Mind-Munitions

The First World War 177
battle between entire peoples. It was a battle that, despite better
pre-war planning, the Germans were to lose, with dramatic effects
for Europe and the world as a whole.
Within hours of the expiry of the British ultimatum to Germany,
the British cable ship Telconia cut the direct subterranean cables
linking Germany with the United States. Thanks to this prompt and
premeditated action, the British were able to seize the initiative in
what was perhaps the most vital of all the propaganda battles: the
struggle for the sympathy of the American people. In 1914, Britain
and Germany were each other’s best trading partners. On the
outbreak of war it became essential for both to compensate for
their mutual loss by increasing their trade with the rapidly expanding
markets of the United States or, better still, to entice the
Americans into joining their cause. Britain, at the head of the
Allied Powers, was of course better placed than Germany to direct
this campaign against American neutrality by virtue of her common
language and heritage. Even so, great caution was required; no
nation likes to be told where its duties lie, least of all by foreigners
with foreign accents. This was a mistake that was to be made by
the German government, which promptly and blatantly poured
propaganda material into neutral America, using the German-
American societies or bunds as their distribution agents. All the
evidence available to the British government suggested that this
approach was counter-productive.
To wage this highly delicate campaign for securing American
sympathies, the British government set up a secret war propaganda
bureau at Wellington House under the direction of Charles Masterman.
This department was the single most important branch of the
British propaganda organization between 1914 and 1917 and its
work was so secret that even most Members of Parliament were
unaware of it. It was essential to disguise from the American
people the fact that the massive bulk of paper material they were
receiving from Britain about the war – pamphlets, leaflets, cartoons,
and even the news itself – was emanating from Wellington House
under Foreign Office guidance. Several other important – and ultimately
successful – principles of operation were also established.
For example, the British campaign adopted a low-key and highly
selective approach based upon persuasion rather than exhortation.
It was also decided that the best propagandists for the Allied cause
were sympathetic Americans, particularly those in influential