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FIXING DHIOLITIONS to blow a gap through the
hedgerow. Soldiers 0/ the 12/S1 Engineer Combat Bat·
la/ion, who took part in the 29th Division drive, have
loaded the holes made by tank prongs.
and must rely on the fire power of tanks and
infantry for protection.
The test of plans and training came in the attack
of II July. In the first few hours, things moved
very slowly, and the situation looked unpromising.
The effects of the heavy concentrations of artillery,
preceding the jump-off, seemed to be minimized
by the hedgerows; at any rate, the 2d Battalion
encountered immediate and determined resistance
&om the prepared enemy positions along the first
hedgerows. Mine fields and booby traps were encountered,
and flanking fires came from 5t-Andrede-l'Epine
and the Martinville Ridge. The attacking
troops experienced the old difficulty of spotting
the exact source of enemy fire. It was only after
severe fighting that the 2d Battalion got past the
first main obstacle, a sunken road heavily protected
with antipersonnel mines. But once beyond this,
the assault troops began to find grim evidence of
the work of American artillery in the large number
57
of enemy dead and wounded scattered through
the next few fields. This, as an observer noted,
was an unusual sight, because the Germans ordinarily
evacuated casualties before they were
reached by our advance.
The 2d Battalion kept the pressure on. By, '00,
with heavy support from artillery and effective use
of the methods for getting tanks through embankments,
the battalion was six hedgerows beyond the
LD. The engineers of Company B, I2ISt Engineer
Combat Battalion were helping the infantry
through mines, and the 4.2 mortars of the 92d
Chemical Mortar Battalion were holding down
the German fire from the Martinville Ridge (Hill
'47). A German self-propelled gun on the northsouth
highway had lost a duel with our tanks and
was left behind, wrecked.
Only 600 yards had been gained, but enemy resistance
suddenly eased, then cracked. Major
Bingham's troops now made rapid progress until
they reached the junction of the ridge road leading
west toward Martinville. Here the battalion
wheeled right, on a !)O-degree change in direction
of attack. The enemy was still hanging on, southward,
and the exposure of the battalion's left flank
during the turn made for rough going. Nevertheless,
the troops were able to push forward astride
the ridge road.
50 far, the attack had made excellent progress.
The infantry later gave much credit to the work
of supporting tanks, which had speeded the advance.
As always, the tanks had drawn enemy
artillery fire, but their use of prongs to break
through embankments had saved much time as
compared to the sole use of demolitions. The
II6th was also greatly aided by the fact that its
axis of attack lay along an enemy boundary between
units, the II and III Battalions of the 9th
Parachute Regiment, where the defensive positions
were not well consolidated.
During the afternoon General Gerhardt took
steps to enlarge the attack and get through as far
as possible in exploitation of the success. Given a
company of tanks in support, the 3d Battalion of
the II6th, at '300, was on its way to follow up the