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miles wide and badly needed more room. According to first plans, when the 90th Division (of VIII Corps) and the 83d Division, advancing on either side of the Prairies Man:cageuses, had reached Gorges to the west of the swamps and 5ainteny to the east, the 4th Division was to attack through them toward Periers, followed by the 3d Armored and 9th Divisions. But the enemy had organized the neck of dry land leading to Periers in great depth and was ready for his strongest defensive effort in VII Corps' zone. The 83d Division lost 300 men during the first day of attack and made only slight gains then and the next day. On 6 July, General Collins threw in the 4th Division, on a front mainly west of the Carentan Periers highway. A sao-yard advance brought the 4th Division up to the first of three enemy MLR's along the isthmus. Three days of heavy fighting had netted little more than 2,000 yards down the Carentan-Periers road. On 7 July, XIX Corps opened its battle, with initial effort west of the Vireo The ultimate goal in this corps zone was the high ground east and west of 5t-La. XIX Corps' Problem The immediate area of 5t-La had limited tactical importance; that city, with a peacetime population of about II,OOO, stands on low ground near a loop of the Vire River, ringed by hills. Its military significance derived from being a hub of main arteries that lead in every direction. From the north come highways connecting it with Carentan and Isigny; eastward, roads suitable for heavy traffic lead toward Caumont and Bayeux; to the west runs a road to Periers and Lessay that constituted the principal lateral behind the German west wing; southwest is the Coutances highway. (5ee Map 111.) Holding 5t-La, the enemy had good connections near his front lines for shifting forces east or west of the Vireo To deny the Germans this advantage would be one gain in capture of the city. Much more important for First Army's larger aims was the prospect of capturing the hills that commanded the Vire Valley on both sides of 5t-La. If XIX Corps could win the objective set, along the line 5t-Gilles-5t-L&-Berigny, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley would have terrain essential to an offensive such as the Allied high command was already planning. The ground west of 5t-La could be used for jump-off on attack into country where tanks could operate and tactical maneuver would be favored. But the terrain near 5t-La on the east was also suitable for mounting an attack, and this fact would both help First Army and embarrass the German command. If XIX Corps could get astride the Vire at 5t-La, thus threatening a drive either southeast toward Vire or southwest toward Coutances, this would increase the enemy's problem in disposing limited forces to guard against a breakthrough. The importance of the 5t-La area to the Germans is shown by the desperate defense they offered in June and were to repeat in July. GROUP OF COMMANDERS who played a part in the fuly offensive: Icft, Gen. Lelal1d S. Hobbs, 30th Division; center, Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, Deputy Commander of First Army; J'ight, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corleu, commanding the XIX Corps.
Near! y 15 miles wide at the start, XIX Corps' zone ran north to south, straddling the winding Vire River. Though relatively small (40 to 60 feet wide), this deep and swift stream constituted a considerable military obstacle. It had three main crossings north of St-Lo, at Pont-Hebert, Aire, and Isigny (Auville-sur-Ie-Vey); only the northernmost was in American hands on 7 July. For tactical purposes, the Vire split the corps zone into two subzones, each presenting different problems in the attack. The westernmost of these subzones lay between the Vire and the minor streams that come together to form the Taute River. The Taute is a sluggish creek that flows for miles in broad and swampy lowlands, cut up by drainage ditches and crossed by only one main highway, the road from Ie Port to Tribehou. South of that crossing, the Taute headwaters fan out in a number of tributary streams that dissect a broad area into little islands of dry ground. In wet seasons the Taute lowlands, almost as far south as the Ferier-St-Lo highway, are unsuitable for maneuver and nearly impassable for ground forces except in restricted zones. As a result of the barrier thus presented, XIX Corps' zone of attack west of the Vire would at first be definitely separated from the action of VII Corps and would be forced to follow the axis of the watershed between the Vire and Taute stream systems. This restriction, limiting all but local maneuver and flanking efforts, would assist the enemy defense. That defense rested 7 Jul y on the Vire-Taute Canal, running southeast from Carentan to join the Vire near the crossing at Aire. Behind the canal, the ground rises gently to a height of 120 feet above the river valleys at St-Jean-de-Daye. South of this