MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
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Matter of Estate of Rose McCloskey, 307 A.D.2d 737; 763 N.Y.S.2d 187 (4 Dept 2003)<br />
An AIP executed a will while there was an Article <strong>81</strong> proceeding pending. At the time her attorney<br />
determined that despite the fact that an Art <strong>81</strong> petition had been filed, the AIP/testator possessed<br />
testamentary capacity and allowed her to execute a will. The <strong>Court</strong> held that although the AIP<br />
testator may have been forgetful and cantankerous, the objectants failed to meet the burden of<br />
proving that she: (1) understood the nature and consequences of executing a will; (2) knew the nature<br />
and extent of the property she was disposing of; and (3) knew those who would be considered the<br />
natural objects of her bounty and her relations with them. Also the court stated in other words that<br />
the AIP/testator “did not suffer from an insane delusion which directly affected her decision not to<br />
leave anything to the [parties objecting to the probate of the will]”<br />
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Matter of Will of Colby, 240 A.D.2d 338; 660 N.Y.S.2d 3; (1 Dept., 1997)<br />
Finding of incapacity under Article <strong>81</strong> is based upon different factors from those involved in finding<br />
of testamentary capacity.<br />
F. Matrimonial law<br />
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Matter of Donald L.L., 82 A.D.3d 72; 916 N.Y.S. 2d 451; 2011 NY Slip Op 943 (4 Dept., 2011)<br />
Guardian brought an action against the AIP’s husband, seeking to enforce a stipulation of settlement<br />
entered in an Article <strong>81</strong> proceeding which divided the couple’s property in a manner similar to<br />
equitable distribution but expressly declined to dissolve the marriage. The husband cross-moved to<br />
vacate the stipulation of settlement, arguing that the guardianship court should not have granted<br />
equitable distribution without having conducted a hearing on the couple’s economic issues. The<br />
Appellate Division disagreed, holding that the economic issues were resolved by the stipulation,<br />
which was the product of extensive negotiations conducted after full disclosure. The court continued<br />
that the trial court had properly refused to apply the equitable distribution law (Domestic Relations<br />
Law § 236 [B]) in view of the couple’s declination to dissolve their marriage.<br />
Matter of Cheryl H., 7/21/10, NYLJ 26 (col.3)(Sup. Ct. Nass. Cty.)(Diamond, J.)<br />
An acrimonious matrimonial action with a custody component involving an autistic son, evolved into<br />
an Article <strong>81</strong> guardianship proceeding when the son became 22 years old. While a custody battle,<br />
the father sought to enforce his visitation rights and his right to be informed about significant<br />
developments with his son. The mother consistently restricted them, arguing that the father did not<br />
properly supervise the son. She refused him access in violation of assorted court orders directing<br />
such access to the son. When the son was 22 years old, the mother petitioned for and was granted<br />
Article <strong>81</strong> personal needs guardianship over her son. The order appointing her directed her to<br />
provide reports to the father and the court, established a detailed visitation schedule, and specifically<br />
found that there was no need for supervised visits for the father. Despite such order, for the next 14<br />
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