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slowly by hand. Our own artillery was asked for
fires, including white phosphorus, along the enemy
ridge, but had little success in reducing the
German fire. Colonel Reed requested pennission
of General Gerhardt to use his 1st Battalion
in attack south, toward Hill 101, hoping to protect
the flank of his main attack. This request
was denied since Corps was unwilling to have this
last reserve committed. General Cota went down
in the morning to help out, and reported back
that, among other difficulties, "all of the I75th's
communications just got shot to hell." He got
permission from General Gerhardt to commit the
2d Battalion, n6th in an effort along the Martinville
Ridge, hoping this would relieve enemy pressure
on the I75th. But this attack was stiffiy opposed
and made only minor gains. Finally, late
in the day, the 2d Battalion of the I75th attempted
to swing south on the left of the 3d, widening the
front of attack. This netted only 100 yards, and
brought the day to a close.
That night, since XIX Corps proposed to halt
the attack for a day, dispositions were made to
regroup. The I75th Infantry took over the whole
zone along the highway ridge, relieving the 3d
and 1st Battalions of the n6th. The 1st Battalion,
II6th Infantry, holding positions north of the
highway ahreast of the proposed LD for the
'75th's attack, had suffered throughout tlle day
from mortar and artillery fire. When the relief
took place, the area was under such fire that the
movement had to he accomplished hy sending in
four or five soldiers at a time. Under cover of
darkness the 1st Battalion moved up on the Martinville
Ridge to take that position over from the
2d Battalion. The 2d was withdrawn for a hrief
rest to an assembly area near St-Andre-de-I'Epine.
Here, on 14 July, it received 125 replacements
which raised it to 60 percent strength.
The fighting on the division right during 13-14
July found the II5th Infantry attacking southwest
from Ia Luzerne; its objective was the southern
edge of the hills, along the St-Li'r-Isigny road, less
than two miles nortlleast of St-La. The 3d Battalion,
making the main effort, was stopped after
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a slight advance by enemy resistance centered in
an orchard east of the highway. Automatic
weapons, entrenched among crooked apple trees
and hidden by matted foliage which hung to
within three feet of the ground, held up the attack
until the 1st Battalion was committed on the
west of the road and advanced to a point even
with the orchard. Only late in the day was the
orchard strongpoint finally cleared.
By Field Order 6 on 13 July, XIX Corps had directed
a change in divisional zones which would
shorten the front of the 29th Division. Preparations
to relieve the n5th Infantry in part of its sector
were made on the night of 13 July by the 35th Division.
The I34th Infantry, released from corps reserve,
was moved into the left of the 35th Division
front. The new houndary extended the 35th Division
line to the St-Li'r-Isigny highway. By 1000 on
14 July, the. 1st and 2d Battalions, II5th Infantry
had been relieved and moved east of the highway
to the vicinity of Ia Fossardiere. The 3d Battalion
held its position near the highway, in contact with
the enemy below Ia Luzerne.
On 14 July, neither American nor German forces
attempted large-scale action along the 29th Division's
front. So bad was the weather, according to
the Germans, that "it was possible to relieve units
during daylight." The enemy confined his operations
to the improvement of defensive positions,
while the 29th Division readied itself for a part in
General Corlett's "Sunday punch," a powerful and
coordinated corps attack ordered for 15 July.
Sevellth Army recorded defemive St