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straining rules and institutions we need<br />

suitable mechanics of checks and bal-<br />

ances, and of incentives and disincentives<br />

at the points where markets meet the<br />

institutions.<br />

To empower markets, we have to grap-<br />

ple with a range of forces on the supply<br />

and demand sides. I give some examples<br />

to provide an idea of the challenge.<br />

Primary agricultural producers — of<br />

cereals, pulses, oilseeds, vegetables,<br />

fi sh, poultry, meat etc — face disproportionately<br />

large buyers, do not have<br />

access to information of other markets,<br />

lack transport, storage and fi nance.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y are also harassed by local extortionists.<br />

Rent seeking at government offi ces and<br />

panchayats does not allow prices to<br />

refl ect anything close to the cost of<br />

production. Further, the problem is<br />

caught in a vicious cycle, because rent<br />

seeking can abate only when markets<br />

take over in a true sense. <strong>The</strong> circularity<br />

does not have an easy solution as<br />

supervision at decentralised level is<br />

enormously costly and corruptible.<br />

Many industries are subject to extortion<br />

along the entire supply chain from<br />

raw material to the customer. Arbitrary<br />

extortion at different stages of value<br />

addition leads to distortion of relative<br />

prices at these stages. Extortion is a law<br />

and order problem only on the surface.<br />

A nexus between extortion and politics<br />

is clear in most cases.<br />

Many markets are subject to avoidable<br />

transaction costs. Some of them are<br />

visible like multiple tax jurisdictions<br />

and multiple and in-kind subsidies. But<br />

there are many items that are not as<br />

visible, e.g. costs incurred at the stages<br />

of inspection, audit, certifi cation and<br />

clearances.<br />

In many cases markets are prevented<br />

from becoming contestable by carteltype<br />

accommodation or political favouritism.<br />

Obstruction by incumbent<br />

groups usually takes the form of collusion<br />

on input, labour and product pricing.<br />

Political favouritism occurs<br />

through manipulation of tender practices,<br />

bid rigging, deliberate delays,<br />

infl uencing buyers and so on. Legal<br />

action is not easy because of lack of<br />

verifi able evidence and, often, offi cial<br />

complicity.<br />

Subsidy on purchases is widespread.<br />

Some are provided on inputs, e.g. on<br />

power, diesel, petrol, loans etc for farm<br />

or industrial use. Others are plain consumption<br />

subsidy e.g. on travel, accommodation<br />

and other services for government<br />

and public sector employees<br />

and legislators. State governments<br />

provide many additional forms of consumption<br />

subsidies. Many are in kind<br />

and hence highly distortionary.<br />

T RANSFORMATIVE PLANNING<br />

Type and quality of consumer goods<br />

and services are dictated in many local<br />

markets by non-market forces through<br />

the guise of customs, culture and chauvinistic<br />

ideology.<br />

Producers are sometimes forced by<br />

local politicians and musclemen to differentiate<br />

between different parts of an<br />

otherwise undifferentiated market.<br />

Some parts of the markets get priority<br />

supply and servicing. In products where<br />

delivery or servicing takes time, it distorts<br />

the functioning of the market. A<br />

wide variety of markets face this sort of<br />

distortion.<br />

Apart from these, we have to grapple<br />

with organised illegal transactions that<br />

feed into other markets and undermine<br />

effi ciency and fairness. Many of the problems<br />

discussed here arise from unlawful<br />

behaviour. But we cannot eliminate them<br />

through the route of law enforcement<br />

alone because of political connection and<br />

corrupt enforcement machinery. To clean<br />

up, we have to develop economic incentives<br />

and employ technology and e-governance<br />

measures that could lock at least<br />

some illegitimate transactions.<br />

Externalities,<br />

Public Goods and Merit Goods<br />

Even as markets are strengthened, important<br />

markets will continue to fail because<br />

of externality. Secondly, markets are not<br />

able to supply the right amount of public<br />

goods. Third, they produce merit goods<br />

at prices unaffordable to many given today’s<br />

income profi le. But public production<br />

alone cannot settle these supply issues<br />

satisfactorily as it leads to poor<br />

quality, corruption, and indifferent or arrogant<br />

behaviour. Both private and public<br />

production have to be used in these areas<br />

in an astute mix, and a variety of issues<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY REVIEW<br />

55

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