MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
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appellant's 91-year-old client and counsel’s failure to comply with two court orders intended to<br />
facilitate findings on exact nature of her disabilities.<br />
st<br />
Matter of Donald F.L. (Mollen), 242 A.D.2d 536; 662 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1 Dept., 1997)<br />
<strong>Court</strong>s refusal to remove guardian unless IP appear for psychological evaluation by court- appointed<br />
psychiatrist and for deposition was not improper. Further, there was insufficient evidence to support<br />
finding that IP had become able to provide for his personal needs or manage his affairs.<br />
I. Discontinuance<br />
Matter of Lee J.P. (Bond), 45 A.D.3d 774; 847 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2nd Dept., 2007)<br />
Where the AIP died before the proceedings were completed and a guardian was appointed, the court<br />
issued an order and judgement terminating the proceeding. That same Order and judgement also<br />
directed one of the AIP’s sisters to repay a sum of money to the AIP’s estate based upon the<br />
allegation that she had misappropriated those funds. The Appellate Division held that the latter<br />
directive must be reversed because the trial court had no authority to proceed beyond a dismissal of<br />
the proceeding as academic except for allowing reasonable compensation to the court evaluator and<br />
counsel.<br />
Matter of Chackers (Shirley W.), 159 Misc.2d 912; 606 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct., NY Cty.,<br />
1993)<br />
<strong>Court</strong> concludes that discontinuance is proper although Art. <strong>81</strong> makes no specific provision for same.<br />
Legislature surely did not intend to cause needless hearings. Even without hearing, if all factors<br />
suggest that no guardian is needed, and all parties agree, Legislature's purpose is met. Discontinuance<br />
must be by court order not stipulation.<br />
Matter of Krishnasastry, NYLJ, 8/25/95, p. 25, col. 1 (Nassau Sup.)(Rossetti, J.)<br />
Petitioner husband, involved in divorce action, instituted and then discontinued guardianship<br />
proceeding for his wife. At issue was who should pay fees of court-appointed evaluator and attorney.<br />
It apparently was unlikely that incapacity of the wife could have been proven. <strong>Court</strong>, noting<br />
petitioner’s partially self-interested motivation for instituting guardianship proceeding and noting<br />
wife’s lack of cooperation, ruled that husband must pay two-thirds and his wife must pay one-third.<br />
Matter of Falick (Mann), NYLJ, 1/19/96, p. 25, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., NY Cty., Miller, J.)<br />
Hospital had petitioned for guardian for an 85-year-old stroke victim. Prior to court’s determination,<br />
she was discharged to nursing home. On recommendation of court evaluator, proceeding was<br />
discontinued because patient continued to functionally improve in therapy and executed a durable<br />
power of attorney to her “devoted, responsible, and caring” niece. <strong>Court</strong> evaluator also felt that her<br />
remaining functional limitations did not impact on her personal needs and property management as<br />
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