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MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System

MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System

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Simar Holding Corp. v GSC, 27 Misc3d 1219A; 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 975 (Sup. Ct. Kings<br />

Cty. 2010) (Rivera, J.)<br />

In an action seeking specific performance of a 2003 agreement in which Jane Doe purported to<br />

transfer her five story brownstone, valued at $ 1.3 million, to a real estate investor for $400,000, the<br />

court granted the motion of Ms. Doe’s Article <strong>81</strong> guardian (appointed in 2008) seeking summary<br />

judgment rescinding the agreement on the ground of unconscionability. Stating that the case<br />

“shock[ed] the conscience of the court, ” the court emphasized that Ms. Doe had a history of mental<br />

illness (involving psychosis and delusions) which necessitated her involuntary psychiatric<br />

hospitalization in the years immediately preceding and following the execution of the agreement, and<br />

“the fact that [Ms. Doe] sold her home for approximately one third of its appraised value . . . to an<br />

individual whose sister/colleague approached [Ms. Doe] at her home and transported her by car on<br />

multiple occasions to the individual's office, where . . . the transfer eventually occurred without . .<br />

. [Ms. Doe] so much as being in the same room as [the] counsel” that the individual himself solicited<br />

on Ms. Doe's behalf.<br />

Matter of Wonneberger, 2009 NY Slip Op 30573U; 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4842 (Surr. Ct.<br />

Nassau Cty. 2009) (Riordan, J.)<br />

The Surrogate <strong>Court</strong> denied so much of a motion for summary judgment as sought to dismiss the<br />

IP’s step-daughter’s objections to the probate of the IP’s will based on the step-daughter’s claim that<br />

this will, in which the IP, inter alia, had removed her as sole beneficiary of the estate, and had left<br />

half of it to two neighbors, and which was made subsequent to an Article <strong>81</strong> proceeding that was<br />

discontinued by stipulation of the parties, but prior to the commencement of a second Article <strong>81</strong><br />

proceeding which had led to the appointment of a guardian, was procured by undue influence. The<br />

<strong>Court</strong> held that based on the conflicting documents submitted (which included a physician’s<br />

affirmation and the court evaluator’s report, in connection with the first proceeding, a physician’s<br />

affirmation in connection with the second proceeding, affidavits of the IP’s home health aides and<br />

neighbors, and the testimony of attesting witnesses and the attorney who drafted and supervised the<br />

execution of the will), triable issues of fact existed with respect to the issues of the IP’s testamentary<br />

capacity, and whether the will was the product of undue influence.<br />

Matter of Doar (Hermina Brunson), 28 Misc.3d 759; 900 N.Y.S. 2d 593 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty.<br />

2009) (Thomas, J.)<br />

Citing to the legislative intent and express requirements of the 1996 National Housing Act and its<br />

accompanying regulations at 26 CFR 206.41, the Article <strong>81</strong> <strong>Court</strong> placed the burden of proof upon<br />

the mortgage company to establish that it had properly counseled its prospective borrower as to the<br />

consequences of the mortgage and to certify that the AIP understood the consequences of the reverse<br />

mortgages she was taking out. The court then found that the mortgage company had failed to sustain<br />

its burden of proof and voided the mortgages.<br />

96

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