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Atter hard fighting, the 2d Battalion of the<br />

1I6th w<strong>as</strong> able to get p<strong>as</strong>t Point 147 on the Martinville<br />

Ridge. The 1st Battalion (Maj. Thom<strong>as</strong><br />

S. Dall<strong>as</strong>) fought into the draw south of 147, then<br />

became involved in a series of small battles in the<br />

hedgerows along the stream. The Germans<br />

counterattacked with three enemy tanks and two<br />

self-propelled 88's which moved along the draw<br />

bl<strong>as</strong>ting at the fields. Major Dall<strong>as</strong>' men countered<br />

with bazook<strong>as</strong> and brought in supporting<br />

artillery fire, knocking out two German tanks.<br />

But the 88-mm guns were elusive; the crews<br />

changed positions constantly, and their heavy fire<br />

caused many c<strong>as</strong>ualties. By the end of the morning<br />

the 1st Battalion w<strong>as</strong> <strong>as</strong>tride the draw just e<strong>as</strong>t<br />

of la Boulaye, but it made no further progress.<br />

<strong>To</strong> its left rear, the 3d Battalion fought all day to<br />

secure the ridgeline south of the highway, and<br />

had not entirely succeeded in this by night. Some<br />

of its difficulties, and many of its c<strong>as</strong>ualties, came<br />

<strong>as</strong> a result of intense artillery and mortar fire,<br />

made accurate by observation from the German<br />

positions on the 101 Ridge to the south, paralleling<br />

the St-LO highway.<br />

As for the I75th Infantry, that unit never got<br />

in position to start its attack, ordered to jump off<br />

at II30. The problem of p<strong>as</strong>sing through other<br />

units to reach a line of departure, always difficult<br />

to manage, w<strong>as</strong> complicated by the fact that the<br />

rr6th units were so fully engaged along the route<br />

of approach. The 3d Battalion of the I75th, trying<br />

to move west on the highway, w<strong>as</strong> unable to<br />

get through the 3d Battalion, rr6th and stopped<br />

to lend it aid in attacking south to clear the ridge.<br />

Only late in the day, too late to attack, the 3d of<br />

the I75th came up behind the left of the 1st Battalion,<br />

rr6th. At 1600, Brig. Gen. Norman D.<br />

Cota, Col. Ollie W. Reed, and Col. Charles D. W.<br />

Canham agreed on a scheme for using Colonel<br />

Reed's other battalion, the 2d. This w<strong>as</strong> moved<br />

along the Martinville Ridge, behind Major Bingham,<br />

with the plan of striking southwest through<br />

la Boulaye. Here, again, the attack could not<br />

get started. Both battalions of the I75th suffered<br />

from enemy artillery and mortars.<br />

In addition to mix-ups that came from intermingling<br />

of units, t<strong>here</strong> were difficulties of communications.<br />

The attacking battalions were' not<br />

sure of positions of neighboring units, or were<br />

misled by erroneous reports such <strong>as</strong> the announcement<br />

in the morning that the 1st Battalion, rr6th<br />

had reached the e<strong>as</strong>tern edge of its objective area<br />

(that is, near la Madeleine). Artillery fires were<br />

hard to arrange under these circumstances. Perhaps<br />

the most annoying accident of the day befell<br />

tanks of the 747th Tank Battalion, supporting the<br />

rr6th Infantry. The Germans monitored all traffic<br />

over the network of the American tanks, and<br />

during the afternoon, cut in with an order in<br />

very good English to "report to the Regimental<br />

CP." The tanks took this order <strong>as</strong> valid and had<br />

started back for the rr6th CP when Lt. Col.<br />

Stuart G. Fries headed them off and sent them<br />

back. The time lost contributed to the delays of<br />

the infantry.<br />

The attack on the division right made some<br />

progress, though the rr5th Infantry's efforts again<br />

met heavy enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion<br />

secured Belle-Fontaine, and the 3d reached la<br />

Luzerne. But the 2d Battalion, fighting on the<br />

west of the St-Lb-Isigny highway, ended the day<br />

without advance. Twice during the day it attacked<br />

across the stream at Bourg-d 'Enfer and<br />

each time enemy artillery, mortar, and small-arms<br />

fire drove it back. When an enemy counterattack<br />

caused a platoon on the left to break, a rumor of<br />

withdrawal spread, and other platoons pulled<br />

out. This withdrawal w<strong>as</strong> completely stopped<br />

and all men were ordered to reoccupy their own<br />

fox holes on the line of departure. Here the battalion<br />

w<strong>as</strong> ordered by Colonel Ordway to reorganize<br />

and prepare to resume the attack. However,<br />

General Gerhardt decided against a resumption<br />

of the attack by this battalion. With la Luzerne<br />

captured by the 3d Battalion, the 1st Battalion<br />

went into a reserve position on the center of the<br />

now more narrow regimental front.<br />

For the 13th of July, General Gerhardt planned<br />

to put his main effort along the Bayeux- St-L8<br />

highway, to be delivered by the I75th Infantry.

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