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Mind-Munitions

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246<br />

Propaganda in the Age of Total War and Cold War<br />

even though the Nazis had failed to exploit those secessionist<br />

national groups who had offered to fight for the Germans against<br />

the Bolsheviks. Blinded by his own ideology, Hitler would not<br />

tolerate the idea of Germans fighting alongside these ‘subhuman<br />

scum’ and ‘rats’, and while the Germans went about systematically<br />

wiping them out, Nazi propaganda concentrated on Soviet atrocities<br />

and the torture of the GPU. Goebbels had strong reservations<br />

about statements concerning the German exploitation of the<br />

eastern lands for fear that it would merely stiffen enemy resistance.<br />

There was little of the ‘Slavic subhuman’ in his RMVP propaganda,<br />

which concentrated instead on the ‘Jewish-Bolshevik Murder<br />

System’. But this divergence reflects the multiplicity of voices<br />

coming out of the Third Reich. For example, Robert Ley, head of<br />

the German Labour Front, carried out much party training and<br />

education so that his propagandists could take the ideology of war<br />

into the factories. Alfred Rosenberg, who had been appointed in<br />

1934 as ‘Commissioner of the Führer for Supervision of the Entire<br />

Intellectual and Doctrinal Training and Education of the NSDAP’,<br />

was appointed in 1941 as a minister for the occupied eastern<br />

territories. Rosenberg provided the pseudo-intellectual justification<br />

for the anti-Semitic propaganda. He did not get on with Goebbels,<br />

or with Ribbentrop for that matter, who also despised Goebbels.<br />

Then there was Dietrich in the Führer’s office, with whom Goebbels<br />

was in constant conflict throughout the war, the army propaganda<br />

branch (which produced Signal, the most highly circulated German<br />

magazine of the war), and the propagandists of the SS. All these<br />

men felt that the propaganda activities of the others infringed upon<br />

their exclusive territory.<br />

For Goebbels, the most important instrument of Nazi wartime<br />

propaganda was the radio, over which he exercised more direct<br />

control than the press (if not quite as much as the Wochenschau).<br />

For Goebbels, radio was ‘the first and most influential intermediary<br />

between movement and nation, between idea and man’. The<br />

German radio network consisted of 26 stations and was managed<br />

by the Reich Radio Society and, after 1942, supervised by Hans<br />

Fritzsche, who was also the most important German broadcaster of<br />

the war years. Foreign broadcasts were monitored so that rumours<br />

could be countered. All announcers and radio news editors were<br />

required to attend Fritzsche’s regular ministerial conferences so<br />

that they clearly understood the propaganda line, from which they

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