Advanced Technology Aircraft Safety Survey Report - Australian ...

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ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY SURVEY REPORT 44 Table 83.2 ’It worries me that the automated systems may be doing something that I don‘t know about.’ Airbus Boeing Captain first officer 3 3% 16% 35% 20% Mode selection Figure B3.3 indicates that 73% of respondents had inadvertently selected a wrong mode. FIGURE 83.3 On occasion I have inadvertently selected the wrong mode 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree No Response Table B3.3 shows the proportion of respondents who had inadvertently selected the wrong mode, comparing pilot rank by aircraft manufacturer. Specifically, Airbus crews were more likely to report that they selected an incorrect mode than Boeing pilots. Table 83.3 ‘On occasion I have inadvertently selected the wrong mode.’ Airbus Boeing Captain First officer 76% 72% 83% 74% Further analysis revealed that Asian-based pilots were less likely to have selected an incorrect mode than pilots based in Australia and New Zealand. This may correspond with the results of question B3.7 which noted that most Asian-based pilots reported that when it came to mode selection, their company set clear guidelines and procedures.
MODE Subtle mode changes Thirty-one per cent of respondents reported that mode changes can occur without adequate indication (see fig. B3.4). This relates to the adequacy of visual and aural warnings associated with mode changes. Pilots reported that mode changes in the vertical plane (e.g. V/S to FLCH) were particularly subtle and often went unnoticed for long periods. For example, when asked to outline the details of a specific event where they had difficulty with mode selection, mode awareness or mode transitions, pilots made the following written responses: Subtle changes from VNAV PATH to VNAV SPEED during descent. The subtle changes or noticeability of mode changes on the FMA. With VNAV path disconnect aircrah goes silently into control wheel steering mode. FMA annunciations on Saab better than on 6747-400. Saabs flash, where Boeing places a box around the changed mode. There are several situations in which the mode changes subtly causing annoyance, e.g. durin descent in IDLE OPEN plus LNAV, an ATC instruction to adopt a HDG causes a reversion to VS, whicf was not a pilot instructed mode. Mode transition from VNAV PATH, SPEED to VNAV SPEED idle if the aircraft leaves the path the FMC changes are subtle, ;.e. VNAV PATH looks too much liie VNAV SPEED. Sometimes a mode selection will inadvertently disconnect itself with no aural warning. FIGURE B3.4 Mode changes can occur without adequate indication 100% i 90% i 70% i---- -1 I 60% I 50% i 45 03% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% .. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disugree Strongly Disagree No Response Too many modes? Authorities in the field of human/computer interaction (e.g. Norman) have warned that a large number of modes may work against the useability of automated systems. Yet contrary to this, only 9% of respondents agreed that there were too many modes available on the FMC/FMGS (see fig.B3.5). i 45
Page 1 and 2: Department of Transport and Regiona
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A
Page 5 and 6: ATC and situational awareness Terra
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Bureau of Air S
Page 9: asic automate ations, navigation, s
Page 12 and 13: ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY
Page 16 and 17: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AIR TRAFFIC CON
Page 18 and 19: 70% - 60% - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FIG
Page 20 and 21: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FIGURE B2.4 The
Page 22 and 23: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL the responses t
Page 24 and 25: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Given direct tr
Page 26 and 27: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL By nominating s
Page 30 and 31: 9 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFE
Page 40 and 41: GENERAL Introduction This chapter a
Page 42 and 43: FIGURE B9.2 Have you detected any F
Page 44 and 45: accident near Cali, Colombia (12 De
Page 46 and 47: GENERAL It appears that much of the
Page 58 and 59: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SITUATIONAL A
Page 60 and 61: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FIGURE B4.1 I
Page 62 and 63: SITUATIONAL. AWARENESS FIGURE B4.4
Page 64 and 65: SYSTEM DESIGN Introduction Research
Page 66 and 67: FIGURE B1.2 It is easy to detect wh
Page 68 and 69: SYSTEMS DESIGN Some reported accide
Page 70 and 71: Table B5.3 'I am sometimes forced t
Page 72 and 73: TRAINING Introduction The introduct
Page 74 and 75: TRAINING The majority of respondent
Page 76 and 77: FIGURE B8.5 My training has prepare
Page 78 and 79: Provision of a FMGS for hands-on tr
Page 80 and 81: TRAINING Im roved tech manuals, e l
Page 82 and 83: TRAINING The depth of training, the
Page 84 and 85: WORKLOAD WORKLOAD Introduction The
Page 86 and 87: FIGURE 86.2 In an emergency, automa
Page 88 and 89: Normal ops automation is very benef
Page 90 and 91: A COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES
Page 96 and 97: Conclusion Although this comparison
Page 100 and 101:
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY
Page 102 and 103:
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 6. MODES
Page 104 and 105:
REFERENCES Aeronautica Civil of the
Page 106 and 107:
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE DETAILS e SURV
Page 108 and 109:
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Questions 2.1 t
Page 110 and 111:
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY
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