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corners, and spray the lateral hedgerow ahead to
cover the infantry scouts advancing (in this case)
along the axial hedges. These scouts would also
be covered by BAR men. Two of the four demolitions
men followed behind, and the engineers
and the leader of the infantry squad would
choose the best place for the tank to go through
the next barrier. Special EE-8 phones were installed
on the rear of the tanks and connected
with the tank's interphone system for tank-infantry
communication during action. Two engineers
would stay with the vehicle to protect it
during advance, scanning and firing at side hedgerows
to keep down enemy bazooka teams. In
the area close to the line of departure, hedgerow
embankments were carefully scooped out on the
American side, leaving a shell which the tanks
could push through on the day of attack.
The terrain difficulties to be expected in the
coming battle were essentially those normal to
hedgerow fighting; Hill 192, as a "hill," presented
no special problems other than the enemy's opportunity
for observation from the higher ground.
The slopes were gradual, rising about 150 feet in
the 1,000 yards from the 38th Infantry's line of
departure to the flattish top. A large diamondshaped
woods lay on the southeast side, near the
crest, and might be expected to figure prominently
in the enemy's defensive plans. But the
main advantages for the German defense lay in
the ordinary dissection of the hill slopes and their
approaches by an intricate pattern of hedgerowed
fields and orchards. (For an example of this on
the eastern slopes, see Map 11.)
The enemy had not been neglecting his opportunity
for organizing this terrain. As usual, he
VlEW NORTH FROM HILL '92, over the ground which had
to be covered by the American attack on II July. The picture is
taken from a field 200 yards trom the crest. The 1St Battalion
of the 38th Infantry came through this ground in the successful attack.