Draft ICAO Circular on NLA.pdf - Airports Council International

More documents

Recommendations

Info

-13- 3.4.1.2 The severity level of an incident/accident (“minor”, “major”, “hazardous” or “catastrophic”) may be deduced from its consequences (“Effect on aircraft and occupants”). 3.4.1.3 Careful consideration should be given by the relevant authorities to the classification of levels of risk. States should implement suitable risk assessment models. Examples of models are given in Appendix B. Advisory Material Joint-AMJ JAR 25.1309, containing material similar to US FAA Advisory <strong>Circular</strong> AC25.1309-1A (21 June 1988) defines “Catastrophic” as “Failure Conditions which would prevent Continued Safe Flight and Landing”. 3.4.1.4 Risk assessment models are commonly built on the principle that there should be an inverse relationship between the severity of an incident and its probability. The appropriate level of safety for each type of incident can be specified in either quantitative (identification of a numerical probability) or qualitative (comparison with an existing situation) terms. A quantitative risk assessment may be problematic and not always relevant. In some cases, a probabilistic approach is possible and numerical target levels of safety can be used. In other instances, a qualitative analysis is more relevant with — for instance — the objective of providing a level of safety equal or better than the one offered to a code E aeroplane on a code E-compliant infrastructure. 3.4.2 Risk assessment process 3.4.2.1 Once each undesirable event is identified and analysed in terms of causes and consequences, the main remaining question is: “Are all identified risks under control?.” The method for the evaluation of the level of risk is strongly dependent on the nature and mechanism of the hazards. Depending on the nature of the risk, three methods can be used to evaluate whether it is under control: a) Method type “A”: For certain hazards, risk assessment strongly depends on specific aeroplane performance and handling qualities. The safety level is dependent upon aeroplane performance, handling qualities and infrastructure characteristics. Risk assessment, then, could be based on the aeroplane design, certification, simulation results and accident analysis. b) Method type “B”: For other hazards, the aeroplane behaviour is not really linked with specific aeroplane performance and handling qualities, and can be calculated from existing aeroplane measurements. Risk assessment, then, could be based on statistics (e.g. deviations) from existing aeroplane operations or on accident analyses; development of generic quantitative risk models can be well adapted. c) Method type “C”: In this case, a “risk assessment study” is not needed : a simple geometric argument may be sufficient to calculate NLA infrastructure requirements, without waiting for certification results or using statistics from existing aeroplane operations. <strong>ICAO</strong> Version 4.1 — 15 March 2004
<strong>ICAO</strong> Version 4.1 — 15 March 2004 -14- 3.4.2.2 The understanding of the risks is the basis for the subsequent evaluation of alternative measures, operational procedures and operating restrictions needed to safely operate an NLA on existing infrastructure. 3.4.2.3 Where possible, the result of the risk assessment should be the establishment of alternative measures, operational procedures and operating restrictions to mitigate risks for the non-compliance of aerodrome facilities with <strong>ICAO</strong> code F requirements. These alternative measures, operational procedures and operating restrictions should be regarded as minimum conditions to achieve uniformity between similar operations at different airports. However, specific local conditions at an aerodrome may prohibit the provision or application of the minimum conditions. In this case additional control measures should be implemented in order to provide an acceptable level of safety. — — — — — — — —
Page 1 and 2: NLACircularVersion
Page 3 and 4: - iii - 4.1.4 Taxiway and shoulders
Page 5 and 6: - v - The Circular
Page 7 and 8: ICAO Version 4.1
Page 11 and 12: f) wake turbulence; g) selection of
Page 13 and 14: d) wake turbulence. ICAO</s
Page 17: ICAO Version 4.1
Page 57 and 58: Wing span Outer main gear wheel spa
Page 59 and 60: Landing gear geometry A380-800 ACN
Page 61 and 62: Maximum passenger and fuel carrying
Page 63 and 64: OFZ/runway width and other OPS/AIR
Page 69:
ICAO Version 4.1
show all

Draft ICAO Circular on NLA.pdf - Airports Council International

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?