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geant. In the 120th, the strength of one of the companies was down to 70 men. Losses since 7 July for the division had now reached 2,300, though replacements were beginning to come in and were to total 940 by the 14th. All these factors weighed very heavily on General Hobbs, and in addition, by '900 on '3 July, he was receiving information indicating a possible build-up for enemy counterattacks from the south. Finally, at 2II7, his mind was relieved by a telephone message from General Corlett: the 30th was to "take it easy" the next day, while the 35th tried again to pull up to the Pont-Hebert crossing. For the first time in a week, the 30th Division issued no attack orders. On '4 July, action was limited to a few minor moves to effect readjustment of lines. Firm contact was made on the ridge between the II9th and the "7th. On the THE PONT·HEBERT BRIDGE, in a sector bitterly defended against the attacks 0/ the 119th In/a11lry. The bridge had been wrecked, and our engineers built a new one. The survival of the church steeple ;s unusual, and is due probably to the fact that, lower than the hills along the river, the tower had little value as an OP.
Vire, the II9th at last pushed the enemy past the Pont-Hebert road and got definite control of the ruined bridge, just as the 35th Division (p. 86) fought up to it on the other bank. The right flank problem was partly solved by success of the 9th Division on 14 July. That unit, beyond the Terrette south of Ie Hommet-d'Arthenay, was pushed down toward the II7th's flank. The 120th Infantry, in reserve, was able to take its hattalions back for shower baths in the St-Jean-de-Daye area. But the respite would be short. The big attack of IS July was coming up, and the 30th Division staffs were working full time to ready their plans. Seventh Army had little to say about this sector of its strained lines, beyond recording defensive successes at Pont-Hebert, which it believed still held by German forces at the end of 14 July. Army's attention was focused farther west, on the American advance (9th Division) southwest and west of Ie Desert. First Army Progress, 11-14 July The hard battles of VIII Corps finally produced their fruits in this period. (See Map VII.) As the three attacking divisions broke past the rough Ia Haye-du-Puits-Mont-Castre hills, where they had cracked the enemy's MLR, they found resistance less and less tenacious. On 14 July, VIII Corps came up to the line of the A y River; it had reached the initial objectives prescribed in its attack order, a gain of 12,000 yards in 12 days of battle. But the corps was still far short of its assigned ultimate objectives when orders from First Army stopped the attack at the positions then reached. In the VII Corps zone, the 4th and 83d Divisions continued to shoulder along tl,e Carentan Poriers highway, more and more aided by the pressure exerted from the east by the 9th Division. On 13 July, that unit drove nearly to the important crossroads at les Champs-de-Losque. By IS July, as a result of the hardest kind of fighting, the 4th and 83d were on a line just north of Raids and held the Sainteny hills which had been their 9 1 mam obstacle. But ahead of them the enemy still held strong defensive positions, and had shown no signs of making a voluntary withdrawal. The cost to VII Corps of getting some six square miles of ground along its peninsula had been high. From 9 to 16 July, the corps lost 4,800 men; by IS July the three regiments of the 4th Division had suffered 2,300 casualties, including three battalion commanders and nine rifle company commanders. First Army now called a halt to the offensive west of the Taute, holding VlII and VII Corps (except for the 9th Division) at the positions reached on 14-15 July. Definite plans for a major breakthrough operation (COBRA) were being made, the outline plan reaming First Army on 13 July. The offensive now under way was to continue, but would aim at more modest objectives which would give suitable jump-off positions for COBRA. The primary goal became the ground along the St-L8-Periers highway in front of the 9th and 30th Divisions. At the end of IS July, the 30th Division was to come under VII Corps in order to coordinate the continuing offensive toward this area. During the 12 days from 4 to IS July, ammunition expenditure was greater than at any other period during the first two months of First Army's campaign. This occurred during a period when control was being exercised and unrestricted firing was not permitted, when units were limited to one unit of fire for attack, one-half unit for each subsequent day of attack, and one-third for a "normal" day. But deeper and wider concentrations of fire than was ordinary had to be employed in hedgerow country to compensate for lack of observation. Stocks became low in certain types, particularly 105-mm howitzer, and strict rationing was established to restore the stocks for tl,e coming operations. Fortunately, the port of Cherbourg, although thoroughly mined and demolished by the Germans, had been rapidly cleared for use. The first supplies from it began to trickle south on IS July. Cherbourg was to prove an essential aid, in the next weeks, to the
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ST-LO (7 July -19 July 1944) Americ
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WAR DEPARTMENT Historical Division
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THE JULY OFFENSIVE ST-LO, capital o
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eluded the Viro River and aimed at
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Near! y 15 miles wide at the start,
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XIX CORPS ATTACKS WEST OF THE VIRE
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units and to close quickly with the
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ASSAULT CROSSING SITE on the Vire R
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ing into Normandy in mid-June, the
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12th Paracl!t/te Regime1lt. Germall
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off, the 1St Battalion following at
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3 0
Page 45:
while the 3d Battalion was hit by a
Page 51 and 52: of the 3d Battalion were ambushed a
Page 53: 1(1 Oeser! MAPNO.8 @JORCn •
Page 57: yond the Mont-Castre hills, one of
Page 66: FIXING DHIOLITIONS to blow a gap th
Page 70 and 71: corners, and spray the lateral hedg
Page 72: attack with two battalions in colum
Page 76: The 2d Platoon of Company A attempt
Page 80 and 81: Army to give it the 14/h Parachute
Page 85: Atter hard fighting, the 2d Battali
Page 89 and 90: On 13 July the claim was made that
Page 91 and 92: 35TH DIVISION, 12-14 JULY "'" MAP N
Page 93: pressed, they could retire easily t
Page 97: from the high ground across both st
Page 102: supply problem. But the main ports
Page 107: mingled, and artillery fire was har
Page 110: to enemy movement or maneuver, Gene
Page 115: the battalion that night and return
Page 118 and 119: penetration. General Gerhardt did n
Page 120: manding the 3d Battalion, was given
Page 123 and 124: the regiment was finally ordered to
Page 126 and 127: further was launched. The attack wa
Page 128 and 129: have the honor to announce to the C
Page 130: The I13th Cavalry Group, in corps r
Page 133 and 134: clinging to the idea of mailltamtll
Page 135 and 136: CONCLUSION A GENERAL OFFICER WRITES
Page 137 and 138: of them could be withdrawn from the
Page 140 and 141: ., Hay.-du.PuifS L8$$01 I X FIRST X
Page 142: -1 ....... --- Gr(lll/".$ (11'1' 38
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