MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
MHL ARTICLE 81 - New York State Unified Court System
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permitting him to use IP’s assets to pay legal fees for transaction. Issue was whether amount of legal<br />
fees, set in an extraordinarily high amount by foreign court, is binding on <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> court. NY court<br />
holds that Puerto Rican court could only set fees subject to its approval and awards more reasonable<br />
fees to prevent “an outrageous injustice.”<br />
Matter of Whitehead, 169 Misc.2d 554; 642 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., 1996)<br />
In proceeding brought by co-committees of Canadian IP, who were appointed by Queen's Bench,<br />
Canada, seeking guardian of IP's <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> assets, it is inappropriate for Supreme <strong>Court</strong> to defer to<br />
determination by Queen's Bench as to a counsel fee payable by IP in proceeding before Supreme<br />
<strong>Court</strong>. Setting counsel fee by other than Supreme <strong>Court</strong>'s determination pursuant to §<strong>81</strong>.16 (f) is<br />
contrary to public policy of <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> <strong>State</strong>.<br />
(ii) Other <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> <strong>Court</strong>s<br />
Cathy R. v. Aaron Fischberg, 2003 NY Slip OP 50551U; 2003 NY Misc. LEXIS 67<br />
Resolution of attorneys fees issue within the context of an Art <strong>81</strong> proceedings is res judicata and<br />
the fee issues cannot later be litigated in another court.<br />
E. <strong>Court</strong> Evaluators<br />
(i) Role<br />
Matter of Incorporated Village of Patchogue v. Zahnd, 3/12/2010 , NYLJ 29, (col. 1) Sup. Ct.<br />
Suff. Cty. (Luft, J.)<br />
Counsel for the AIP moved to dismiss petitioner‘s application after presentation of evidence on<br />
petitioner’s prima facia case, arguing that the <strong>Court</strong> should have considered only the sufficiency of<br />
that evidence and that on its own, it is not clear and convincing, a point he emphasized in his<br />
additional application to suspend the appointment of the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator pursuant to §<strong>81</strong>.10(g). The<br />
<strong>Court</strong> concluded, however, that it was appropriate to consider the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator's testimony and<br />
report before ruling on the motion to dismiss. The court reasoned :(1) that while suspension of the<br />
appointment of the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator is permissible in cases in which the <strong>Court</strong> has appointed counsel<br />
for the AIP:, the primary purpose for that authority seems to be to avoid unnecessary expense to an<br />
AIP and determination to forego the benefit of a <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator is generally exercised in the initial<br />
Order to Show Cause or shortly thereafter. Noting that <strong>MHL</strong> <strong>81</strong>.10 does not establish any time<br />
frame for suspension of the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator, the <strong>Court</strong> reasoned that where, as here, the <strong>Court</strong><br />
Evaluator has already conducted an investigation and prepared a written report, the value of<br />
receiving the benefit of the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator's work is outweighed by any cost savings or procedural<br />
advantage the AIP seek in securing the suspension of the <strong>Court</strong> Evaluator. The <strong>Court</strong> further<br />
reasoned that (2) while there is an adversarial element to an Article <strong>81</strong> proceeding, the <strong>Court</strong> must<br />
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