFE
Page 40 and 41: GENERAL Introduction This chapter a
Page 42 and 43: FIGURE B9.2 Have you detected any F
Page 44 and 45: accident near Cali, Colombia (12 De
Page 46 and 47: GENERAL It appears that much of the
Page 58 and 59: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SITUATIONAL A
Page 60 and 61: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FIGURE B4.1 I
Page 62 and 63: SITUATIONAL. AWARENESS FIGURE B4.4
Page 64 and 65: SYSTEM DESIGN Introduction Research
Page 66 and 67: FIGURE B1.2 It is easy to detect wh
Page 68 and 69: SYSTEMS DESIGN Some reported accide
Page 70 and 71: Table B5.3 'I am sometimes forced t
Page 72 and 73: TRAINING Introduction The introduct
Page 74 and 75:
TRAINING The majority of respondent
Page 76 and 77:
FIGURE B8.5 My training has prepare
Page 78 and 79:
Provision of a FMGS for hands-on tr
Page 80 and 81:
TRAINING Im roved tech manuals, e l
Page 82 and 83:
TRAINING The depth of training, the
Page 84 and 85:
WORKLOAD WORKLOAD Introduction The
Page 86 and 87:
FIGURE 86.2 In an emergency, automa
Page 88 and 89:
Normal ops automation is very benef
Page 90 and 91:
A COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Conclusion Although this comparison
Page 98 and 99:
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY
Page 100 and 101:
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY
Page 102 and 103:
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 6. MODES
Page 104 and 105:
REFERENCES Aeronautica Civil of the
Page 106 and 107:
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE DETAILS e SURV
Page 108 and 109:
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Questions 2.1 t
Page 110 and 111:
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY
show all

Advanced Technology Aircraft Safety Survey Report - Australian ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?