Advanced Technology Aircraft Safety Survey Report - Australian ...

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ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY SURVEY REPORT 20 Automation surprise Figure B1.6 shows that 61% of respondents agreed that with automation there are still some things that took them by surprise. Automation surprise can be defined as a weakness in a pilot’s mental model of the automated environment that results in the pilot being ‘surprised’ by the difference between the expected and actual performance of the aircraft. For example, subtle mode reversion (commonly between Vertical Speed mode and Flight Level Change mode) may result in an unexpected change in aircraft performance from what was expected by the pilot. Common verbal responses to automation surprise are ‘What is it (the aircraft) doing now?’, and ‘Why did it (the aircraft) do that?’ This weakness has been attributed to a lack of mode awareness and inadequacies in training. Sarter and Woods (1995) have discovered weaknesses in the mental models pilots had developed of how the FMS functions in specific situations. They concluded that training must go beyond teaching how to operate the automated systems to teaching how the automated systems operate. Ongoing learning programs are also needed to help pilots refine their mental models of how automation works. Table B1.6.1 summarises the responses of those pilots who agreed with the statement, ‘With automation there are still some things that take me by surprise’. A statistically significant difference was observed between the responses of Airbus and Boeing pilots. Airbus pilots were more likely to report experiences of automation surprise than Boeing pilots. It should be noted that Boeing pilots had considerably more experience on type than Airbus pilots (see table B1.6.2), and this may account for some of the differences between groups. Table B1.6.1 ’With automation there are still things that take me by surprise.’ Captain First officer Airbus 68% 73% Boeing 55% 65% Table B1.6.2 Hours on type by aircraft manufacturer Mean hours on type Minimum recorded hours Maximum recorded hours Airbus 1,789 Boeing 2,379 0” type on type 5 10 6,800 9,999
FIGURE B1.6 With automation there are still some things that take me by surprise 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% .. 54.89% Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree No Response Altitude capture The weakness in the mental model is not necessarily the fault of the pilot. Poorly annunciated mode changes can leave the pilot several steps behind the aircraft. The pilot anticipates that the aircraft will respond to the last selected mode, whereas the aircraft may have reverted to a sub-mode and will behave in a different manner than expected. As in the previous question (B1.6), this also provides evidence of a weakness in the pilot’s mental model, particularly in relation to mode awareness. Fifteen per cent of respondents indicated that the FMC/FMGS sometimes fails to capture an altitude as they expect (see fig. B1.7). FIGURE B1.7 The FMC/FMGS sometimes fails to capture an altitude as I expect 80% 1 - I 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 2 0% 10% 0% Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree No Response 21
Page 1 and 2: Department of Transport and Regiona
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A
Page 5 and 6: ATC and situational awareness Terra
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Bureau of Air S
Page 9: asic automate ations, navigation, s
Page 12 and 13: ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY
Page 16 and 17: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AIR TRAFFIC CON
Page 18 and 19: 70% - 60% - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FIG
Page 20 and 21: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FIGURE B2.4 The
Page 22 and 23: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL the responses t
Page 24 and 25: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Given direct tr
Page 26 and 27: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL By nominating s
Page 30 and 31: 9 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFE
Page 40 and 41: GENERAL Introduction This chapter a
Page 42 and 43: FIGURE B9.2 Have you detected any F
Page 44 and 45: accident near Cali, Colombia (12 De
Page 46 and 47: GENERAL It appears that much of the
Page 58 and 59: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SITUATIONAL A
Page 60 and 61: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FIGURE B4.1 I
Page 62 and 63: SITUATIONAL. AWARENESS FIGURE B4.4
Page 64 and 65: SYSTEM DESIGN Introduction Research
Page 66 and 67: FIGURE B1.2 It is easy to detect wh
Page 68 and 69: SYSTEMS DESIGN Some reported accide
Page 70 and 71: Table B5.3 'I am sometimes forced t
Page 72 and 73: TRAINING Introduction The introduct
Page 74 and 75: TRAINING The majority of respondent
Page 76 and 77: FIGURE B8.5 My training has prepare
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Provision of a FMGS for hands-on tr
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TRAINING Im roved tech manuals, e l
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TRAINING The depth of training, the
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WORKLOAD WORKLOAD Introduction The
Page 86 and 87:
FIGURE 86.2 In an emergency, automa
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Normal ops automation is very benef
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A COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES
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Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Conclusion Although this comparison
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ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY
Page 100 and 101:
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 6. MODES
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REFERENCES Aeronautica Civil of the
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE DETAILS e SURV
Page 108 and 109:
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Questions 2.1 t
Page 110 and 111:
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY
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