Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler

It is true that a British statesman will always follow a pro-British and not a pro-German
policy; but it is also true that certain definite interests involved in this pro-British policy may
coincide on various grounds with German interests. Naturally that can be so only to a certain
degree and the situation may one day be completely reversed. But the art of statesmanship is
shown when at certain periods there is question of reaching a certain end and when allies are
found who must take the same road in order to defend their own interests.
The practical application of these principles at the present time must depend on the answer
given to the following questions: What States are not vitally interested in the fact that, by the
complete abolition of a German Central Europe, the economic and military power of France
has reached a position of absolute hegemony? Which are the States that, in consideration of
the conditions which are essential to their own existence and in view of the tradition that has
hitherto been followed in conducting their foreign policy, envisage such a development as a
menace to their own future?
Finally, we must be quite clear on the following point: France is and will remain the
implacable enemy of Germany. It does not matter what Governments have ruled or will rule
in France, whether Bourbon or Jacobin, Napoleonic or Bourgeois-Democratic, Clerical
Republican or Red Bolshevik, their foreign policy will always be directed towards acquiring
possession of the Rhine frontier and consolidating France's position on this river by
disuniting and dismembering Germany.
England did not want Germany to be a world Power. France desired that there should be no
Power called Germany. Therefore there was a very essential difference. To-day we are not
fighting for our position as a World-Power but only for the existence of our country, for
national unity and the daily bread of our children. Taking this point of view into
consideration, only two States remain to us as possible allies in Europe - England and Italy.
England is not pleased to see a France on whose military power there is no check in Europe,
so that one day she might undertake the support of a policy which in some way or other
might come into conflict with British interests. Nor can England be pleased to see France in
possession of such enormous coal and iron mines in Western Europe as would make it
possible for her one day to play a role in world-commerce which might threaten danger to
British interests. Moreover, England can never be pleased to see a France whose political
position on the Continent, owing to the dismemberment of the rest of Europe, seems so
absolutely assured that she is not only able to resume a French world-policy on great lines
but would even find herself compelled to do so. The bombs which were once dropped by the
Zeppelins might be multiplied by the thousand every night. The military predominance of
France is a weight that presses heavily on the hearts of the World Empire over which Great
Britain rules.
Nor can Italy desire, nor will she desire, any further strengthening of France's power in
Europe. The future of Italy will be conditioned by the development of events in the
Mediterranean and by the political situation in the area surrounding that sea. The reason
that led Italy into the War was not a desire to contribute towards the aggrandizement of
France but rather to deal her hated Adriatic rival a mortal blow. Any further increase of
France's power on the Continent would hamper the development of Italy's future, and Italy
does not deceive herself by thinking that racial kindred between the nations will in any way
eliminate rivalries.
Serious and impartial consideration proves that it is these two States, Great Britain and
Italy, whose natural interests not only do not contrast with the conditions essential to the
existence of the German nation but are identical with them, to a certain extent.