Advanced Technology Aircraft Safety Survey Report - Australian ...

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY SURVEY REPORT
60
Table 61.1
'The FMC/FMGS and associated controls are not user-friendly.'
CarJtain First officer
Airbus 2 7% 21%
Boeing 0% 6%
Similarly, statistically significant differences were noted between the responses of pilots from
different national groups. As expected, significant differences were also noted between pilots
on the basis of their home port.
National groups. Asian groups, Singaporeans and Australians were more positive regarding
the user-friendliness of controls compared to New Zealand, British and European pilots.
Home port. Pilots based in Asian ports (excluding Singapore and Hong Kong), Australia
and Singapore were more positive regarding the user- friendliness of controls than pilots
based in New Zealand, Europe and Hong Kong.
Data entry error detection
Twenty-seven per cent of respondents stated that it was difficult to detect when incorrect data
had been entered into the FMUFMGS (see fig. B1.2).
There are two aspects to this question. Firstly, the acceptance of incorrect data by the
FMC/FMGS, and secondly, the detection of incorrect data.
Tests completed throughout the course of this study revealed that it is possible to insert
incorrect data into the FMC/FMGS. For example, researchers found that it was possible to
insert and execute an end-of-descent point below the elevation of an airfield. However, airline
standard operating procedures prohibited pilots from flying VNAV approaches below the
initial approach altitude.
Data error detection is the other aspect of this question. The pilot is left with only two
methods of error detection, namely, human detection (including physical sensation) or
electronic detection. Through a process of cross-checking, pilots may realise their mistake, or
the FMC/FMGS may generate a warning message or fail to accept some erroneous data.
Either approach highlights a degree of inconsistency. The FMC/FMGS will accept some
erroneous data whereas it will not accept others. The pilot may pick up some mistakes whilst
others may not be discovered. For example:
Wrong runway inserted for Brisbane. Not detected until initial turn off track (due ATlS change).
An incorrect OAT was entered into FMC and not icked up in check. This resulted in the auto-throttles
not bringing sufficient power for takeoff. Manua f ly overridden and corrected during take-off roll with
no further incident.
Pacific random track crossin requiring manual entry of wa
entry error by first
crew combination followed E y duty hand-over prior to ran Error was not detected
until aircraft had /eft correct waypoint towards incorrect navigation
anomaly occurred. Procedures for manual entry and have deteriorated
with increased automation.
Puffing in a wrong departure in the FMS. Both pilots missed the entr The
flown until ATC s otted it. PON 7 D was inadvertently entered insteaJof
ID was a new B eparture included into the database, something which
Information is presented to pilots on CRT or LCD screens. It is possible that pilots experience
the same difficulties during the input of information as computer operators do when editing
information on-screen. The development and application of advanced system logic would
minimise the opportunity for pilots to 'execute' unintentional mistakes.