Pueblo-v-Lydia-Echevarria

dicho que para que proceda la revocación por inconsistencia, los veredictos tienen que haberse
basado en evidencia idéntica en cuanto a todos los coacusados. En un caso del siglo pasado se
expresó, sobre el particular, lo siguiente:
"Of course, as a matter of pleading, two may be jointly indicted for the same offense, whether
the offense be in its nature joint or not; and, on a joint trial before a jury, where the offense is not
in nature joint, one may be convicted and the other acquitted, or one may be convicted and the
jury disagree as to the other, provided the evidence warrants the difference in the results. But
where there is but one witness, and his testimony equally affects both, it is simply impossible
that a different result can be legally reached as to the two. Davis v. State of Miss., 23 So. 770,
771 (1898). (Enfasis suplido)
No obstante, este caso fue revocado en 1975 en Newell v. State of Miss., 308 So. 68, 70 (1976)
para acogerse a la doctrina que permite los veredictos inconsistentes. En Newell se juzgó
conjuntamente a dos coacusados del delito de violación. El único testimonio fue el de la víctima.
El Tribunal razonó:
"If the defendants Newell and McCormick had been tried separately on the same indictment and
the testimony had been identical in both cases, and acquittal of one would not affect a verdict of
guilty as to the other. The rule should be the same when they are tried together."
La emisión de veredictos inconsistentes también se ha favorecido por tratadistas:
{DPR 341} "... [i]t has been argued that 'an enlightened jurisprudence should not thus permit the
jailing of accused persons on a record exhibiting verdicts in which a jury simultaneously says
'yes' and 'no' in answer to a single critical question.' But it is better to have such inconsistency
than to try to forbid it. It is well to remember that the 'true rationale for the rule permitting
inconsistent verdicts in a single trial is that a jury may convict on some counts but not on others,
not because they are unconvinced of guilt, but because of compassion or compromise.' The
exercise of such leniency, which is an aspect of the right to jury trial, is preferable to a system in
which jurors, whenever they believed the defendant guilty, 'would be strong-armed into
rendering an all-or-nothing verdict." 3 La Fave & Israel, The Criminal Trial. Deliberations and
Verdict, Sec. 23.7. Notas omitidas.
Es menester concluir que la doctrina y la línea jurisprudencial sobre veredictos inconsistentes no
favorece la contención de la apelante Echevarría Rodríguez. Aunque ésta alega que el veredicto
no estuvo fundamentado en un sentimiento de indulgencia por parte del jurado hacia el
coacusado López Watts, sino que fue consecuencia de error o parcialidad por parte del Jurado,
ella no ha rebatido la presunción de que los jurados siguen las instrucciones impartidas, de que
su función de juzgador se ha descargado conforme a derecho y estuvo desprovista de todo
prejuicio. Además, cualquier argumento que pudiera esgrimir sería completamente especulativo,
toda vez que no se tiene acceso al proceso de deliberación. Sobre este particular, el Tribunal
Supremo Federal ha señalado:
"We also reject, as imprudent and unworkable, a rule that would allow criminal defendants to
challenge inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of
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