litde village, along the line of the highway to St-Lo, there are no pronounced terrain features for several miles. Small, irregular dips and swells blur the line of the watershed and add to the difficulties of observation in rypical hedgerow country, with few villages and only occasional scattered farms. A road net ample for rural purposes, and ranging from "improved" 6 second- and third·class roads to sunken lanes and farm tracks, sprawls over the area. The roads of greatest military value were two: the north-saudI highway via Pont-Hebert to St-Lo, and the eastwest route from Aire toward Ie Desert. Near Pont-Hebert the general level rises above the 150-foot contour, and the axis of XIX Corps' attack would lead into more definitely hilly country. The Vire River, south of dlis crossing, loses its flood plain and is squeezed into a narrow corridor between steepening bluffs. Hauts-Vents, a crossroads hamlet, stands at an elevation of nearly 300 feet (Hill 91), enough to give it commanding observation over the plains west and toward Carentan. South of Hauts-Vents, the attack west of the Vire would necessarily follow a narrow ridge line toward St-Gilles, between dIe Vire and the small Terrette River, tributary of the Taute. Once near the St-L&-Periers highway, tactical contact with Vil Corps would no longer be interfered with by the marshy lowlands of the Taute plains. On the right bank of the Vire, XIX Corps faced rather different country, except for the common factor of hedgerows. The first surge of V Corps from the initial beachhead in June had carried the First Army line into hills that constitute the strongest defenses of St-Lo on the east. To the northeast of St-Lo, the 29th Division was on dlese hills and only three miles away from the town. But due east of it, the Germans still held the highest ground, including Hill 192, about 300 feet higher than the surrounding area and affording the best observation post in the whole St-Lo sector. As the map shows (Map III), at dIe start of the action the left wing of XIX Corps extended south in a considerable salient, flanked by the Vire River. West of that water barrier, the right wing of the corps was on a general line some ten miles farther from the objective area. Maj. Gen. Charles H . Corlett, commanding XIX Corps, aimed his first blow west of the Vire, to gain ground which would bring that wing up on line. Advance here would support dIe attack of VII Corps to the west, cover the flank of his own units on the right bank
Page 2 and 3: ST-LO (7 July -19 July 1944) Americ
Page 5: WAR DEPARTMENT Historical Division
Page 10 and 11: THE JULY OFFENSIVE ST-LO, capital o
Page 12: eluded the Viro River and aimed at
Page 18 and 19: XIX CORPS ATTACKS WEST OF THE VIRE
Page 20 and 21: units and to close quickly with the
Page 22 and 23: ASSAULT CROSSING SITE on the Vire R
Page 26: ing into Normandy in mid-June, the
Page 34: 12th Paracl!t/te Regime1lt. Germall
Page 37 and 38: off, the 1St Battalion following at
Page 39: 3 0
Page 45: while the 3d Battalion was hit by a
Page 51 and 52: of the 3d Battalion were ambushed a
Page 53: 1(1 Oeser! MAPNO.8 @JORCn •
Page 57: yond the Mont-Castre hills, one of
Page 66:
FIXING DHIOLITIONS to blow a gap th
Page 70 and 71:
corners, and spray the lateral hedg
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attack with two battalions in colum
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The 2d Platoon of Company A attempt
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Army to give it the 14/h Parachute
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Atter hard fighting, the 2d Battali
Page 89 and 90:
On 13 July the claim was made that
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35TH DIVISION, 12-14 JULY "'" MAP N
Page 93:
pressed, they could retire easily t
Page 97:
from the high ground across both st
Page 100 and 101:
geant. In the 120th, the strength o
Page 102:
supply problem. But the main ports
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mingled, and artillery fire was har
Page 110:
to enemy movement or maneuver, Gene
Page 115:
the battalion that night and return
Page 118 and 119:
penetration. General Gerhardt did n
Page 120:
manding the 3d Battalion, was given
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the regiment was finally ordered to
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further was launched. The attack wa
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have the honor to announce to the C
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The I13th Cavalry Group, in corps r
Page 133 and 134:
clinging to the idea of mailltamtll
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CONCLUSION A GENERAL OFFICER WRITES
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of them could be withdrawn from the
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., Hay.-du.PuifS L8$$01 I X FIRST X
Page 142:
-1 ....... --- Gr(lll/".$ (11'1' 38
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