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Mind-Munitions

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12<br />

Introduction<br />

as experienced by the soldiers. Today, that gap appears to have been<br />

substantially narrowed by the presence of the mass media, and<br />

especially television. But is this in fact the case? Or does it merely<br />

raise new problems for the projection and presentation of warfare?<br />

The Roman writer Livy wrote that ‘nowhere do events correspond<br />

more to men’s expectations than in war’. Yet even volunteer,<br />

professional troops suffer from low morale and even panic if there<br />

is too wide a gap between the expectations of what war will be like<br />

and its realities on the battlefield. Factors such as bad weather,<br />

poor food and low pay can sap the morale of even the best-trained<br />

armies. Discipline and training designed to foster mutual reliance<br />

are essential factors in maintaining good fighting spirit, but this is<br />

difficult with conscripted troops reluctant to fight or fearful of<br />

their fate. Hence the use of incentives such as money, social status,<br />

personal or family or national glory, and even religious promises of<br />

everlasting life. A brave soldier who becomes a war hero might have<br />

all of these things; a coward would be denied them. Hence propagandists<br />

exploit both positive and negative incentives in order to<br />

persuade men to overcome their fear and risk their lives in the most<br />

brutal and terrifying of circumstances.<br />

But what about the reasons for the soldier being there in the first<br />

place? Throughout history, great emphasis has been placed upon<br />

the justness of the cause for which men must go to war. Yet, as Lord<br />

Wavell wrote in 1939, ‘a man does not flee because he is fighting in<br />

an unrighteous cause; he does not attack because his cause is just’.<br />

Wavell’s view was that good morale was determined by the degree<br />

to which a soldier felt part of a cohesive unit, a small core of<br />

mutually reliant individuals, and the degree to which that unit<br />

identified with the society on whose behalf it was fighting.<br />

Propaganda for and about war, therefore, cannot be studied<br />

merely by confining its analysis to the battlefield. It requires a much<br />

wider context extending into every aspect of society. At the end of<br />

the eighteenth century, Thomas Malthus wrote that ‘a recruiting<br />

serjeant always prays for a bad harvest, and a want or unemployment,<br />

or, in other words a redundant population’. Motivating men<br />

to fight – for the history of warfare is largely the history of male<br />

aggression – has always been a major problem for history’s recruiting<br />

serjeants. Hence the need to glorify and publicize military<br />

achievements to a wider public in order to increase the sense of<br />

mutual identification. Soldiers fight better if they know that their

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