atw 2017-09

atw Vol. 62 (2017) | Issue 8/9 ı August/September
554
AMNT 2017
one project – technical visits, workshops,
training courses, expert support
and on-site permanent mission
with 3 experts. The project team
helped in defining essential ­regulatory
processes, in developing an internal
management system and in defining
required staff qualification. They provided
their peers with examples of
good practices in licensing, oversight
and safety assessment and outlined
good practice in performing factory
acceptance tests, establishing of local
TSO, support in international communication
and other aspects. Concerning
the development and use of
regulations, which was also lagging
behind, the team suggested defining
priorities in regulations development,
supported analysis of the vendor
country's (Russia) regulations and
provided draft regulations, methodologies
etc. Finally, concerning the
­human factor, Iuri Iesypenko underlined
that it was important to build
trust through permanent presence
and unofficial communication, to be
aware about personal attitudes and
way of communication and to be
ready to communicate on all relevant
issues. For the last issue it was very
­important to have experts speaking
the national language in the project.
When asked about the licensing
process in Belarus, Iuri Iesypenko
­explained that it was a two-step
­process with a construction and an
operating licence. Commissioning is
part of the operating licence, which
puts a pressure on schedule.
As next speaker, Elmar Wendenkampf
(Chief Advisor Nuclear Safety,
Areva GmbH, and member of the
KTA Executive Committee, Germany)
talked about The Role of KTA
Standards for German Suppliers in
Foreign Countries. Elmar Wendenkampf
set out with an explanation
how KTA standards are created; he
explained their important role in
­Germany in verifying that components
or processes fulfil the legal
­requirement of “precaution against
damage in the light of the state of the
art in science and technology” used in
the Nuclear Energy Act. In order
to be able to fulfil this crucial role,
KTA standards are being checked and
if necessary updated at the latest
every five years. However, as Elmar
Wendenkampf explained, this work
will be discontinued after 2022 due
to the German nuclear phase-out
with the last nuclear power plants
scheduled to go offline end of 2022.
For special standards with relevance
for decommissioning a solution has to
be agreed to ensure their availability
until end of decommissioning.
Next, he turned to the international
relevance of KTA standards. As he
­explained, in some countries such as
Switzerland, the Netherlands or
­Brazil, KTA standards constituted the
licensing basis of plants built by
the German KWU (now Areva); but
even in other countries KTA standards
were acknowledged and generated
high interest, as he was able to
­demonstrate by using statistics of
downloads from the KTA website.
Looking at the future, he stated
that the standards as they are now
will continue to exist, although they
will gradually lose their function
of displaying the state of the art.
As the standards showed a high
­accomplishment, they will in the midterm
remain generally valid; they
could be, if necessary, complemented
by individual assessment, e.g. by
­comparison with updated international
guidance. However, the most
significant problem will be the availability
of equipment which fulfills
KTA requirements (KTA qualification);
or, seen from the perspective of
manufacturers: will there be suppliers
that are certified in accordance with
KTA 1401 in the future? Addressing
this problem, Elmar Wendenkampf
­developed the concept of Cross
­Qualification as a strategy to provide
­suitable equipment. In this concept, a
systematic comparison with other
standards is performed, identifying
identical requirements and those
­requirements which may be merged
or where, if necessary, a decision has
to be taken whether to follow one ­
or the other. Such a systematic comparison
may result in equipment
­available on the worldwide market to
be accepted for plants with KTA
­requirements, and vice versa, in opening
new market possibilities abroad
for German suppliers.
In the following discussion,
when asked about the importance
of con­vergence of codes and stand­ards
worldwide, Elmar Wendenkampf
­emphasised that this was of prime
­importance, especially given the
­concept of Cross Qualification he had
developed in his talk. Adressing the
next question whether KTA standards
were rather to be qualified as regulations
or as industry codes & standards,
he replied that the purpose of the KTA
Standards was to concretize safety
­requirements, but that safety requirements
could also be fulfilled by other
means. KTA Standards were therefore
not legally binding but in practice,
because of their generation process
and depth of detail, they were widely
regarded as such. Therefore they
could be considered indeed as something
in between regulations and
codes & standards.
The session closed with a panel
­discussion with the four speakers
and the audience. The chairman
­addressed the first question to Iuri
Iesypenko and recalled the typical
situation of newcomer countries as
narrated by him in his presentation,
with political leaders taking a quick
decision to implement a certain technology
and the regulator struggling
behind to build up competence. Might
this be detrimental to nuclear safety?
Iuri Iesypenko replied that certainly
newcomer regulators always started
with a lack of competence. Therefore
it did not really matter how big
­pressure from government was – initial
deficiencies were there anyway.
Construction of a nuclear power plant
was a huge business project with
­mutual and opposite financial and
other interests of counterparts. Safety
was not always a priority for all of
them. So the competent and strong
national regulator should be essential
part of this process. This was exactly
the reason why international support
is so crucial. Concerning Belarus, Iuri
Iesypenko expressed his view that the
Russian design as such is safe and
proven and that the safety of the NPP,
in this respect, could be guaranteed.
Joachim Specht basically agreed
but emphasised that safety is not only
about the reactor design and an
­effective regulator, but also about the
operating organisation which must
have the characteristics of an “intelligent
licensee” and must demonstrate
that it holds the design authority.
In this respect, the support and
­education services offered by an
­experienced operator such as PreussenElektra
could be a crucial asset. A
discussion ensued revolving around
the term “design authority”: whether
it needs to be assumed by the operator
or whether it can also rest with the
supplier, provided the operator has
contractual access to its services. As
Kjell Ringdahl reiterated, this was the
model used in the UAE with KEPCO.
The panel agreed that several options
are possible, provided that the design
authority can be demonstrated to the
regulatory body.
A member of the audience stated
that even in Germany, at the outset of
nuclear power development, the utilities
did not really have much knowledge
about the design. Therefore,
AMNT 2017
Focus Session: International Regulation ı Christian Raetzke