Advanced Technology Aircraft Safety Survey Report - Australian ...

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT SAFETY SURVEY REPORT
62
The following responses contain examples where incorrect data was corrected:
Upon receiving a route modification the captain selected the position to the top of the second page
and executed without realising the error. Picked up by second officer.
Overly ‘snappy’ FMC pre-fli hting led to cost index 1,000 instead of cost index 7 00 being loaded
(key pad bounce perhaps). Y he higher speed climb was detected airborne.
Wrong data entered for runway due to last-minute change.
When altering the legs age to track direct to a waypoint we passed over a waypoint causing the
incorrect point being ta P en to the top of the legs. The error was recognised prior to it being entered.
Crew awareness
System design and cockpit layout should enhance communication and awareness of crew
activities. It is important that each crew member is aware of the other crew member’s control
inputs, including those involving computer/automated controls.
Figure B1.3 indicates that 25% of respondents reported that they did not always know what
the other crew member was doing with the automated systems. Some pilots commented that
the other crew member had ‘executed’ automated functions without informing them. For
example:
On descent into Sydney where VNAV was engaged by the PF without the PNF being informed.
The ATC requires a minimum rate of climb shortly after t/off. The PF immediately selected v/s on the
MCP without advising the other pilot, resulting in thrust reduction immediately.
FIGURE B1.3
I always know what the other crew member is doing with the automated systems
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
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24.29%
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree No Response
Pilot control inputs
Figure B1.4 shows that 13% of pilots had been surprised to find the pilot not flying (PNF)
making flight control inputs. Boeing and Airbus pilots were equally likely to report this
problem.
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